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Some Aspects of the Colonial Administration in Ceylon, 1855-65
This work belongs to the genus of studies in British Imperial
history. It attempts to illustrate the way in which the colonial
system of administration functioned, by looking at the case of one
Crown Colony, Ceylon, in a ten-year period in the mid-nineteenth cen¬
tury. Initially, a study is made of the main participants in deci¬
sion making, the Colonial Office, the Governor, the Legislative Coun¬
cil and the principal pressure group in the island, the Planters'
Association. Two particular problems, the railway and the military
expenditure question are then examined to illustrate the various view¬
points of these agencies. Although these studies have their own
intrinsic interest, they are used mainly to show the interaction of
the varying levels of government. Lastly, some tentative conclusions
are put forward concerning the nature of British colonial administra¬
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Notes on Abbreviations and Spelling
The abbreviations used are as follows:
BPP British Parliamentary Papers
CHBE Cambridge History of the British Empire volume
PA Proceedings Planters* Association Proceedings
I have tried to adopt the spelling used by contemporaries through¬
out and the names of places in Ceylon are reproduced as they were spelt
in the document in which they were mentioned. To avoid confusion, the
planter Henry C. Bird is referred to as such throughout, despite the
fact that he changed the spelling of his surname to Byrde in the early
1860s.
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The post of Governor of the island of Ceylon was a key one in
the British Empire and was the pivot around which the administrative,
1
political and social life of the colony revolved. The holder of
the office possessed immense prestige within the colony as the repre¬
sentative of the Imperial Government in the colony and he was the
channel through which the desires and views of the Colonial Office
and the colonial population were transmitted.
2
Although accused by some of wielding autocratic powers, there
were limits on the Governor's freedom of action, even if they were
3
rarely shown to be stringent. He was strictly bound to consult the
Executive Council on all matters and, whilst not obliged to accept
the advice proferred, he had to have a convincing defence to forward
to the Colonial Office if he acted without support. On occasions
of crisis, he was permitted to act without the prior consent of the
Executive Council, but he was bound to offer an explanation of his
conduct to its members at the earliest opportunity. Until 1860, the
Governor controlled the subjects for debate in the Legislative
*The importance of the post is indicated by the £7,000 per annum
salary paid to the Governor of Ceylon. Only the Governors of
Victoria and New South Wales and the Captain General and Governor in
Chief of Canada were more highly paid, BPP Xiy 1860, p. 123.
2
One such critic wrote, 'The Governor, however, concentrates in his
own person all the power of the State, without either restraint or
responsibility. He is the dispenser of place, patronage and promo¬
tion; and has the virtual disposal of the Revenue. Every indivi¬
dual and every public body in the country, must depend for the bene¬
fits they may desire, or for the redress they may seek, on the will
and pleasure of the Governor.• Speculum, Ceylon; Her Present
Condition, letter 19 ^ 11
3A good summary of the powers of the Governor can be found in Lennox
Mills, Ceylon Under the British,pp. 99»- lio.
5
4
Council and his approval was required before legislation passed by
the Legislative Council was forwarded to London to receive the Royal
5
Assent.
As head of the Civil Service in the colony, the Governor wielded
power over the subsequent career of his officials. Although his
powers of patronage in the colony were restricted to the lower eche¬
lons, his reports formed the basis upon which officials were judged
by the Colonial Office staff.^
The relationship between the Governor and his superior, the
Secretary of State, was a complex one. In his book on Russell's
administration, Earl Grey provided a very pertinent description of
the situation as he saw it.
In proportion as Governors are more independent of any
local control, it becomes necessary that some should be
exercised over them from home; and in these Colonies
where they are unchecked by any kind of representative
institutions it is the duty of the Secretary of State
to maintain a vigilant superintendence over their pro¬
ceedings. Although he ought, as I conceive, to abstain
from any meddling interference in the details of their
administration, and to support their authority so long
as they appear to deserve his confidence - and rather to
advise their recall when they cease to do so than to
fetter their discretion by detailed instructions - he is
Ward's original proposal that unofficial members should be allowed
to put forward Bills, escaped Colonial Office attention for one
reason or another, and officials were consequently somewhat sur¬
prised when the change was announced. C054/346/86 24 October 1859.
The change was incorporated in the Instructions to MacCarthy
0)381/27 28 August 1860.
5
The fact that the Governor's assent was needed before an Ordinance
could be forwarded to London was the subject of complaint in 1861.
With unity rarely seen, the unofficials objected to clause 64 of the
Rules and Orders of the Council, but in a vote on 14 August they
were defeated by nine votes to six. COS7/29.
6
For an example of a Governor's report on mesbers of the civil ser¬
vice, see C054/374/Confidential 15 January 1863.
6
yet bound to attend to complaints which may be made
against their measures, and to prescribe for their
guidance the general line of policy to be pursued.^
The railway question of 1855-6 was an issue over which the Secretary
of State sought to abstain from interference, yet maintained an over¬
all surveillance. The Governor was, therefore, able to enjoy a
decisive role in the project and the staff of the Colonial Office
interfered only to impose certain guidelines. In very few cases
during this period did the Colonial Office staff categorically dic¬
tate policyi one of the few exceptions was over the military expen¬
diture question when the Colonial Office itself was under strong
pressure from the War Office and the Treasury, as well as from
Parliament,
This policy was largely inevitable because of the great dis¬
tance between London and the colony, which meant that staff in the
Colonial Office were constantly some six weeks in arrears with
happenings in the colony. Nor was there available in London the
staff or the detailed knowledge to interfere in the affairs of the
island. As a result of this, a marked reluctance is often seen in
the middle years of the century to ignore the recommendations of a
Governor. Grey, for example, was far more favourably disposed
towards the constitutional changes suggested by George Ackland in
8
1848 than was Governor Torrington. Yet Grey minuted that he did
7
Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administra¬
tion, vol. 1, pp. 21-2.
*kckland was a partner in the Colombo firm of Ackland, Boyd and Com¬
pany and was a member of the Legislative Council in 1848. He wrote
two letters to the Governor, the first dealing with Ordinances which
had recently been passed by the Council despite the opposition of
not think 'it would be convenient actually to adopt the changes he
9
(Adcland) recor®ends contrary to the decided opinion of the Governor.'
One of the Governor's most important functions was that of inter¬
mediary between the Colonial Office functionaries in London and the
important groups of colonists in the island. His was the task of
listening to, and assessing the strength of the views expressed by the
sain classes, the merchants and planters, and of ensuring that other
indigenous groups who did not put forward their views, were neverthe¬
less considered. Here the Governor's own knowledge of the island and
his relationship with the leaders of these groups could be very impor¬
tant and could influence the reports which were relayed to the Colonial
Office. Similarly, if instructions were issued from London which were
likely to prove unpalatable to a section of the community, the person¬
ality of the Governor and his method of presentation could be crucial
in reducing tension. The character of the Governor was of immense
importance. The arrival of a Governor with strong preconceptions,
such as the deeply evangelical Stewart Mackenzie, threatened reper¬
cussions immediately.*0 In the same way, a man such as Sir George
the unofficial members. The second letter concerned the actual
composition of the Council. Ackland suggested that a further three
unofficials should be appointed so as to equalise the numbers of
officials and unofficials, and he also advanced the view that the
Governor should not play such a major role in the proceedings of the
Council. The letters were forwarded to the Colonial Office by
Torrington, and Grey wrote that he did not find the suggestions un¬
worthy of consideration. See CC54/247/S3 3 March 1848,
9
Torrington dissented from the contents of the letters in his cover¬
ing despatch. Ibid.
*°J.A. Stewart Mackenzie was Governor of Ceylon from 1837-41 and
achieved a measure of notoriety because of his campaign to dissociate
the government from Buddhism.
8
Anderson^who had spent the majority of his colonial career in India
might be expected to find the adjustment to an ostensibly similar but
fundamentally different system of government difficult.** However
much views on the importance of personality in history may have
changed over the last century, it is difficult to avoid the conclu¬
sion that in the colonial context the character of the man on the
spot, whether a Rhodes, a Gordon or a lesser known administrator,
could be of immense importance. A Governor's attitude, beliefs and
background could play a significant part in his decisions and his
tact or lack of it, in his dealings with leading colonists, could
facilitate or greatly complicate the workings of the colonial govern¬
ment machine. The two men who governed Ceylon during the years from
185S-65 were Sir Henry Ward and Sir Charles MacCartny, and the lives
of these men prior to their arrival in the island will now be con¬
sidered.
Sir Henry Ward
Sir Henry Ward came from a literary background. He was the son
of Robert Plumer Ward who had achieved a degree of fame as the author
of Tremaine, possibly the first society novel and the model on which
Disraeli is thought to have based Vivian Grey. Sir Henry's wife was
the aunt of Algernon Swinburne and he himself was the author of the
standard contemporary work on Mexico. Ke was a more flambuoyant
character than his successor. Sir Charles MacCarthy, and is said by
**Sir George Anderson was Governor from 1850-5. He had joined the
service of the Bombay government in 1S03 at the age of seventeen, and
apart from sixteen months as Governor of Mauritius, the whole of his
career, prior to his arrival in Ceylon, had been spent in India.
s
J.R. Weinman to have 'lived and spent like a Russian Grand Duke before
the Revolution* and to have spent his way through two fortunes by the
12
time of his arrival in Ceylon. Whether or not these tales of pre¬
vious extravagance are true, what is certain is that the new Governor
caused some surprise in Ceylon by journeying straight to Colombo from
Corfu, the scene of his previous post, without first returning to
London. Be may merely have been anxious to assume his new responsi¬
bilities but there were rumours which propounded an alternative theory,
as MacCarthv recorded^ *I believe the truth is that he got very much
entangled in Railway-matters some years ago, and that it is more oon-
13
venient for him not to show in England.*
ward had enjoyed a most successful parliamentary and diplomatic
career. Born in 1797 and educated at Harrow, he was appointed to the
Diplomatic Service as attache to the British Minister in Stockholm and
at the age of twenty-six became British Ambassador to Mexico. He
held this post for only four yearn, before retiring from the Service
in favour of domestic polities. He sat in the Commons, first as the
Meatier for St Albans and later for Sheffield, and made a considerable
name for himself as a radical young Liberal. Concerned with the
state of contemporary British society, he attributed the rise of work¬
ing class pressures such as Chartism, neither to bad government nor
bad laws but to the economic condition of society which denied employ¬
ment to so many. His solution was the Wakefieldian one, which en¬
visaged the use of the colonies for the relief of domestic problems.
12
H.A.J. Hulugalle, British Governors of Ceylon, p. 89.
13
MacCarthy to Milnes, 29 April 1855, letter 221.
The tin® spent in the Commons, apart from bringing him the Under-
Secretaryship of the Admiralty in 1846, gave ward many useful contactsj
Henry Labouchere, Edward Bulwyer Lytten, and of course William Moles-
worth, wore all close associates and all were later to become Secre¬
taries of State for the Colonies. Under the former two Ward was
later to serve in Ceylon.
Ward* s membership of the Commons lasted until 1849 when he retired
from politics. He was offered, and accepted, the post of seventh Lord
Hiqh Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. These islands had first come
under British sovereignty in the early part of the century when Britain
was appointed the protecting power by the Congress of Vienna. At that
time, Corfu was considered to possess a strategic importance similar to
Gibraltar and Malta, and although the islands enjoyed a nominal inde¬
pendence, Britain soon established a virtual dictatorship there. Ward*
immediate predecessor had been Lord Seaton, a staunch Conservative peer,
who had panicked after the 1848 revolution in France and made sweeping
constitutional chances immediately prior to his own departure from the
island. The more liberal Ward was therefore faced with a situation in
which many of his ideas had been put into practice in far from auspi¬
cious circumstances. 'Even the reformed English Parliament,* one
writer commented, 'had refused to introduce the vote by ballot, or
very extended suffrage. Yet, a community of half civilised Greeks
was, as it were in a moment, criver privileges which were considered
too dangerous even for the enlightened inhabitants of Great Britain.* *
It was clear that the AescBfcly considered the changes merely as
14
C.r7.H. Fitzmav.rice, Four Years in the Ionian Islands, ed. Viscount
Kirkwall, vol. 1, p. 187.
stepping stones, and Ward was forced to prorogue. He toured the
islands in an attempt to avert the outbreak of new disturbances, but
he erred dramatically in proclaiming amnesty for those still in gaol
after the disturbances of 1848. This concession was interpreted as a
sign of fear and helped to precipitate a peasants revolt in Cephalonia.
This Ward suppressed with a severity which compares unfavourably even
with that of Torrlngton in Ceylon in 1848. Despite his connections
in Parliament, Ward was not spared the indignity of having a small
band of Liberals led by Joseph Hume, propose a motion condemning his
actions. The support of the leader of the Liberal party ensured that
this resolution was quite handsomely defeated but the incident is sig¬
nificant and indicates the suspect nature of Ward's actions under
pressure.
Ward encountered tremendous hostility during his stay in Corfu.
Nor did the difficulties of the High Commissioner cease with the sup¬
pression of the Cephalonian rebellion, for the Assembly elected on the
basis of Seaton's reforms continued to be intractable and to demand
yet more radical reform. Eventually, Ward was forced to prorogue it
and again he acted unwisely, both in arbitrarily banishing newspaper
editors and four members of the Assembly, and in cutting public works
expenditure rather than curtail the salaries of officials as the
Assembly had recommended. This Assembly was eventually dissolved but
its successor proved equally unmanageable.
Ward's first essaie in colonial government proved a far from
salutary experience and he learnt the dangers of unwise and rapid
constitutional change as well as the difficulties of acting in opposi¬
tion to the loudly expressed wishes of the inhabitants. There was
also much evidence of the impetuosity which was later to be seen in
Ceylon. Despite these experiences. Ward arrived in Ceylon as a
liberal of many years standing and this trait partly reasserted itself
during his stay in the island. He showed a strong belief in the idea
that economic development would automatically serve the interests of
the indigenous population and that new roads and a prospering economy
15
would bring the Ceylonese round to an acceptance of British values.
It is thus scarcely surprising that the construction of a railway in
Ceylon became a focal point of his policy and that he looked to it to
win him a permanent place in the history of Ceylon. The failure of
this attempt to bring rail communication to the island will be con¬
sidered later.
Sir Charles MacCarthy
The death of Sir Charles Justin MacCarthy at Spa in August 1864
was an event which shook neither the Expire nor the Colonial Office.
MacCarthy was not one of the small number of colonial administrators
who captured popular imagination and he died, as he lived, an almost
unknown figure whose sole claim to fame was the fact that he had ad¬
ministered the colony of Ceylon in the interval between the better
known Governorships of Sir Henry Ward and Sir Hercules Robinson.
Charles MacCarthy was born in Cork in 1812, the eldest of the
six children of Mary and Dennis MacCarthy. His father died in 1833
leaving the widow and children haunted by the shadow of insolvency
^Ward subscribed to what has been called the 'general assumption
that increased economic developments must, in the long run, benefit
not merely the Europeans whose efforts were producing it, but also
the backward peoples of the territories concerned.' J.D. Legge,
Britain in Fiji, p. 139.
\l
which was to remain with them for many years. Through his mother
Charles was related to the Spanish branch of the Wiseman family, for
Mary was the sister of James Wiseman, a Spanish merchant. She was
thus the aunt of Nicholas, later Cardinal Wiseman, first Archbishop
of Westminster. Although not poor by early nineteenth century
standards, the MacCarthys were nevertheless left ill-provided for and
the need to pay off family debts and provide for his brothers and
sisters was to become one of the motivating forces of Charles Mac¬
Carthy's life.
After attending St Edmund's College at Ware, MacCarthy went to
Rome to study at the English College where cousin Nicholas was employed.
At this time, Charles, himself, was destined for the priesthood. It
was whilst in Rome that he met, not only Richard Monckton-Milnes, 8
with whom a lifelong friendship was formed, but also the group of
17
exiled French Catholic intellectuals headed by the Abb6 de Lamennais.
His friendship with the Abb£ has been described by one of Lamennais*s
18
biographers as one of the most significant in his life and the
Richard Monckton—Milnes was a minor poet, politician and man about
town. He was MP for Pontefract for some years and was created Lord
Houghton in 1862. He is now most remembered for his poem, 'Flight
of Youth'.
17
Lamennais, an important figure in French Church History, was the
leader of a group which also included Montalembert and Rio. Lamen¬
nais tried to persuade MacCarthy to settle in Paris and become in¬
volved in the running of j.*Avenlr, the vehicle through which his views
were publicised. The aims of the newspaper were religious liberty,
the separation of Church and State, the freedom of the Press and uni¬
versal suffrage. MacCarthy was not persuaded, however. For details
of the life of Lamennais see W.G. Roe. Lamernais and England, and A.R.
Vidler, Prophecy and Papacy.
18Roe, p. 77.
excommunication of the Abb£ in 1834 may well have exacerbated Mao-
Carthy's feeling of estrangement from the Catholic Church. Certainly
the idea of entering the priesthood had gone forever by this time.
Instead, MacCarthy spent the next few years wandering around Europe
working from time to time as a courier or tutor and indulging himself
in both material and cultural pleasures. Unfortunately)the financial
position of his family was not equal to the gambling losses which he
sustained and by 1840 he was forced to appeal to Monckton-Milrves for
help. Financial aid was forthcoming and Charles was able to return
to England to spend an unhappy summer trying to put his experiences
abroad to good use by working on translations in an effort to raise
money. He also began to write a series of descriptions of contempo¬
rary Germany in what he described as a 'smart, flippant style that may
19
perhaps go down with the vulgar'. In F.ngland he was cut off from
the social and cultural circle with which he had associated on the
Continent and this, coupled with his increasing debts, prompted him to
accept a position which Monckton-Milnes secured for him as Collector
20
of Customs on Turks Island, part of the Bahamas group.
During his years on Turks Island MacCarthy succeeded, by prudent
management, in both repaying his debts and remitting money to England
19
MacCarthy to Monckton-Milnes, 23 April 1841, letter 12.
20
MacCarthy was obliged to undertake a short training course before
taking up his position. He attempted to keep his departure a
secret, because of his heavy debts, but with help from Monckton-Milnes,
most creditors were satisfied prior to his departure. This meant that
he meowed Monckton-Milnes a larger amount than ever. Letters39-45
(undated but probably written in April 1842) deal with this part of
MacCarthy*s life.
21
for the upkeep of his mother and sisters. Through the goodwill of
the new Governor of the Bahamas who arrived in 1844 and proved to be
a cousin of Monckton-Milnes, he was appointed Colonial Receiver in
addition to his other duties and his salary was thus increased to
22
£425 per annum. It is clear fro® a study of MacCarthy's correspon¬
dence with Monckton-MiInes that the sojourn on Turks Island forced
upon hi® a degree of self discipline which had previously been lacking.
Finding that the European population of the island failed to stimulate
his intellect^he devoted himself to righting the accounts and quickly
became absorbed in his duties. There seems no reason to question his
efficiency and he was twice mentioned favourably in despatches by the
23
Governor to the Secretary of State.
By 1846, the state of his health, which had never been good, made
a period of leave a necessity. It is also clear that he felt his
presence in London at that time might aid Monckton-MiInes to bring his
friend's talents to the attention of the Colonial Office and secure a
post for him under their auspices. MacCarthy arrived in London hoping,
at the most, for a Lieutenant-Governorship of Turks Island. Me left
^MacCarthy to 1'onckton-MiInes, 2S August 1843, letter 47. In this
letter MacCarthy enclosed £75. £50 of this represented half the
amount which he had promised to repay Monckton-Milnes each year,and
the remainder was to be forwarded by Monckton-Milnes to Mrs MacCarthy.
22
Letter 55, 1 March 1845. Governor Matthew also offered one of
MacCarthy's brothers a post as Receiver of Colonial Duties in Harbour
Island, one hundred miles north east of Nassau. Although MacCarthy's
letters at this time refer to his brother William, it is clear from
later letters that it was actually Felix, the black sheep of the
family who accepted the position and was a predictable failure in it.
23
He reported this fact to Monckton-Milnes in letter 48, 27 Novem¬
ber 1843. The Governor at this time was not Matthew, but Sir
Francis Cockburn.
as Auditor-General of the important Crown Colony of Ceylon, at three
times his former salary. This was due partly to Honckton-Milnes's
influence with Grey and partly to the development of a friendship
between MacCarthy and Benjamin Haves who was Parliamentary Under-
24
Secretary to Grey* MacCarthy had originally contacted Hawes on
behalf of Governor Matthew whose personal life in the Bahamas had
attracted unfavourable attention in the Colonial Office and for whom
25
KacCarthy had promised to intercede, " He soon became a frequent
guest at the Hawes home and he informed Milnes that the Under-Secre¬
tary had indicated to him that the talents of the younger man were
wasted in his existing post. MacCarthy reported to Milnes that Hawes
had told him that he would like to seduce him from the service of the
26
Board if only to make him Governor of Turks Island . By April 1847,
several vacancies had occurred in high positions in Mauritius and
Ceylon, Grey was anxious to infuse new blood into these colonies and
was only too willing to accept Hawes's suggestion that MacCarthy be
offered a post.
MacCarthy's contact with Hawes was productive in another sense,
for shortly after taking up his post in Ceylon he was granted leave to
return to England in order to marry Hawes's daughter, Sophia. This
was not an attempt on MacCarthy's part to further his career for he
24
Hawes was MP for Lambeth between 1832 and 1847 and in 1848 became
MP for Kinsale, His wife was a sister of I.K. Brunei.
25
Governor Matthew had offered to pay his expenses if he would act
as his agent when in London. MacCarthy refused the offer, but
promised to do all he could for Matthew nevertheless.
26
Letter 72 of 1 February 1847. The Customs Department was quite
separate from the Colonial Office at that time.
17
had received the offer of the new post before the romance blossomed
and the letters of the young couple make it clear that it was a love
27
natch. After his return to Ceylon with his wife, MacCarthy began
to correspond with Earl Grey privately and his connection with the
Colonial Office clearly did not impede the advance of his career.
Grey remained Secretary of State until February 1852 and in the same
year, Hawes moved to the War Office to take up an appointment as
Parliamentary Under-Secretary there. In his early years in Ceylon,
his father-in-law's position undoubtedly imbued MacCarthy with a con¬
fidence and standing he might otherwise have lacked. He wrote to
Monckton-Milnaa in 1847 that Hawes 'seems to contemplate quite seri¬
ously my advancement to the Government of the Island in due time.
Lord Torrington is to be instructed to give me every facility and
listen to my advice on all points, and Emerson Tennent to receive a
direct hint that any opposition of his will result unpleasantly to
28
himself'. Tliis is certainly support of a kind which few appointed
to a similar position might expect to receive.
The years 1847-50 were important ones, not only for Ceylon but
also for Charles KacCarthy. Arriving in the colony in 1847, he
27
Not all contemporaries adopted this view. An article in the
Quarterly Review which attacked Grey and the Colonial Reformers, also
contained a reference to KacCarthy which readt 'The latter gentleman
appears to have distinguished himself so egregiously that he was
shortly afterwards, on becoming the son-in-law of Mr. Under-Secuetary
Hawes, appointed to one of the most lucrative offices in Ceylon - the
income being increased to make it worthier of acceptance.' Quarterly
Review, vol. 88, 1850/1, fn., p. 106. This was not even factually
correct since MacCarthy had already assumed his post when he married
Sophia Hawes.
28
Letter 88 undated but written on a Friday morning probably in early
1848 when MacCarthy was home on leave for his wedding.
witnessed the effects of the coffee crash at first hand, a factor
worth remembering when consideration is given to the policies which he
later pursued. As he had returned to England for his marriage in
1848Nhe was away from the island during the fateful months of 1848.
He was thus removed from all the ensuing recriminations. Indeed, it
has been said by one modern authority that when all other officials
in Ceylon concentrated only on the defence of the official record in
the following years, MacCarthy alone kept his liead and he was respon¬
sible for the only constructive achievement of the following four
23
years, the Report on Fixed Establishments. Certainly he was the
only one of the high officials in Ceylon who did not become involved
in the scandals of the succeeding years and whose career did not con¬
sequently suffer.
MacCarthy remained consistently loyal to Corrington, although
there were occasions when he despaired of the Governor's actions.
From his early days on tine island he had played an even more important
role than the nature of his office might suggest. He had found the
Colonial Secretary, Tennent, ® to be consumed by a desire to leave the
island and more than willing to hand over come of his duties to the
willing newoomer. MacCarthy reported to Monckton-Milnes, 'finite
simply^ and as a matter of course^all decisions of every kind connected
29
E.M. De Cilvs, 'Correspondence of Grey and MacCarthy', Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch), new series no. 10.
30
Sir James Emerson Tennent was the ex-M.P for Belfast who had suppor¬
ted reel's Irish policy and the Dissenters Chapels Bill, ant" whose
position had become somewhat difficult as a result. He therefore
joined the Colonial Service.
n
with the Government come finally to be made by roe.*'* Even if we
allow for the element of exaggeration in a letter to an ex-creditor
and patron, Torrington's own persistently high opinion of MaeCarthy
does appear to lend weight to this view. Certainly Torrington's
private letters to Grey abound with the phrase 'MacCarthy and I'
and his consistently high opinion of MacCarthy acquires the more
significance when contrasted with his vacillating attitude toward
32
Tennent and other members of the administration. Indeed, it is
possible to view MacCarthy and Tennent as rival influences on the
Governor. MacCarthy maintained an attitude of constant distrust
toward the Colonial Secretary and considered him *a very unsafe
counsellor* and 'one who could in no way be relied on in an emer-
33
gency'. By 1849 Torrington's obsession with the attack being
mounted upon him in London made him increasingly amenable to the
schemes of Tennent. In particular, MacCarthy was unable to pre¬
vent Tennent*s handing over to the Colombo newspapers a copy of a
despatch purportedly by Colin Campbell^which claimed that Christopher
Elliott had offered his services to the government. MacCarthy
believed that this story was totally untrue and that Tennent was
the author of the forged despatch. However, he was unable to
prevent its publication which did further harm to Torrington's
^Letter 81, 16 August 1847.
32
Torrington wrote privately to Grey on 16 September 1847 that he
had 'never met a mam whose qualifications so commanded respect as
MacCarthy'. Por examples of MacCarthy*s influence with Torrington
see private letters from Torrington to Grey of 10 May 1849, 10 July
1849, 11 August 1849 and 5 January 1850.
33
MacCarthy to Grey. Private letter, 14 August 1849.
34
cause. Similarly, MacCarthy attempted to dissuade the Governor
from allowing Tennent to journey to England to give evidence before
the Select Committee, but Torrington bowed to Tennent's insistence,
35
with disastrous consequences.
MacCarthy succeeded Emerson Tennent as Colonial Secretary in
1851 but his relationship with Sir George Anderson, Torringtom's
successor, was one of the least successful of his life. Anderson's
Governorship was unsatisfactory for the colony and proved an unfortu¬
nate end to the career of a long standing Crown servanti what he was
unwilling to do himself he was equally unwilling to allow others to
36
do cn his behalf. Undoubtedly slightly eeeentric^he called Mac-
37
Carthy out over an imagined insult on one occasion and was reported
on another to have kicked one of his numerous children along the
length of the verandah of his house in front of his wondering
. 38
servants.
Torrington was admonished by Grey for allowing the publication of
this document. MacCarthy admitted that whilst he did not like
Elliott, Torrington's most hostile critic, he did not believe him
to be corrupt. Letter from MacCarthy to Grey, 13 January 1850.
35
A series of acrimonious disputes ensued with Tennent and Wodehouse,
another Ceylon civil servant, producing damning private letters which
both received from Torrington. Both men were dismissed in 1850.
Tennant became Secretary to the Board of Trade in 1852 and Wodehouse
became Governor of British Guiana (1854-61), of Cape Colony (1861-70),
and of Bombay (1872-7).
"^Letter 99 to Monckton-Milnes on 10 July 1851. MacCarthy wrote that
•I have hardly anything to do. Since my chief has virtually suspen¬
ded me by insisting on doing everything himself,.' Later, in 1853
MacCarthy wrote again to Milnes on the same subject describing Ander¬
son as 'such an old fool* who would neither do anything himself nor
let MacCarthy do it for him. Letter 207, 11 April 1853.
37
Letter 214, 25 February 1854.
38
Letter 214, 25 February 1854.
Throughout Anderson's term of office it was well known in the
colony that the Governor and his Colonial Secretary were on poor
terms and the blame for this situation was popularly laid at the
39
Governor's door. In view of the tact and diplomacy shown by
MacCarthy in the difficult days following the 1848 rebellion^it is
difficult to disagree with this view. At the same time, h>
the large degree of responsibility which MacCarthy had exercised as
Auditor-General and Acting Colonial Secretary, it is possible that
he assumed too much under Anderson. The difficulties of their
relationship were most clearly seen in mid-1851 when Anderson, dis¬
liking from the start the system whereby all matters coming to him
for decisions contained a note of the opinion of the Colonial Secre¬
tary, attempted tc end this system and reduce the role of the Colonial
Secretary to one similar to that of the Chief Secretary in India.
Eventually the matter had to be referred to Grey, who ruled in favour
of MacCarthy.
With Governor Ward, MacCarthy's relationship was altogether
happier. Whilst appreciating Ward's vigour and enthusiasm MacCarthy
nevertheless considered him to be in many respects 'not a very wise
41
man'. Nor did he feel Ward to be as responsible or discreet a
39
'The estrangement of the Governor and the Colonial Secretary is
well known' the Ceylon Times reported on 23 July 1852.
40
C054/279/85 10 June 1851 contains MacCarthy*s Address to the Colo¬
nial Office, Anderson's covering despatch and the draft reply from
Gray.
41
Letter 101 to Monckton-Milnes, 29 January 1856.
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figure as the Governorship required. Despite this the partnership
was a successful one, though Ward's energy left little scope for the
exercise of initiative by his second in command. It seems that Ward
was quick to appreciate the help that KacCarthy with his experience
of Ceylon could give and he strongly advanced MacCarthy's claims to
the Governorship of Mauritius in 1856 and played a major part in
securing him a knighthood in 1856.
When MacCarthy became Governor in 1860, he assumed the position
with immense knowledge of the island and its needs, whereas Ward had
arrived coupletely new to Ceylon. V?ard, however, had the advantage
of succeeding an ageing, unpopular and inactive Governor, and his
administration was therefore destined to shine by comparison. Mac¬
Carthy was less fortunate. How each handled the main problem which
beset them will be seen later.
42
MacCarthy wrote in letter 222 on 11 June 1855 - 'The only misgiving
I have is as to his discretion. Ke is, I am afraid, a little hasty
in forming conclusions and in acting on them when formed. And he
talks rather more than is wise or safe for a man in his position, as
if he were on the hustings-or in the House of Commons instead of the




As the seoond half of the nineteenth century dawned it could
truly be said that the administration of overseas territories had
seldom been given high priority among the functions of the Government
in London. Instead it had been carried out by a series of makeshift
measures. The necessity of providing some degree of central adminis¬
tration for the colonies had been recognised at an early date when a
Council for Plantations was established by the Privy Council after
the Restoration. This was soon reconstituted as the Council for
Foreign Plantations which in turn was amalgamated with the Council for
Trade in 1672 as the Council for Trade and Plantations. This combina¬
tion of duties lasted only a short time; in the following year, super¬
vision of Plantations reverted to the Privy Council, but the joint
Council was reconstituted once more under William III. This remained
in existence until 1782 when^after a short lapse, during which control
was again exercised by the Privy Council, a new Committee for Trade and
the Plantations was formed. A third Secretaryship of State was estab¬
lished in 1768 to oversee American affairs, but this was abolished
following the loss of the American colonies. The increasing preoccu¬
pation of the Committee for Trade and Plantations with matters connec¬
ted with trade necessitated the provision of alternative means for the
supervision of colonial affairs. Accordingly^ in 1801 a new Secretary¬
ship was created to deal with both the existing and the newly acquired
colonies. This Office was also concerned with War and it was not
until 1854 that the functions were separated and two independent
departments created. This was a long overdue innovation, for the
size and diversity of the Empire had increased beyond all recognition
since the beginning of the century and colonial problems had inevi¬
tably taken second place to matters concerning war during the time
the two departments were united.*
This brief summary of the administration of the Empire until 1854
gives some indication of the lack of priority afforded to colonial
affairs during this time. The apparently almost accidental acquisi¬
tion of colonies meant that little constructive thinking was devoted
to deciding the manner in which the largest Empire the world had ever
seen should be administered. Whatever the contribution of men such
as James Stephen to the running of the colonial department from the
inside, it nevertheless seems that to the Government as a whole, and
certainly to successive parsimonious Parliaments, the administration
of the Empire was approached with a lack of enthusiasm which verged at
times on complete indifference. Colonial matters took the very lowest
priority, particularly if the expenditure of money wefe involved.
It is within this context that the Colonial Office within the
years 1855-65 must be viewed. A new department had certainly been
created in name but this did not of itself necessarily indicate any
increase in the importance of colonial affairs to the Government as a
whole. The most talented men among those forming the government were
rarely deployed to the Colonial Office, and the permanent officials
there had little prestige or influence in administrative circles.
The Treasury, in particular, was often very dilatory in dealing with
correspondence from the Colonial Office, which clearly occupied a
*Much of the information on the history and organisation of the
Colonial Office has been drawn from C. Jeffries, The History and
Development of the Colonial Office.
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rather lowly position in its eyes. This was unfortunate since the
Lords Commissioners of the Treasury possessed considerable power over
the affairs of a colony such as Ceylon and their agreement was re¬
quired for major expenditure. The Treasury was also unpopular because
of what seemed to be its penny-pinching attitude.^ No matter how small
the amount of expenditure, the Treasury was always able to suggest an
economy, regardless of the long term affect of the proposal.
Considerable annoyance was often felt with the War Office also^
although no indication of this was ever given in official correspon¬
dence. The Court Martial of Major O'Brien in Ceylon in 1864, and the
apparently highly partial attitude adopted by the Commanding Officer
of the Troops stirred deep feelings in the Colonial Office and caused
some fairly astringent comments to be made on the character of the
4
representative of the War Office in Ceylon. No official protest was
made however.
2
So slow, in fact, were the Treasury officials in replying to cor¬
respondence that Strachey suggested in a Minute on the railway that
the Treasury should be told that if no specific veto was received
from them by a specific date, then their consent to the proposed plan
of action would be assumed. This proposal did not meet with appro¬
val in the higher echelons of the Colonial Office, where it was known
that the Treasury would be offended by such a course. Minute an
C054/371/233 29 November 1862.
3
Over the Gosset case (in which the former Surveyor-General of Ceylon
was held responsible for defalcations in his department during his
term of office) the Treasury shewed an unmerciful adherence to the
letter of the law which won them few admirers in the Colonial Office.
Indeed, Elliot, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, described the
attitude of the Treasury officials as am example 'of the evidence
which we constantly have of such a want either of capacity or of care
in the disposal of cases in that Department as to render it impossible
to feel the confidence which we ought to be able to place in the jus¬
tice of their sentences.' C054/383 Treasury to Colonial Office,
4 August 1863.
4
This subject is dealt with in the chapter on the Governor and Mili¬
tary Expenditure, p. -1c>"3l.
If the work of the Colonial Office was not aided by its fairly
huirble status among government departments, the internal conditions
in which the work was carried out certainly did nothing to aid or
encourage the staff. The actual offices were housed at numbers
thirteen and fourteen Downing Street, in cramped conditions which a
Select Committee on Public Offices in 1839 found to be not only in¬
adequate but also unsafe and unworthy of repair. Furthermore the
materials with which the staff worked were poor, even by contemporary
6
standards; there was a severe shortage of maps and reference books.
This inevitably enhanced the importance of anyone in the department
with first-hand knowledge of the colonies. It also made it more
difficult for successive Secretaries of State and their Parliamentary
Under-Secretaries to play a prominent role. In most cases they
could not hope to rival the information which the permanent staff had
acquired over the years, and there were inadequate facilities to
enable them to compensate for their ignorance. Only Molesworth, who
had devoted much of his life to the study of colonial administration
and might have proved an influential Secretary but for his untimely
death, and Newcastle, who in his second tenure of office approached
his work with the advantage gained from previous acquaintance with
colonial problems, were well equipped for their posts.
5
The Duke of Newcastle is said to have commented wryly in 1860 that
•it is to be hoped that the building will fall (for fall I believe
it will) at night*. The remark is taken from the Office of Works
Report, 22 October 1860, CO 323/262 and is quoted in H.L. Rail, The
Colonial Office, pp. 48-9.
^The average amount spent on books per year between 1859 and 1866
(with the exception of one most unusual year) was £8 6s Od.
Hall, p. 49.
X7
The Department was directed by the Secretary of State who was
added by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary and by the Permanent Under-
7
Secretaries. Next in rank were the Chief Clerk, the Senior Clerks,
the Assistant Clerks and the Junior Clerks. Each despatch received
in the Office was transmitted to the Senior Clerk of the geographical
department into whose scope it fell, and from there progressed up the
hierarchical chain from Under Secretary to Parliamentary Secretary
and thence to the Secretary of State himself. Each recipient appen¬
ded whatever comments seemed appropriate as the despatch passed
through his hands. Once a decision had been taken by the Secretary
of State, with or without attention to the advice of his subordinates,
the despatch was returned to the Senior Clerk. He supervised the
drafting of the reply which was submitted once more to the Secretary
of State for formal approval. This system was cumbersome and time-
consuming. Yet there is also much to admire in an arrangement which
meant that the Secretary of State saw every despatch from the colonies
no matter how trivial the content. He was thereby kept much more
closely involved in the affairs of the inhabitants of the colonies
than might have been imagined, since all had the right to petition
0
him on any subject.
^Ceylon was dealt with in the Eastern Department after 1860 when
this was created. The Senior Clerk in charge of the Department was CwUS'
Cox and the Superintending Secretaries of State were Rogers and C\\U^Wsb*<
Fortescue.
0
It meant that in 1860 the Secretary of State and his Under-Secretary
were concerned with so apparently trivial a case as that of Mrs Bray-
brooke, a teacher dismissed from her post in Ceylon on the grounds of
her supposedly questionable moral character. She had neither been
told the reason for her dismissal nor paid the gratuity which the
School Commission had recommended. She was at least able, however,
The period 1855-65 saw the Secretaryship held by no fewer than
eight men whose tenure of office varied in length from the fifteen
days of Herbert in 1855, to a period of almost five years by New¬
castle. Newcastle was by far the most effective of these men, par-
9
ticularly in the first three years of his second tenure of office.
Of the others, Labouchere was perhaps the most influential so far as
Ceylon was concerned.^* Lytton was one of the least able, having
little application and his ultimate breakdown forced an unusually
large share of the burdens of his office upon the shoulders of his
Parliamentary Private Secretary, the Earl of Carnarvon.^ Of the
other Parliamentary Secretaries, by far the most important was C.S.
Fortescue, later Lord Carlingford, who gave indications of both
ability and interest in colonial affairs. However, he probably
exercised less influence over Newcastle than might have been the case
had their personal relationship not been marred by their rivalry for
12
the affections of Frances, Lady Waldegrave.
0
to put her case before the Secretary of State, where it was viewed
with considerably more sympathy than it had been by Governor Ward.
C054/360/89 10 May 1861.
g
This was before his illness began to take effect. Details of this
are given in C.C. Eldridge, 'Fifth Duke of Newcastle', PhD thesis,
University of Nottingham, 1966.
*°His decisions on the railway are considered in the chapter on the
Colonial Office and the railway, p. W~l «J=-
^Carnarvon wrote of hims 'He has no great capacity for business,
or method in the small details and arrangements of the daily work,
his ideas succeed each other when he takes up keenly any subject too
rapidly and his plans undergo too many changes.' This remark is
quoted in Hall, p. 57, and the original source is A. Hardinge,
Carnarvon, vol. 1, pp. 120-1.
12
Fortescue eventually married Lady Waldegrave.
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The Permanent Under Secretaries whose charge included Ceylon were
13
Herman Merivale until 1860 and Frederic Rogers thereafter. The
former of these has suffered in reputation through comparison with his
eminent predecessor, James Stephen, as well as with Rogers. His work
on Ceylonese matters, however, shows him to have had a breadth of
vision not always apparent in the work of Frederic Rogers, as well as
a sound judgment. Originally a lawyer and then a Professor of Poli¬
tical Economy at Oxford University, he was appointed Under-Secretary
by Grey on the retirement of James Stephen in 1847. At that time)he
possessed no experience in colonial administration at all despite
14
being the author of several works on the colonies and colonisation.
He left the Office in 1859 to become head of the India Office and was
succeeded by Frederic Rogers who had first been appointed to the
Colonial Office in 1846 as Assistant Under Secretary.*^ Like Meri¬
vale, he was a graduate of Oxford, although his earlier education had
been at Eton while Merivale had been a pupil at Harrow. During his
years at Oxford he was much influenced by Newman who tutored him at
Oriel, and although he later broke with his sometime mentor, the Church
influence was to remain strong throughout his life. In 1844, Rogers
was appointed Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and in the following
years founded with some friends what was to become known as the
Manchester Guardian. From 1846 his work at the Colonial Office was
13
Information on Merivale and Rogers is drawn in particular from
J.W. Cell, British Colonial Administration, pp. 15-21 and Hall, p. 72.
14
Lectures on Colonisation and the Colonies is probably the best known.
15
He had entertained hopes, quashed by Grey, of succeeding James
Stephen.
3o
mainly concerned with questions of emigration since he also held the
appointment of Emigration Commissioner. When he succeeded Merivale
in 1860 he also undertook the post of legal adviser to the Colonial
Office, carrying out these duties in addition to the supervision of
all work connected with the colonies of Australia, West Indies,
16
Ceylon and the Eastern Colonies.
Merivale, Rogers and the Secretaries of State whom they served,
are all fairly well-kncwn figures in the colonial history of the
nineteenth century. One member of the Colonial Office staff who has
remained virtually unknown and yet who arguably exercised a larger
influence on the history of Ceylon in this period than any of these
17
other men, was the office precis writer, William Strachey.
Strachey's 'special* subjects included Cfeylonese financial affairs and
he thus dealt with the problems of both the railway and military ex¬
penditure. In the years 1855-65, his grasp of the complexities of
the financial situation was so strong that he was able to play a
18
major role in the formulation of policy within the Colonial Office.
Bora in 1819, one of seven brothers, he was a member of a famous
family. His brothers included Colonel Henry Strachey and Sir John
*6Stephen had done the same.
17
For general information on William Strachey, see M. Holroyd,
Lytton Strachey, A Critical biography, and C.R. Sanders, The Strachey
Family.
18
Cell, p. 23, fn. 44, describes Strachey as 'the least valuable
member of the upper echelon' of the Colonial Office. This is not
a view which is supported by an examination of the role played by
Strachey in the formulation of policy on Ceylon in this period.
19
and Sir Richard, the last two of whom served in India. William
himself joined the Indian Civil Service in 1838 and, although he re¬
turned to England in 1843 he did not officially resign from the ser¬
vice until 1848, when he was appointed Precis Writer in the Colonial
Office. His work appears to be thorough and the product of a clear
and logical mind, yet this accords strangely with what can be learned
of his personal life and habits. His nephew St Loe Strachey once
20
described him as 'the strangest of men* and one recent writer on
the Strachey family has written that 'He was the Strachey primarily
responsible for the saying of the family doctors that members of this
family Could never go mad - tlv-t Stracheys were all far too eccentric
21
for that'. Certainly there seems much evidence to corroborate
this view. Following his short sojourn in India, he developed a
taste for upholding Eastern customs^ as the same writer has described;
•Having once visited Calcutta, he became convinced that the clocks
there were the only reliable chronometers in the world, and in conse¬
quence kept his watch resolutely set by Calcutta time, organising the
remaining fifty years of his life accordingly. The results were
often disconcerting for his friends living in England. He break¬
fasted at afternoon tea and lived most of his waking hours by candle-
22
light*. In the fifties and sixties he is reported to have been
19
Sir Richard became Chairman of the East India Railway Company in
1875 but his greatest claim to fame was as the father of Lytton.
20
St Loe Strachey, Adventure of Living, p. 487. The description of





Holroyd, vol. 1, pp. 29-30.
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something of a man about town. A bachelor, a member of Brooks and a
friend of Thackeray, he was also a sometime visitor at Holland House.
It was probably there that he encountered Lord Palmerston to whom, in
23
later life, he was fond of attributing his own thoughts and opinions.
It may be that a part of the answer to the apparent contradic¬
tions in the personality of this strange man lies in the fact that he
is remembered and written of mostly in his later years. Certainly,
if the stories are to be believed, his adherence to Calcutta time dated
from the early 1840s, but it is possible that this was nothing more
than a desire to assume a degree of eccentricity as a means of achiev¬
ing social prominence. It is difficult to envisage the staid Frederic
Rogers cooperating with Strachey's view of the time or looking kindly
upon the galoshes which are said to have been his usual footwear. So
far as his work is concerned, however, there is nothing to suggest that
he was anything other than a well-respected member of the Colonial
Office staff. Despatches on most important matters on Ceylon were
referred to him and his appointment as the Colonial Office representa¬
tive on the Board of the Ceylon Railway Company may be seen as a token
of the esteem in which he was held. He shared a common attitude on
many subjects with Sir Charles MacCarthy and the two were in frequent
communication during MacCarthy's visit to England in 1859. Strachey
was undoubtedly the member of the Colonial Office staff least enthus¬
iastic over the public works schemes inaugurated by Governor Ward and
he judged them, as MacCarthy was prone to, by the immediate gain or
23
St Loe Strachey suggested that William was often selected by Lord
Palmerston for special duties, pp. 487-8.
loss to the revenue. His was the guiding hand behind the Colonial
Office policy which favoured the reduction of the railway debt in the
1860s even at the expense of reductions in the public works pro¬
gramme if necessary. His over-riding concern was to establish the
colony on a sound financial footing and although this policy was, and
has been criticised, it is arguably a more admirable course than has
generally been admitted.
In looking at the history of the Colonial Office between the
years 1855 and 1865 certain points must be borne in mind. Firstly,
it was not a strong, still less an omnipotent body. Though in pos¬
session of considerable power over successive Governors in Ceylon and
over legislation passed by the local legislature, it could only rarely
be the initiator of policy. On the railway question, although the
Colonial Office played an important role, the impetus for a railway
came from elsewhere. Similarly over the military question, although
it played a much more dominant part, this was the result of pressure
brought to bear by other government departments. The Colonial Office
ultimately, had neither the standing in the British Government nor the
real power in the colonies, to actually enforce measures. Nor did it
have the capacity, the manpower, or the time to formulate long-term
ideological policies. Hence the reliance placed on the man on the
24
spot, the Governor, was enormous. A Governor at the commencement
of his career might be very susceptible to influence from the body
'4
In the case of Mrs Braybrooke, already referred to, despite the
sympathy with which her case was regarded by Rogers and Newcastle,
the Governor was nevertheless told 'The question which of these
courses ought to be adopted is one which can only be decided by
means of knowledge to be arrived at on the spot. This decision
therefore, I must leave to you.* ic. isju
which controlled his promotion but a change in the holder of the
office of Secretary of State could easily eradicate past misdemeanours.
In most cases the Colonial Office was anxious not to act directly con¬
trary to the advice of its Governor, and it was also reluctant to
25
appear to act autocratically. In most cases there was insufficient
information available to the Colonial Office staff to enable them to
over-rule the recommendations of the Governor with confidence. Fur¬
thermore, the length of time which despatches from Ceylon took to
reach London and to be examined by the chain of command within the
Colonial Office meant that, in cases where urgent action was required,
the Colonial Office Could do little more than approve the action which
the Governor had already taken.
Due to the difficulties standing in the way of the Colonial
Office's playing a dominant role in the decision-making process, the
staff came to see one of their most important functions as the provi¬
sion of a check on the actions of the local government. One of the
prime concerns of the staff was with ensuring that justice was done to
the indigenous population. Another was with ensuring the reason¬
able competence of the local administration. The former role was
exemplified when the head clerk of the Kandy Post Office was dis¬
missed because of the disappearance of a number of registered letters
en route for Jaffna. The Colonial Office staff, particularly Pogers,
were incensed by the injustice of the action by the Governor although
25
Certainly officials at the Colonial Office were most anxious not
to appear to be forcing a candidate upon the congregation of the
Wolfendahl Presbyterian Church to which the Colonial Office had the
right of nomination. C054/359/6& 10 April 1B61.
it was supported by the Executive Council. Rogers wrote that the
decision was totally indefensible* not only because the letters hied
not necessarily been stolen in Kandy but also because similar thefts
had occurred after the dismissal of the clerk. A despatch was
accordingly forwarded to the new Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson,
instructing him to re-examine the case and, in the absence of new
26
evidence, to reinstate the clerk.
In the same year a petition was received in the Colonial Office
from a lady who, as a relation of the ex-King of Kandy, was entitled
to a government pension. This had been refused by the local govern¬
ment on the grounds that she was already in receipt of a pension,
albeit a small one, as the daughter of a Kandyan chief. As it was
forbidden for one person to receive more than one pension, it seemed
only just to Rogers that the lady should receive the larger pension.
He criticised the Minute of the Executive Council on the subject as
'slovenly', since it scarcely bothered to deny the injustice of its
decision which saved the colonial exchequer only a small amount of
money. He continued his Minute by underlining the role which he
felt the Colonial Office could play in this type of case. 'The
matter is very trifling in amount' he wrote, •- but it is a case of
direct petition to the Secretary of State from natives not able to
help themselves - and I am inclined to consider cases of this kind to
be much more important (as lessons to the officials and as giving
^0)54/401/39 6 March 1865.
evidence of justice to the unrepresented natives) than thermoney value
27
would indicate'.
The Colonial Office staff were also quick to seize upon incompe¬
tency and inefficiency in the local administration. In particular,
great care was devoted to the scrutiny of all ordinances by the legal
advisers. In the middle 1960s, Richard Morgan, the Queen's Advocate,
was much criticised for the low standard of his work which resulted in
28
the refusal of the Royal Assent to several ordinances. Careful
consideration was also given to the decisions of the Executive Coun¬
cil and the conduct of the local officials toward the Ceylonese was
closely watched. In 1860, Bailey, the Assistant Government Agent at
Badulla, was censured for having brought pressure to bear on a local
magistrate to pass a severe sentence on a Sinhalese who had offended
him. Although the Executive Council had criticised both Bailey and
the magistrate involved, Rogers did not believe that this was suffi-
29
cient.
The Colonial Office staff, then, working in poor conditions,
attenuated not only to formulate general policy in Ceylon, but also to
keep a watchful eye on the actions of the local administration. With
what success they achieved this will be examined later.
27CO54/400/27 15 February 1865.
28
Rogers wrote "He should, I think, learn to be more careful in his
work and where palpable defects are pointed out, to amend instead of
attenpting to justify*. C054/387/66 26 March 1864.




The Legislative Council of Ceylon was established in 1833 on
the recommendation of William Colebrooke, a member of the Commission
of Eastern Enquiry. Before this, the Governor had ruled, aided but
scarcely checked, by a Council of Advice made up of five top officials.
This system had proved less than successful and^with the future of the
island more secure following the end of the wars with France, it had
become desirable to establish a more efficient form of government.
In particular, the officials at the Colonial Office were anxious to
end the recurrent financial deficit of the island and to exercise a
greater degree of supervision over the government to this end. Thus
the authority of the Eastern Commission, originally intended to cover
only the Cape and Mauritius, was extended to include Ceylon.
Colebrooke's own over-riding intention was to curtail the power
of the Governor, or at least to render the holder of this office more
accountable to the Colonial Office. The establishment of the Execu¬
tive Council, conposed of ex-officio members of the administration
whose promotion depended on Colonial Office approval rather than that
of the Governor, was one step in this direction. The Legislative
Council was designed to provide a further check on the Governor. To
this end, Colebrooke suggested that the Governor be excluded from its
proceedings.* The Colonial Office felt, however, that this would
deprive the Governor of the opportunity to explain fully his policies
and the measures for which he might be seeking approval. Despite
*Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, edited G.C. Mendis, vol. 1, Report upon
the Administration, p. 56.
this difference; it is clear that the Colonial Office did share Cole¬
brooke's view of the Legislative Council as an instrument by which
Imperial control of the colony could be made more effective.
The inclusion of a number of unofficial members gave the Legis¬
lative Council some superficial claim to be of a representative nature,
but it is evident that this was not Colebrooke'S aim. Rather, the
presence of the unofficials was intended merely to facilitate commu¬
nication between government and the governed, without giving the
latter any real influence over the former. As Colebrooke envisaged
it, the Council 'would primarily act as a sounding board rather than a
2
representative body in the strictly constitutional sense'. At the
same time, enlightened government meant ascertaining and taking into
account the wishes of those for whom it was conducted, or at least
those sections capable of articulating their wishes. Thus Colebrooke
wrote - *0n these and other questions of general importance the
people are entitled to ejq>ect that their interests and wishes may be
attended to, and their rights protected; and although the ignorance
and prejudice which still prevail generally throughout the country may
preclude the adoption of their views on all subjects, it would be con¬
sistent with the policy of a liberal government that they should have
an opportunity of freely communicating their opinions of the effects
3
of the legislative changes that may be proposed.' To this extent,
then, Colebrooke saw the Council which he created as a first step on
the road toward constitutional progress. 'Such a Council' he wrote
2
History of Ceylon, edited K.M. de Silva, p. 82.
3
Mendis, vol. 1, p. 56.
'is not proposed as an institution calculated in itself to provide
effectually for the legislation of the island at a more advanced
stage of its progress' but 'it would eventually constitute an essen¬
tial part of any colonial legislature for which the island may be
4
prepared at a future period,•
It was intended that the Legislative Council, as inaugurated in
1833, should be composed of nine official members and six nominated by
the Governor from the three main communities on the island, though not
in proportion to their numerical strength. It proved impossible, due
to the dissatisfaction of the European population with the composition
of the Council, to complete the unofficial appointments until 1837,
However, representatives of the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher commu¬
nities served from the first. The Council was entrusted with the
legislative powers formerly possessed by the Governor and Advisory
Council but ordinances could only be introduced by the Governor and
all subjects for debate had to secure his approval.^ The Council did
possess fairly wide pcwers to call for administrative papers and in
1838 the Secretary of State granted it the authority to provide for
all the island's contingent expenditure; this meant that it had the
right to vote all expenditure other than that incurred annually on the
authority of the Imperial Government for such purposes as the Civil
Establishment and Military Expenditure. Nine years later, a techni¬
cal change was made with regard to the enforcement of ordinances passed
by the Legislative Council. Whereas originally no ordinance could be
4
Mendis, vol. 1, p. 58.
^This was the situation until 1860.
4o
enforced except in case of dire necessity before the official assent
had been given by the Crown (a process which could involve serious
delays), it was now provided that all legislation could be provision¬
ally enforced prior to the grant of Royal Assent. This was clearly
a small but not insignificant step toward a greater degree of inde¬
pendence for the Council. The next year (1848) saw Earl Grey's
promise regarding future Legislative Council control over all the
island's expenditure. Writing in May, the Secretary of State signi¬
ficantly, if erroneously, stated that the Legislative Council had
control over all the island's expenditure.^ This was hastily correc¬
ted in July, but,in amending his view, Grey stated instead that this
was the policy at which the Government aimed and he named the condi-
7
tions under which such control would be granted. These conditions'
were fulfilled with regard to civil expenditure by the Fixed Estab¬
lishment settlement of 1858, but no corresponding terms were laid down
with regard to the military establishment over which the Legislative
Council continued to exercise only very limited control.
During the Governorship of Sir Henry Ward two further changes
were effected with regard to the Legislative Council. Firstly, in
1855, Ward allowed the two commercial organisations, the Planters'
Association and the Chamber of Commerce, to choose their own represen¬
tatives on the Council. In the past all unofficial members had been
nominated by the Governor and, although this was still technically the
case, Ward was liberalising the system by allowing these bodies to
6 ^
C055/89yMay 1848.
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decide whom he should nominate. Moreover, before his departure in
1860, Ward had brought about another significant change in the con¬
stitution by agreeing to allow the unofficial members to initiate
8
Bills of a non-financial nature.
Some changes, then, had taken place in the Legislative Council
since its establishment. On the whole, however, constitutionad pro¬
gress had been slow, and had fallen far behind the changes in the
economic structure of the colony. This was an argument which was
much stressed by the critics of the Council. Agitation for consti¬
tutional reform was sporadic, and often half-hearted. It emanated
almost entirely from the merchants of Colombo and,in the forties and
fifties, from a small group, predominantly Burghers, led by Christopher
9
Elliott of the Colombo Observer. So long as the Governor was
reasonably active and pursued policies acceptable to these elements,
then no complaints were voiced concerning the Legislative Council, for
there were few Europeans in the colony with time to devote to playing
any larger role in government than was already accorded to members of
the Legislative Council. In fact it was frequently difficult to find
men willing to accept office at all.*'®
8
See Chapter on the Governor, fn. 4, p 6.
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Christopher Elliott was a Doctor who arrived in Ceylon in 1834 as
an Assistant Colonial Surgeon. He soon built up a large private
practice and then branched into journalism, winning fame as the
editor of the Colombo Observer. He played a leading role in poli¬
tical agitation in the late 1840s and 1850s.
*°V?ard reported his difficulty in finding unofficials in a letter
to Lytton C054/344 Confidential of 7 June 1859. In C054/345/9 23
July 1859 he reported that he had been obliged to appoint Thomas
Rust, the advocate, to represent the mercantile interest, since
the Chamber of Commerce could find no one willing to accept the
post. In the same despatch, he announced that the Planters' Assoc¬
iation was also unable to find a member.
The criticisms which were made of the Legislative Council were
usually reflections of discontent with the incumbent Governor and his
administration. At these times it seemed that the only hcpe ojl
bringing about a more accommodating administration lay in increasing
the influence of the Legislative Council over it. There was inter¬
mittent agitation, for example, during the Governorship of Sir George
Anderson, who failed to meet the demands of the commercial interests.
This culminated in 1B54. The Chamber of Commerce requested an un¬
official majority on the legislative Council in a Memorial of March
1851 and asked that unofficial members be allowed to initiate legis¬
lation.** These, it should be noted, were essentially fairly conser¬
vative requests. The Times in June 1853(thundered that under the
existing constitution 'the Legislative Council is a mockery and a play¬
thing in the hands of the few called the Executive; its unofficial
members represent the wants of the public, but without the power to
supply them, whilst the whole comprises a system of absolutism unri¬
valled in the most despotic governments of either ancient or modern
12
times,* This illustrates quite clearly that the fundamental com¬
plaint was less against the composition of the Council in principle
than against the fact that the views of the unofficials were not
heeded; this was something which, it was felt, could be remedied by
altering the composition of the Council so that the government was
obliged to bow to the views of the unofficials. Equally, it could
be remedied merely by the government's paying more attention to the
**The Memorial can be found at C054/278/41 2$, March 1851.
12
Ceylon Times, 28 June 1853.
opinions which the unofficial members expressed. The financial sit¬
uation at the time made it difficult, if not impossible, for Anderson
to carry out the demands of the planters for more roads. The lethargy
of the administration also led to requests that the unofficials be
given the power to initiate legislation, for, in the rule of an in¬
active Governor, even an unofficial majority would be inpotent without
this right. This same Memorial also requested an end to the Governor's
control over the votes of the official members of the Council: this was
yet another indication that there existed no widespread demand for mem¬
bers of the community to play any larger part in the process of govern¬
ment if any other method of ensuring that the Governor passed acceptable
policies was available.33 So powerless was the existing position of
the unofficial members felt to be that one prominent merchant at the
June meeting claimed that no Legislative Council at all would be pre¬
ferable, since the despotic powers of the Governor would then be obvious
for all to see.3^
Two well-known merchants who, at different times, sat on the Leg¬
islative Council^made public their objections to it. George Ackland,
a founder member of the firm of Ackland, Boyd and Company, wrote two
letters in March 1848 conplaining of the powerlessness of the unoffi¬
cials ' position.However, his criticisms were significant mostly
13C054/278/43 21 March 1851.
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The merchant concerned was Cargill who was addressing the juhlic
meeting in Colombo on 28 June 1854. Reported in the Colombo
Observer of 30 June 1854.
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Ackland's letter can be found at C054/247/53 8 March 1848. See
Chapter on The Governor, p<p. GO ;
for their inate conservatism. Ackland sought, not to change the basic
structure of government but merely to effect minor reforms in the ex¬
isting machinery to ensure its smoother running. He was careful to
guard against accusations of radicalism - indeed, one of his principal
arguments was that under the existing system any unofficial who did
oppose the Governor ran the risk of being labelled a radical. He ex¬
pressed his criticisms in a letter rather than in Council, explaining
that he feared that to give vent to his views in the Council might make
him appear factious.
Many of Ackland's criticisms were reiterated eleven years later
16
when George Wall resigned his seat on the Legislative Council. He,
too, advocated the withdrawal of the Governor from the proceedings of
the Council and the granting of the right to initiate measures to un-
officials. He also favoured increasing the number of unofficials by
two. However, where Ackland's criticisms had been conservative and
reformist, and,it may safely be said, representative of the vast
majority of the European community, Wall's were of a much more radical
nature. Ackland had chaffed at the inability of unofficial members
to defeat measures which they disliked, and constitutional agitation
in the early fifties had been largely a symptom of dissatisfaction with
the administration of Anderson; Wall, in contrast, made known his dis¬
content at a time when the Governor was generally popular. His criti¬
cisms were levelled not at Ward's policies but at his methods, not at
his actions but at the principle (or lack of it) behind them. Thus
16
He resigned on returning to Britain on leave, and not as a protest
against the composition of the Council.
he wrote in his letter of resignation from the Council that 'in the
hands of an able, resolute Head, the Council is a mere instrument for
17
giving effect to his ovm views.' Wall was not quarrelling with the
Governor's intentions, as he went on to explain:
Large sums are expended without votes and the Council is
superceded in its principal functions. The Governor, it
is true, fully admits and strongly deprecates the uncon¬
stitutional character of such expenditure, but makes out a
strong case for a departure in the particular instances,
from the usual rules. It is willingly admitted on all
hands that the money so expended is generally well applied,
hence the unofficial members though feeling that their
rights have been infringed, are little disposed to censure
strongly the way in which the thing was done, when the
thing itself was really good and was prompted by a spirit
of earnest zeal for the public service.
X8
what Wall was seeking to bring about was the transformation of the
Legislative Council into a body whose rights and privileges, and hence
its actions, were totally independent of the personality of the incum¬
bent Governor. This degree of independence was wholly unacceptable to
the Colonial Office, given the unrepresentative nature of the Council.
The Colonial Office view of the Council was, in many ways, a more
limited one than that of Colebrooke. Officials were unwilling to
accept Colebrooke's recommendations in their entirety but, by the
middle 1850s, there were signs of a more liberal attitude beginning to
prevail. It appears almost certain that Sir George Grey, at least,
was prepared in late 1854 to concede to demands for some reform of the




Council. Blackwood, the Colonial Office clerk, saw the need to
encourage commerce as a major reason for the extension of the Council,
so as to include more representatives of these increasingly powerful
20
groups. Herman Merivale, however, remained sceptical of the advan¬
tages of change, whilst at the same time refuting many of the appre¬
hensions expressed by Governor Anderson of the consequences of such a
move. Merivale felt that to concede too much to unofficials was
unwise in principle and he pointed out that no other group in British
institutions had so much power without any responsibility whatsoever.
He went on to eaqsress his regret that the Legislative Council with its
»
illusion of power, had ever been established at all; it might have
been preferable in many ways, he felt, to have continued with the pre-
21Colebrooke Council of Advice. Certainly, dissatisfaction with the
Council as it existed, was widespread among the staff of the Colonial
fcsfcOffice. The Duke of Newcastle, during hisjtenure of office, favoured
improving the situation by the extension of the unofficial membership.
At the same time, he adhered firmly to the belief that representative
government was quite out of the question. 'I think the present
Council worse than none,' he minuted. 'It has only the shadows of
power or influence, and if its members cannot be trusted withoutj^res-
22trictions they had better coma to occupy a nominal position.' As
19
A note by Blackwood on a Memorial on the constitution, in C054/309/
48 26 September 1854, says that Sir G. Grey 'has determined to con¬
cede' to demands for reform.
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early as August 1853, he made the first tentative move toward change
by asking Emerson Tennent and Charles Cameron for their advice on the
subject of possible changes in the Council. Unfortunately, a closer
examination of the situation revealed an apparently insuperable bar¬
rier to any extension of the Legislative Council and to an unofficial
majority. This was the large amount of military expenditure which
was voted annually by the Council and which would almost certainly not
be voted if the number of unofficial members we<» increased. A c^sj^vtck
, bVisra.Vt.f'"-
W\*d noted in April 1856, 'I do not^think that any extension of the
unofficial element of the Legislative Council can be prudently effected
unless some measure be taken to remove the chance of collision on this
23
particular subject.1 It was not until the mid-1860s that this
question was finally settled. By that time. Colonial Office willing¬
ness to increase the number of unofficials had evaporated» this was
partly due to the concern felt over the military question, and partly
the result of a complete lack of any significant agitation for consti¬
tutional change in the early years of the decade. For this very
reason Governor MacCarthy advised against conceding to a request in
1862 from certain inhabitants of the Northern Province that two extra
members, one official and one unofficial, be appointed to the Council.
There was, he claimed, no evidence of popular discontent with the
Council as then constituted. 'Since my return to the Colony? he
wrote, 1 have not heard a whisper of^dissatisfaction at the present
constitution of the Legislative Councillor received the slightest in-
24
timation of a desire for its reconstitution in any other form.'
23Drai fc reply dated 23 February |85& on CO34 / JOI / H3 20 SeptenW ISS4.
24C054/361/155 30 July 1861.
The situation which MacCarthy described at this time had altered
out of all recognition from that which he had reported in 1953. In
that year, he had composed a Minute on the subject of the extension
of the Council, in which he opposed many of the views put forward in
the accompanying despatch by Governor Anderson. Anderson adamantly
opposed any suggestion that increased powers should be given to the
Council. On the contrary, he firmly adhered to the idea that strong
Crown rule was the only way by which the indigenous population could
be protected. An altered Legislative Council, he claimed,
would not be the Council of the people, but chosen in the
main from a few hundred Europeans whose interests are fre¬
quently in opposition to the interests of the people....
The many - the mass consisting of a million and a half c.^-
people^ would be just as much unrepresented as they
... I know not that they would be better cared for - that
their interests would be more impartially weighed by the
Government carried on by a majority of the Legislative
Council as it is proposed to constitute it, than by the
Government as now constituted4which has its eye over the
interests of all, setting aside all classes or class -
interested considerations and views.
This is a very reasonable statement of the view against extension.
At that time, however, MacCarthy saw no danger in equalisation.
whilst agreeing that the time was not yet ripe for representative
government, he nevertheless felt that the idea of representation was
•so inherent in the very idea of all Sovereignty exercised by the
Crown of Great Britain, and so essential to the efficacy and free
working of any deliberative assembly in any one of its dependencies
as to make it the obvious duty as well as policy of its government to
introduce and developethat principle as fully as circumstances will
25
C054/301/143 20 September 1954.
allow.' Moreover, he claimed that a degree of representation was
inherent in the Legislative Council already since its procedure was
modelled on that of representative institutions.
Ward's attitude to the Legislative Council was ambivalent; on
the one hand, he tried to act in a liberal manner toward it, whilst at
the same time he was prepared to act unconstitutionally by ignoring it
altogether when it suited him to do so. His liberalism extended to a
refusal to take the chair at the Legislative Council debate on the
Fixed Establishment, because he felt that on such an important matter
nothing should be decided on his casting vote. He further attempted
to improve the institution by allowing the Chamber of Commerce and the
Planters' Association to nominate their own representatives on the
Council. Shortly before the end of his time in Ceylon, he secured
for the unofficials the right to initiate legislation for which they
had long pressed. Despite this, his view toward more drastic change
was essentially the same as MacCarthy's. When in April 1856 he re¬
ceived a despatch from Labouchere containing limited proposals for
changing the composition of the Legislative Council, he advised against
re-opening the question at a time when there was no agitation for
change in the colony. Whilst stressing that he did not doubt that his
measures would receive the same support from the Legislative Council
whether there was an unofficial majority or not, he did admit to fears
that the role of the government as guardian of the interests of the
Ceylonese might be endangered if the unofficial European element became
dominant in the Legislative Council. He agreed too, that any form of
26
C054/301/143 20 September 1854.
representative government was quite out of the question. 'The true
principles of Representative ^and <vs,\V>V, Government cannot be
introduced into a Colony^ he wrote, 'the population of which consists
of six,or eight Hundred European Settlers, a small, though intelligent
Class of Burghers, - and two Million, of Cinghalese,Tamils and Moormen,
equal to the Europeans in all legal rights, but wholly unaccustomed to
27
the working of a Constitutional System.' Another factor in Ward's
attitude to the Legislative Council was his fear of the Burgher commu¬
nity. He felt that this group would be the main one to benefit from
major changes in the composition of the Council, and he regarded this
as dangerous to the future of British rule. 'They should be used,
not trusted • he wrote in a private letter to Lytton in 1859, and he
continued by stipulating that 'if you value the peace of Ceylon, you
must never give these Gentlemen a preponderance in the Legislative
28
Council.' Thus he preferred to make minor modifications in order
to avoid the need for more sweeping changes. His unfortunate exper¬
ience in the Ionian Islands, where he had witnessed at first hand the
unhappy results of premature and sweeping constitutional change,clearly
left an impression which was not easily erased.
The Officials
The officials who sat on the Legislative Council were the five
members of the Executive Council plus the Government Agents of the
27
C054/345/9 23 July 1859. This was included in a letter written
by J. Bailey, the Governor's Secretary, at Ward's direction, to the
Chairman of the Planters' Association, G *^"5%
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Western and Central Provinces, the Collector of Customs at Colombo and
the Surveyor-General. The attendance of some of these was uncertain,
particularly the Government Agent for the Central Province>who had to
journey from Kandy for Council meetings and whose every-day work in¬
volved a considerable amount of travelling around the province. Much
of the work on sub-committees therefore tended to devolve onto the
members of the Executive Council who were based in Colombo.
One of the most recurrent problems in the working of the Legisla¬
tive Council concerned the degree of loyalty to be expected from offi¬
cial members with regard to their votes. Clearlyjif the Legislative
Council were to operate as an efficient check on the Governor, it was
essential to allow the officials to vote as they wished. Equally,
this might be embarrassing for the Governor and might cause genuine
29
difficulties in carrying on the government.
Wilmot-Horton first posed the question to the Colonial Office in
1837 of how far the officials should be allowed freedom to vote as they
wished, and the matter was later resubmitted by Stewart Mackenzie and
by Torrington. The Colonial Office found the question one of some
difficulty but generally adopted the view that those members of the
Legislative Council who were also members of the Executive Council
should usually support the Governor on matters of principle, or at
least should not record their votes in opposition to the Governor.
In 1848, Grey voiced the opinion that the officials in the Legislative
Council should be able to express their personal views there, bob that,
having done so, they should help to pass the matter in the Governor's
29
This question is dealt with at some length in Lennox Mills, pp. /*
108-11.
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favour and on his responsibility, whilst putting their dissent on
record in a Minute if so desired.^ Though the reasoning behind
such a proposal is clear enough, it also contains an element of the
ridiculous. The situation remained unclear, and Anderson found it
difficult to obtain support in the Legislative Council on many occa¬
sions, even from those members who had previously agreed to measures
in the Executive Council. This was yet another reason for his re¬
luctance to approve any scheme for increasing the number of unoffi-
cials on the Council, for he felt that this could only make his gov¬
ernment more difficult. He believed that the support of the official
members should be absolutely required on all important issues and that
31
they should not be permitted the luxury of abstention. MacCarthy
agreed that Executive Council members at least, should be required to
32
stand by decisions of that Council in the Legislative Council and
Merivale at the Colonial Office also favoured this view, whilst be¬
lieving that those officials who sat only on the Legislative Council
33
should be allowed to abstain. No definitive ruling was made by
the Colonial Officefbr, as Blackwood pointed out, the Colonial Office
would not receive a realistic view of opinions if all the officials
34
were obliged to support the government. Ward achieved at least a
temporary solution when he reached a firm understanding with his
^Minute on C054/247/53 8 March 1848.
31CO54/301/143 20 September 1854.
^Enclosed in CO54/301/143 20 September 1854.
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officials that those who sat on the Executive Council were bound to
present a united front in the Legislative Council and support all the
decisions reached by majority vote in the Executive Council. The
Governor was thus assured of at least five votes in the Legislative
Council. Despite this arrangement, there were issues on which Ward
allowed a free vote. One such was the railway debate in 1856, when
he was strongly opposed in the Legislative Council by MacCarthy, his
Colonial Secretary. In 1859 he was again opposed on the railway
issue by two members of the Executive Council. On this occasion,
however, no free vote had been granted, and Ward was bitterly angry
about the conduct of the men involved, Gibson and Skinner. He wrote
to Newcastle privately, that
tWe
.1 really do not see howgovernment is to be carred on, if the
members of the Executive Council are to oppose the Governor
openly, and bitterly, in carrying out the orders of the Secre¬
tary of State^as was the case with Major Skinner upon the
Railway Reference,- and if the Acting Colonial Secretary, who
brings me every question connected with the Supplementary
Supply, and whose recommendations are, almost invariably acted
upon, is not only to ignore his own part in the matter, but
to throw upon me the entire responsibility,when acting as a
member of a sub-committee of the Legislative Council.
It is clear, then, that whatever understandings may have been reached,
the Governor could not always rely on a majority on Council on the
military expenditure question.
The Unofficials
The group of six unofficials who sat on the Legislative Council
was made up of three representatives of the European community (one
planter, one merchant, and one member for the general European group)
35
Private letter from Ward to Newcastle, 15 November 1859, NeC 10981.
and one member from each of the Burgher, Tamil and Sinhalese popula¬
tions. The only criterion by which these men were chosen was that
the Europeans must have resided in the colony for at least two years,
and the Ceylonese must be English speaking. Ironically, there was no
ruling that a representative had to belong to the community which he
actually represented; thus for example there were occasions when, in
the absence of Coomaraswamy, a Burgher (Eaton) represented the Tamil
community because, apparently, no suitable Tamil could be found.
Similarly, a lawyer named Thomas Rust once represented the mercantile
community and was succeeded by a journalist, Capper. Furthermore,
George Wall was first a planting and then a mercantile member of the
Council.
Considerable difficulty was frequently experienced in finding men
willing to serve. It is too simple to imply, as Ward did, that this
was purely symptomatic of the lack of interest in the long-term future
36
of the island among the Europeans. Many of the planters and mer¬
chants spent a considerable part of their lives in the island and
developed financial interests which continued long after their return
to Britain. in this sense, there was no shortage of men with an
interest in the future of the colony. The problem was rather one of
time. The Legislative Council 3at approximately once a week for any¬
thing up to five months of the year. Few planters could find the time
to journey to Colombo each week and even to those merchants and Ceylon¬
ese living and working in Colombo, the sacrifice of time was still
substantial. Nor were the rewards for this s3crifice large. The
^C054/345/9 23 July 1859. Letter from J. Bailey to Chairman of
the Planters' Association on the Governor's instructions.
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Council was, after all, a purely consultative body - only in the event
of a 'rebellion* on the part of the official element, or a large number
of absences, could the unofficial group hope to defeat a government
measure. Even once the power of initiation was granted, no measure
could hope to succeed without the support of government officials.
There was thus little incentive to make the sacrifice of time necessary
for membership, particularly during the rule of an active Governor who
was pursuing measures of general acceptability. Under Ward^both the
Planters' Association and the Chamber of Commerce found it very diffi¬
cult to find men to serve and this led V7ard to speculate that a return
to the system of pure nomination might be necessary, or even that
Moorish and Kandyan representatives might have to be appointed. The
Chamber of Commerce told Acting Governor Wilkinson in 1860 that they
could find no-one willing to represent them but that they hoped that
when the railway question was under discussion once more, someone might
be found.
Perhaps the most fundamental point which should finally be stressed
concerning the unofficials is that they were in no sense a united oppo¬
sition to the administration. Not only were they not an opposition
with any opportunity to replace the government, but they were in no
sense a united group either. The six unofficials were, first and
foremost, six individuals. They were subject to no formal control by
the groups which they nominally represented, and there was no real
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In November 1860, MacCarthy again requested the Chamber to nomi¬
nate a menber as the Council was about to discuss the railway ques¬
tion. The Chamber found a member this time - J.M. Robertson. See
C054/355/28 21 Novenber 1860.
unity of interest between them. It was rarely that a question arose
in Council on which all six agreed; even over the military expendi¬
ture question^one or other would often vote differently due to reser¬
vations about the wording of resolutions.
The Legislative Council, then, was neither a powerful nor a
united body. Nevertheless, on many occasions it was called upon to
make important decisions and it is hardly surprising that it was fre¬
quently unable to rise to the occasion.
Chapter 4
THE PLANTERS
The men who were engaged in the planting enterprise in the early
fifties came from a variety of backgrounds. In many cases they lived
in isolated areas, maintaining only sporadic contact with their
fellows. They were in no way a naturally cohesive unit. Neverthe¬
less , the problems with which each planter was faced were generally
similar to those which confronted his colleagues, although the loca¬
tion of estates had a bearing upon the severity with which problems
were felt by each proprietor.
The main problem facing planters was transport and this included
two closely related, though distinguishable, aspects: the supply of
carts and the construction and maintenance of roads. Carts were
used, not merely to transport the coffee from the estates to Colombo,
but also to bring rice from the port to the plantations. The owners
of the carts were, in the main, low country Sinhalese, and although
the early fifties saw an increase in the numbers of Tamils engaged in
this trade, in 1855 this latter group still formed only five per cent
of the carriers.* Whilst the supply of carts on the Colombo to Kandy
road remained fairly steady, except when exorbitantly high rates were
offered elsewhere, the availability of carts in other planting areas
was unpredictable. Drivers understandably disliked working in
regions where small-pox or cholera wvj prevalent and they were un¬
willing to risk their carts on roads which were known to be in partic-
*Details of the numbers of low-country Sinhalese engaged in the
carrying trade were published in the Colombo Observer of 14 February
1856. Of the carriers licensed at Colombo in 1850, three per cent
were Tamils (155 out of 4,884) and in 1855 five per cent were Tamils
(314 out of 6,585).
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ularly bad condition. Nor were some of them averse to increasing
their profit dishonestly and it was an accepted fact that coffee was
often stolen en route for Colombo. One writer in the mid-forties,
from which time the situation had changed little, reported that carters
refused to take coffee from estates unless the measures given were
generous; if only the exact measure was despatched it was impossible
for any of the coffee to be removed along the way and the correct
2
amount still delivered at the destination. Cases were often recor¬
ded of carts loaded with coffee disappearing along the Colombo road;
there was little to prevent the substitution of licence plates en
route so that the cart which had left the estate effectively vanished
whilst the load itself could be sold to uninquisitive buyers in Colom¬
bo. The obvious answer was an improved system for the registration
of carts, possibly introducing the branding of the number on the side
3
of the cart. Furthermore, it was said that carters would complain
to estate agents in Colombo if they felt that they had been detained
too long on an estate, or if they had not been paid in cash. Accord¬
ing to Millie, the superintendent would then be told by the agent that
4
any further complaints by carters would result in his dismissal.
Exactly how many carts were operating in the early and mid-fifties
remains largely a matter for conjecture. Figures exist of the number
of licences granted, but these are unreliable because of the likelihood
2
P.D. Millie, Thirty Years Ago, ch. 7 (unnumbered pp.).
^Normally, the only visible sign of registration wa3 a tin plate
hanging on the side of the cart.
4Millie, ch. 7.
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of drivers registering in more than one place, or not at all. Indeed,
when a determined effort was made in the Central Province in 1855 to
stop this malpractice by requiring the surrender of the previous year's
licence plate when application was made for a new one, the number of
5
licences issued fell by more than two-fifths in the area around Kandy.
The trend was not repeated, however, in the more remote Badulla and
Nuwara Eliya areas. The figures do indicate that the great majority
of the carts were registered in Colombo and presumably plied the route
between the capital and Kandy.
The supply of carts was also regulated to a large extent by both
the number and health of the cattle available to pull them. The
first half of the decade saw the gradual replacement of the Sinhalese
bullocks by cattle imported from Southern India where a large supply
was available. In 1850 eight thousand, five hundred and seven cattle
were imported, but by 1854 the nunfoer had reached twelve thousand, five
hundred and twenty-four and, in the following year, it rose to an un¬
precedented height of sixteen thousand, five hundred and thirty-four.
Thereafter, the number sank in the following years to around the ten
7
or eleven thousand mark. Unfortunately^it is impossible to say
what proportion of these animals was imported for transport purposes
and what proportion for consumption; but, since
5Observer, 18 February 1856.
®It is likely, of course, that the cartmen in the more remote areas
might see less need to bother with the formality of registration.
Official figures gave the total number of carts in the island as
8,171 in 1854 and 8,720 in 1855. It seems likely, however, that
the estimate by the Colombo Observer of 10,000 in 1856 is a more
reliable figure. See Observer, February 1856.
7
Figures taken from J. Ferguson, Directory for 1864/5, p. 228.
conteroporari.es were quick to stress the significance of the increasing
numbers of Indian cattle when mentioning transport difficulties, it
may safely be assumed that a large proportion escaped slaughter. The
importance of the increasing use of Indian cattle lies in the fact
that they showed a markedly higher tendency to fall victim to cattle
disease (or 'murrain', as it was usually termed) and also to the lesser
8
known and less dangerous hoof disease. Estate owners made many
attempts to find cures for these diseases, but during this period, at
least, they both defied contemporary scientific knowledge.
Carts played an absolutely vital role in the coffee industry.
When supply was short and the price of transport consequently high,
the planters simply could not afford to defer shipment of their coffee.
If the coffee were to be exported from Colombo in the season in which
it was picked, it had to be shipped before the onset of the monsoon.
Few estates possessed proper storage facilities with the result that
9
the quality of any coffee which was stored was seriously impaired.
Storing coffee on the estates also caused financial problems for the
planter since it meant that he did not have the sale price of his
coffee available to meet expenses or for reinvestment. Late shipping
also led to increased freight and insurance charges.
Almost as important to the planters as the safe conveyance of
their product to Colombo was the transport of rice to the estates to
8
It was reported in a Memorial from the Planters' Association to
Anderson that one quarter of the cattle in the Central Province died
from murrain in 1852 (25,000 out of 100,000), and sporadic outbreaks
were anxiously reported in the press in the following years. See
Observer, 11 January 1855 for details of this Memorial.
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This was particularly serious because of the stress laid on the
quality of Ceylon coffee.
feed the Tamil labourers. The rice was imported from Southern India
and was sold by the planters to the labourers at a fixed price. Any
transport difficulties thus raised the cost to the planters. Simi¬
larly, estates which were not easily accessible and where the rice
supply was not assured, were the first to suffer in the event of any
labour shortage. P.D. Millie recalled that it was frequently neces¬
sary to empty carts of rice far from their destination and carry the
rice by hand when the roads were impassable or the progress of the
bandies (carts) too slow.^
Both for financial reasons and through lack of nanjiower, the
government was unable to expand the road network to keep pace with the
recovery and expansion of the coffee industry in the fifties. Many
prosperous areas were consequently very badly served by roads. A
noterious example of this was the Ova district. Lack of money for
the government departments concerned with road building meant that it
was difficult to attract highly skilled officials to them, or if such
men could be engaged, to allow them to fully exercise their talents.
It was impossible for the existing machinery to carry out both the
construction of new roads and the maintenance of existing ones. As
Sir Henry Ward wrote on one occasions "The pressure is the inevitable
result of the introduction, and too rapid development, of a new branch
of industry, creating wants for which the country was not prepared, and
which it has no means of providing for.• The government could, and
did, point in its own defence to the large sums voted and expended on
10Millie, ch. 4.
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roads, but sonte planters ware quick to point out that it was less a
question of how much was spent, than of how it was spent. Money
spent on the actual construction of roads was wasted if the same roads
were not maintained in good usable order afterwards. Amounts spent
without the benefit of experienced supervision were also wasted and it
seemed that only an enormous expansion in the staffing of the road
department could solve the problem.
Many of the difficulties originated in the fact that the economy
of the island had expanded very much more quickly than the administra¬
tion had been able toj government departments were still designed to
suit the colony as it had been in the 1820s and 1830s and, instead of
attempting to expand the administration, Anderson had preferred to
meet demands merely by feeding the existing machinery increasingly
large sums of money. These had been swallowed up with few apparent
results. Even a fairly substantial Legislative Council grant for the
upkeep of a particular road would often be spent before the end of the
year with the work unavoidably still incomplete. In such circum¬
stances^ nothing more could be done to maintain the road in that year.
Even in cases where a further sum had already been granted for the
following year's repairs, no part of this could be spent until 1
January, by which time, in all probability, the road had deteriorated
further and the labour force had moved to another area.
The number of carts passing over roads and the weight of their
loads was another factor which affected the condition of the roads.
As the coffee industry prospered, drivers strained to load more and
more coffee onto the cartsj the pressure on the wheel rims was in¬
creased and they cut more and more deeply into the surface of the
roads. The weather could be kind or cruel; if the transporting
season were a dry one, then the roads could withstand the heavy traffic
reasonably well, but after prolonged heavy rain the sane roads could
be transformed into impassable and muddy tracks.
Tha other main problem of constant concern to the planters was
the supply of labour, and this assumed new and increased significance
after 1854 when the Madras Public Works schemes were inaugurated.
With work more readily available in Southern India, there was less
incentive for the Tamils to make the hazardous journey to work on a
Ceylon coffee plantation. Tin increasing concern began to be shown by
many planters about the conditions encountered by immigrants in Ceylon.
The government was asked to contribute toward the provision of more
wells and resting places on the long walk south taken by many immi¬
grants after arrival in the north of the island and the necessity of a
regular steam communication with India was also urged.
If the planters experienced problems in the island, events many
thousands of miles away also caused them some concern. Judging by
the prominence given in contemporary newspapers to details of the pro¬
gress of coffee cultivation in Brazil, there is every indication that
the rivalry between Ceylon and Brazil was taken seriously by many
planters. In particular^it was emphasised that a railway was being
constructed in Brazil by British capitalists. Coffee, as an export-
12
able commodity, had a much longer history in Brazil than in Ceylon,
and some planters found the comparison between the two producers
12
The trade probably began there in the 1750s and by 1826 Brazil was
producing one-fifth of the world's coffee. By 1850, the proportion
was one-half.
interesting, since it could be used to present the encouragement
given to the industry by the British authorities in Ceylon in a very
poor light. A railway was under construction in Brazil in the mid-
fifties when it was no more than an idea in Ceylon.
Of greater priority was the position of coffee in Britain at this
time, for consumption was decreasing, reportedly by some hundred tons
during the first three months of 1851 alone. The blame for this was
laid on the adulteration of the coffee with chicory which was widely
practised. It was estimated thafcten thousand tons of chicory was
grown annually in Britain, and those who had invested in its cultiva¬
tion, along with many small time grocers who employed and benefited
from the practice, formed a powerful lobby. Much of what was sold at
the same price as pure coffee was thought to be actually fifty per cent
chicory.Although the adulteration had once been forbidden, the
order against it had been suspended by order of the Treasury> since the
British Government claimed that it was impossible to distinguish by
test between what was, and what was not, adulterated coffee. Oppo¬
nents claimed, however, that Dr Hassall*3 test, which had been perfec¬
ted in 1849, and which showed differences in the vegetable tissue of
pure and adulterated coffee upon examination under a microscope, could
easily be employed. It is not difficult to envisage the concern with
13
An analysis done by the Lancet in late 1850 found that a sample
of supposedly fine plantation coffee actually contained a little
coffee, a great deal of chicory and some roasted corn. Rumours
spread of the other substances used to adulterate the coffee, in¬
cluding soot, sawdust and beans. Even the chicory itself was said
to be impure. See report of a speech made by Tytler at a meeting
of planters and merchants at Kandy, ?3 June 1851, which was reported
in the Ceylon Tiroes, 27 June 1851.
which planters viewed this practice with its resultant effect on the
consumption level of coffee.
These problems which were associated with the planting industry
in the fifties can all be said to have played some part in the forma¬
tion of the Planters' Association. Although these worries had long
existed, a lack was felt of any established method by which the plan¬
ters could make representations to the government about them. The
merchants were able to express their views on issues which concerned
them through the Chamber of Commerce, but the only course which lay
open to the planters was to assemble in public meetings. Such meet¬
ings were not only disorganised but also could not claim to be repre¬
sentative of any particular group, being attended not only by planters
and merchants but also by Burgher proctors, government officials and
members of the indigenous population.
A few such meetings were held in the early fifties, but they were
14
infrequent and generally unproductive. Undoubtedly, the government
of Sir George Anderson was unsympathetic to the needs of planters and
isolated protests could not hope to attract sufficient attention in
the Colonial Office. The ineffectiveness of those protests which had
been made showed the more politically conscious among the planters
that it was necessary to organise a more concerted and representative
14
A meeting on 1 April 1854 heard complaints about the system of
maintaining roads and suggestions were put forward for the employ¬
ment of prisoners on road works. Nothing resulted, however. It
is interesting to note the prominence in these meetings of men such
as George V?all, Tytler, Pitts, Gerard, Brown and Jolly, who were
later to play such a prominent part in the foundation of the
Planters' Association. Attendance at these meetings was not
usually high. A typical one, held on 25 January 1850, was attended
by only twenty-three people.
group which could better express collective opinions. The assumption
was that, once formed, a planting body would immediately command a
certain position within the colony. In other words, it would give
the planters a permanent framework. Whilst individual planters might
come to the island and depart again fairly quickly, an association of
planting interests would provide not only an organisation within which
individual opinion might be articulated, but also, at the same time, a
continuity of leadership and consistency of approach which had pre¬
viously been lacking.
The Planters' Association was actually founded at a public meet¬
ing, held at the Boarding House, Kandy, on 17 February 1854. It was
the result of an advertisement by five men - R.D. Gerard, John Gavin,
Simon Keir, P.B. Tytler and George Wall - though Tytler's signature
had been appended to the circular calling the meeting largely as the
15
result of a misunderstanding with Wall. The inaugural meeting was
attended by around one hundred people then engaged in planting activi¬
ties.
A constitution drawn up in advance by Wall was placed before the
meeting and accepted.Its main proviso was for the establishment
of a committee which was to be the ruling body of the Association.
Each district was to have at least one representative on this body.
The whole committee was to be composed of eighteen members from the
15
According to the Observer on 9 February 1854, Tytler's name was
added to the circular in error, but when informed of this, he said
he did not mind. Later, he criticised the hostile tone of the
circular and tried to dissociate himself from it.
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The report of the meeting published in the Observer on 20 February
1854 contains details regarding the constitution.
G1
outlying districts and nine from Kandy. Significantly, clause four
specifically laid down that the quorum for the committee could consist
of the Kandy representatives alone. The reasoning behind this was
clear. As clause four stressed, it was politic to make provision for
the speedy transaction of urgent business but, in many ways, this
clause was the admission of the impossibility of involving a large
number of planters in anything more than a nominal way. The organi¬
sation was predestined to be very much a Kandy based one, and the
presence of eighteen district members on the committee was no guarantee
that those areas would be able to exert any appreciable influence on
the solid phalanx of Kandy members. In many cases, the distances to
be covered by either committee members or ordinary members wishing
to attend general meetings^ were considerable and the journeys were not
only difficult in themselves but involved prolonged absence from the
plantation which many planters could ill afford. In the first year
of the Association's existence, eight committee meetings were held at
which the nine-man Kandy contingent made a total of forty-nine appear¬
ances as opposed to only twenty-eight by the eighteen district members.
Whereas only one Kandy member attended no meetings whatsoever no fewer
than ten district members found attendance at even one meeting more
17
than they could manage.
Even at the first meeting there was an indication of a deep div¬
ergence of attitude among members. Men such as Alexander Brown, were
politically conscious and envisaged a future political role for the
Details of the attendance at committee meetings can be found in PA
Proceedings 1854.
Association. In proposing the adoption of the draft constitution,
Brown made an appeal to his audience, stressing that strength could
be achieved only through unity. Whilst stressing^ for the benefit of
his more moderate listeners^ that the Association was in no way inten¬
ded to be an opposition to the government, he made a powerful declara¬
tion of what he felt to be the communal rights of the planters:
'Surely that body which is the mainstay and support of the country -
which has made the Xsland what it is - is entitled to be heard and
represented - , entitled to a voice in the Councils which govern it -
entitled to be treated with respectful consideration - entitled to
offer suggestions and make representations where such are clearly
18
needed for its own good, and the common good.' Brown ended his
speech by declaring, 'Once convinced of the rectitude of our measures
let us press them with vigour till we gain our point, having for our
motto that of the late great Irish repealer Daniel O'Connell - agitate
19
agitate, agitate.' There were those, however, who viewed the pros¬
pect of overt political action with less than enthusiasm. These were
the men, such as Captain Bird, who viewed the Planters' Association as
basically an amended form of the old Agricultural Society, predominant
ly, though not exclusively, concerned with the technology of the plant
20
ing industry and with only a limited interest in political affairs.
Bird later drew a very strict line over which he felt the Association'
activities should not stray. At the time the Association was formed
18
Deport in the Observer, 20 February 1854.
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Feport of meeting in the Observer, 20 February 1854.
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Bird himself was actually in England at this time.
this view was not so well articulated as that of Brown, but it existed
and was to corre to the fore in the following years.
A look at the size of the membership of the Planters' Association
and at the attendance record of its meetings can give some idea of
its strength in the late fifties and sixties. In the season 1858-9,
the total membership stood at two hundred, but in the following year
the number had decreased to one hundred and forty-eight because of the
resignations of some dissident proprietors. By 1862^ the membership
had dropped still further to one hundred and twenty-five and, although
1863 was notable for a temporary increase to one hundred and forty-four,
a decline was once more apparent in the succeeding years. By 1866-7
21
only seventy-five estates were registered with the Association.
Even more significant was the attendance at both committee and
general meetings. In 1859 this was so poor that the Chairman, R.B.
Tytler, felt obliged to issue a circular to committee members on 29
April. This asked a fundamental question - 'how is it possible that
one or two persons, upon whom the onus of deliberating, it may be upon
questions of difficulty and importance, can afford general satisfac¬
tion, divided in opinion and sentiment upon so many points as the
22
Planting Committee are?' The general meeting of 20 April 1861 was
attended by only eighteen members; that of January 1862 {which adop¬
ted the new constitution) by only thirty-three. Nor were these
exceptional. Far more out of the ordinary was the gathering of over
one hundred at the general meeting of June 1862. The average member
21
Membership details are available in PA Proceedings each year.
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PA Proceedings, 1859.
of the 1861-2 committee who attended any committee meetings at all
was present at only two out of the six. Only the Chairman of the
Association, Bird, was present at them all. Ten committee meetings
were held in 1862-3, and each member attended on average only three
of these. Gavin and Harrison of Keir, Dundas and Company were among
those with the best attendance record, having been present at nine
and five meetings respectively. In 1863-4 the pattern was identical.
The most consistent attenders were Harrison and Leake and the same was
true of the following year. The only real rival to the men frcm this
agency, so far as presence at meetings was concerned, was Henry Bird.
He shared many of the same views and appears to have been closely
23
aligned with Harrison and Leake.
During the 1860s the Planters' Association became increasingly
dominated by the important Kandy agency of Keir, Dundas and Company.
This firm was by far the largest in Kandy and, both because of its
size and the fact that its offices were situated in Kandy rather than
in Colombo, it was able to exercise a major influence over the
Planters' Association until at least 1868. It produced three of the
most impressive figures in the Association in the sixties, in the
persons of Gavin, Harrison and Leake and the latter, who was Secre¬
tary of the Association until 1872, was one of the most influential
figures in its history.
Until 1862, the firm of Keir, Dundas and Company was run by Keir
and Dundas themselves, in partnership with John Gavin. One historian
has gone so far as to say that 'Probably no Ceylon firm has ever had a
23
All figures are taken from PA Proceedings.
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brighter time than Messrs. Keir, Dundas and Company enjoyed during the
24
ten years^1854-64.• Unfortunately for the Company, the failure of
Wilson, Ritchie and Company in 1864 had repercussions for both firms
as they were engaged in several joint enterprises. The following ten
years were lean ones, but the Company was eventually able to buy itself
out of trouble and to become the largest estate owner in the island,
although the decline of coffee led, naturally, to a decline in the
prosperity of the Company.
The position which this firm achieved within the Planters' Assoc¬
iation was facilitated by the constitutional changes adopted on 11
25
January 1862. Certain proprietors resented the equality in voting
accorded to superintendents and to some other members of the Associa¬
tion who had no real connection with planting. Hie idea was there¬
fore mooted, as early as 1859, that property should become the basis
of membership of the Association. Some estate owners had gone so far
as to resign in protest at what seemed to them to be a completely un¬
fair situation and a sub-committee was appointed to consider the ques¬
tion. This duly reported in favour of strengthening the position of
the property owners. It was proposed that property should, in
future, form the basis of membership and votes would be given in the
name of plantations. In this way, those who owned more than one
estate would come to possess a dominant voice in the Association. The
committee further recommended that proxy voting should be allowed in
24
Quoted from J. Ferguson, Pioneers of the Planting Enterprise,
section on w.M. Leake, vol. 0., p.M.
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Planters' Association Proceedings, 1861.
the case of absentee proprietors and that those without property qual¬
ifications should not be allowed to vote on matters concerning taxa¬
tion. The committee, and the Association^when it met to consider the
proposals, were divided over the suggestions, but eventually a compro¬
mise was reached whereby membership continued on the same basis as
26
before but voting on taxation matters was restricted to owners. It
would seem that the proposals which were not acceptable in 1859 were
put forward again, and adopted in 1862. If the exact details are un¬
clear, the implications are not. This can only be seen as a deliberate
attest by the larger interests in the Assocation to increase their
powers as multiple owners and to weaken the position of the superinten¬
dents. There were many who openly regarded the change in this light.
Alexander Brown, for example, made no secret of his critical view of
events when he resigned the Chairmanship. He wrote, with regard to
the changed constitution: 'We have run after a pampered few whom some
would wish to set up as golden images for the Planters to fall down and
worship - good men enough and highly respectable - pity indeed that we
should want them, but still not so all important that we should consider
27
them necessary to our very existence.'
The important position of Keir, Dundas and Company in the Associa¬
tion is reflected by the key roles played by three of its men, Gavin,
26
Committee meetings were held on 25 May and 15 June to discuss the
constitution. At the first of these, the proposal that property
should constitute the basis of membership was passed only on the
casting vote of the Chairman. A compromise was adopted at a Gene¬
ral Meeting on 16 July. See FA Proceedings, 1859.
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Brown's letter to the Association Secretary is contained in the
Sundry correspondence of the PA Proceedings for 1861.
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Harrison and Leake. Little is known of the early life of George
Dennis B. Harrison, but he is known to have arrived in Ceylon in 1858
as an engineer with the Ceylon Railway Company. He left its employ
soon and began to work on government irrigation schemes in the South
Province. In 1862, he joined Keir, Dundas and Company. John Gavin
first arrived in Ceylon in 1843 as an employee of Ackland, Boyd and
Company and he formed his own agency, Pitts and Gavin, in 1848. When
this partnership was dissolved in 1855, he became a partner in Keir,
Dundas and Company. He achieved some measure of fame as one of the
chief supporters of the Ceylon Railway Company and was actually the
Company's sole supporter at the famous public meeting of August 1856.
He was also one of the founders of the Planters' Association and was
active on its committee throughout the remainder of his years in Ceylon.
He v/as elected Association Chairman on 24 May 1862, in succession to
Bird, but he held the post only until February lSGS^when he returned
to England.
Perhaps the most interesting, and certainly the most important
of the three was W. Martin Leake, who was Secretary of the Planters'
Association for the ten years following 1862. Born in London in
1832, his father was official Private Secretary to the second Earl
Grey. He completed his education at St John's College, Cambridge, and
then chose to make Civil Engineering his career. From 1856-8 he was
29
apprenticed to J.M. Rendel but in October 1861 he set sail for
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Biographical details of all leading planters are available in J
Ferguson, Pioneers of the Planting Enterprise., S^ois.
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President of the Institute of Civil Engineers and Consultant
Engineer to the Ceylon Railway Company.
Ceylon, not to commence a career in planting, but at the invitation of
Harrison. He had first met Harrison in 1856, and when, a few years
later, his friend reported to him that prospects were good for engin¬
eers in the Southern Province, he lost no time in responding to his
friend's suggestion. Leake worked in the south of the island until
1861 when, after a brief trip home, he decided to enter a completely
new line of business. Both Harrison and Leake were introduced to the
firm of Keir, Dundas and Company by a nephew of John Gavin named
Anderson, with whom they had become friendly. Since all three part¬
ners in the firm were planning to retire home shortly afterwards,
Harrison and Leake were able to take over the firm. Neither of them
had had any real experience of the practical side of coffee planting
at all. Leake was quickly elected Secretary of the Association and
ten years later he became its Chairman.3*3
If Harrison and Leake lacked practical e>q>erience of planting,
this was made good,to some extent, by their close association with
Henry Bird who was Chairman of the Association for much of the sixties.
He was a nephew of the George Bird who had opened the first coffee
plantation in Ceylon in 1824. Henry became a partner in H.C. Bird and
Company, another large Kandy agency. One of the most well-known
planters of his generation, he lived at the most famous of his many
estates, 'Farieland*. Although actually absent in England at the
inauguration of the Planters' Association, he served on the committee
30
Even after his return to Britain in the mid-1870s, he continued
to take an active interest in the affairs of Ceylon and served as
London agent of the Association from 1877. He was also Secretary
of the Ceylon Association from 1888-97.
from the time of his return to the island. He was elected planting
member of the Legislative Council in 1855, in preference to George
Wall and he became Association Chairman in 1861 when Alexander Brown
resigned. He himself gave up this position shortly afterwards, due
to pressure of business commitments, but he was re-elected in 1863 and
continued in the post for the following five years. Even though Bird
had much practical experience of planting, the planting which he knew
was carried out on a large scale and he was as divorced as Harrison
and Leake from the struggle of the small planter whose livelihood
could be shattered by a poor crop.
The political stance which had been adopted by the previous part¬
ners of Keir, Dundas arid Company and, to a lesser extent, by the
Colombo merchants, Wilson, Ritchie and Conpany, was a close alliance
with the Governor. In this way, they attempted to bring influence
31
to bear directly on the man in charge. This policy was also fav¬
oured by the new partners. The firm had little to gain from any ex¬
tension of the powers of the Legislative Council since tile planting
community would not have a decisive voice in it. Furthermore, the
immediate corollary of any such liberalisation of the constitution
would be an increase in the influence of the Burgher and other native
Ceylonese communities who could not be relied upon to look sympatheti¬
cally on planter aspirations. All that a large agency could wish to
obtain from the government could be gained most surely by quiet influ-
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It is possible as rumour had it that the voice of Keir, Dundas and
Company was decisive in persuading Ward to favour the Ceylon Railway
Company scheme in 1855.
ence with the Governor and to be seen to have the ear of the Governor
was to further increase the importance of the firm.
Unfortunately for the agencies, MacCarthy proved less amenable
to this type of influence than Ward had been. Whilst anxious to in¬
gratiate themselves with the holder of the office of Governor, the
partners of Keir, Dundas and Company and many other leading figures
in the Planters' Association were confronted by an incumbent who was
not particularly sympathetic to their demands. It was this which lay
at the basis of the antagonism between Keir, Dundas and Company and
the Planters' Association on the one hand, and MacCarthy on the other.
The opposition to MacCarthy from this source in the early sixties was
largely the result of frustration stemming from unheeded advice.
Their criticisms were directed against the person of the Governor and
the Colonial Secretary alone. No criticism of the governmental sys¬
tem as such was intended. When! in 186^ the time for taking sides on
the constitutional issue arrived, the majority in the Planters' Assoc¬
iation, led by Bird, Harrison and Leake, showed that their sympathies
and hopes still lay with the autocratic rule of the Governor rather
than with any liberalisation of the constitution as demanded by the
Ceylon league.
From the time of its inauguration, the Planters' Association
sought to influence affairs in Ceylon by putting pressure on the Gov¬
ernor. Under Ward, this policy was frequently successful. Under
MacCarthy, however, the influence of the Association was greatly dim¬
inished and, as a result, the Association was loud in its criticisms
of the Governor and the administration in general. Despite this, the
Association was, and continued to be, a conservative element in Cey-
lonese society. It was the natural ally of the government and, despite
the discontent felt under MacCarthy, it continued to be so.
PART II
Chapter 5
EARLY HISTORY OF THE RAILWAY
An examination of the formation and early history of the Ceylon
Railway Company requires an initial glance at the British background
from which it emerged. The Railway Era in Britain has been said by
one writer to have begun on 15 September 1830 with the inauguration
of the first modern railway from Liverpool to Manchester.* From that
time onward, there was a steady flow of capital investment, and rail¬
way construction in the forties was able to absorb the entire British
annual surplus seeking investment, which amounted to almost sixty mil¬
lion pounds. This boom was not untouched by the depression of 1837-
42 but it continued and at the height of railway mania (1846-7) some
quarter of a million men were employed on the construction of railways
in Britain. By 1851, seven thousand miles of track had been laid and
although dividends in the early forties were often lower than antici¬
pated, they were still usually higher than those paid on government
2
stock, and an improvement did take place in the middle of the decade.
The years 1844-6 saw a blossoming of railway schemes at home.^
Nor was the upsurge destined to be confined to the domestic arena, for
as one writer has ejqplained, the boom brought into being 'promoting
and constructing organisations whose energy could not be restrained by
political accidents and which were loath to cease activity when domes-
*H. Perkin, The Age of Pvailway, p. 77.
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Much of the information regarding the railway era is drawn from
Perkin, from H. Pollins, British Railways; An Industrial History,
and from L. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875.
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In 1843, Parliament authorised the construction of one hundred
miles of line. In 1844, the figure was eight hundred and by 1846,
four thousand five hundred and forty.
tic opportunities became more restricted when competition reduced the
4
profits.' Slowly, promoters became aware of the potential overseas
and many came to see their future in foreign schemes. Although ideas
were broached at this time for railways in both Europe and the Empire
- including eleven companies to build lines in India - little was to
come of the Imperial plans, with the exception of a railway in Jamaica.
Of the eleven Indian companies, only two survived the economic crisis
of 1847-8. Most of the successful schemes were carried out in France
and the Low Countries, the Paris-Rouen line built by the London and
Southampton Company being the first to be constructed in France with
British capital.
The world crisis of 1847-8 put an untimely end to many schemes
but a proliferation of colonial plans is visible in the early fifties,
caused by a definite limitation in the European field after 1848.
Although, as Leland Jenks has said, 'Nearly every part of the world
borrowed of England's capital surplus before she made notable use of
5
it in her empire overseas,' the movement did, nevertheless, eventu¬
ally gather momentum, particularly in India under the guiding hand
of Dalhousie. In India, of course, the system of construction was
considerably more complicated than that which operated in England; the
promoters demanded safeguards because they were working so far from
home and thus there evolved the guarantee system. This meant that
the government of India pledged itself to pay interest on the capital




dividend on their investment. If the profit from running the line
were less than this amount, the difference was paid by the government
and if the profit were greater, the arrangement was usually one of
profit sharing, with a possible rider regarding the reduction of
fares.** The interest of the East India Company and the Imperial
Government in the construction of railways in India was clear - they
were not only of commercial but also of military and political impor-
7
tance in such a large and unsettled country. Furthermore, there
existed those, like Dalhousie, who saw railways as possessing a
strong social and economic purpose and who hoped that just as the em¬
ployment of British capital and labour in European construction had
engendered local enterprise, so a similar result might be effected in
India.
Who then were the key people behind these enterprises? All the
British schemes were carried out by Joint Stock Companies, since any
form of direct government construction was unthinkable, at least until
g
the late forties. The early buyers of railway shares were small,
provincial investors rather than the business classes of London, but
gradually London became the focal point of the enterprise and the
shareholders came to have less and less control over the directors.
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The first guarantee was given to the East India Company in 1844.
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A recent writer has shown that the Mutiny acted as a spur to rail¬
way construction in India, where railways had a recognised military
importance. W.J. Macpherson, 'Investment in Indian Railways 1845-
75, Economic History Review, Vtll (1956).
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The Belgian Government was the first to decide to construct the
main lines itself and this decision was followed by that of the
French Government to proceed along similar but more limited, lines.
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In many cases, the latter themselves began to fall under the dominance
of either large financial interests or the contractors who had for¬
merly been employed by them.
Enormous scope existed for unscrupulous promoters, particularly
in the later 1840s} schemes behind which there was little or no in¬
tention of actual construction were projected, deposits collected and
the directors shares sold at a premium. The company was then quietly
wound up. Nor were directors always above giving agents company
money with which to buy shares to increase the price. The worst of
these directors could, as has been said, 'steer the company's spending
toward the purchase of land, equipment or materials, often at inflated
9
prices, in which they had a private interest.' Names such as Leopold
10 11
Redpath and George Hudson soon became notorious and severely tar¬
nished the image of the whole enterprise.
The Ceylon Railway Company
A modern writer has asserted that 'The key groups whose pressure
led to the launching of modern railways in India were the great English
12
and Scottish mercantile houses trading in the Fast'. This statement
is equally valid with regard to the formation of the Ceylon Railway
9
Perkin, pp. 182-3.
^Re<%>ath was the Registrar of the Great Northern Railway who was
convicted of embezzling and transported for life in 1857.
^Throughout his career, Hudson operated just within the law. By
1848, he controlled companies worth £30,000,000 but following in¬
vestigations into the accounts of his companies in 1849, he was
forced to resign and in 1855 he fled abroad.
12
D. Thorner, 'Great Britain and the Development of India's Rail¬
ways', Journal of Economic History, XI, 1851.
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Company. The of this body stated in 1847 that the Company's
promoters were 'for the most part Gentlemen closely connected and in¬
timately identified with the Interests of the important Colony of
Ceylon.A glance at the list of directors in 1845 lends credence
to this view. Of the twenty-three named in official returns, fourteen
belonged to mercantile firms with interests in Ceylon. The others
comprised a Ceylon government official, an ex-Ceylon government offi¬
cial, a director of the Bank of Ceylon, the Secretary of the East India
Railway Company, an ex-Lieutenant in the Ceylon Rifle Regiment and an
ex-East India Company servant. None of these people was resident on
the island and, although those with commercial interests there might
hope to reap the benefits of improved communications, the main aim of
the enterprise was to make money from the construction of the railway
itself. By July 1848, the thirteen remaining directors owned almost
14
one quarter of the shares sold.
Although the idea had been previously mooted in Ceylon, the ori¬
ginal impetus for a railway in the island came neither from the colony
nor from the Secretary of State, but from this group of men in London.
They approached Lord Stanley with the nucleus of a scheme in 1845.
The attitude of the Colonial Office at this time was non-committal and
the matter was referred to the Ceylon government. Before any answer
was received from the colony, before indeed the despatch in question
could have arrived in the island, the Ceylon Railway Company was pro-
15
visionally registered under the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844.
13 Letie r -«ac<yJVe.W (5 "-^-t V~®
\ ^ ^ R*uv ' , vo| 3 ( '
14BT41/135/785/2069/l and C.246/27.
^Details of the provisional registration of the Company can be seen
at BT41/135/785/2069/1.
By October 1845 twenty-four shares had actually been allotted and a
local committee appointed to act as the Company's mouthpiece in
Ceylon.^ Governor Campbell's reception of the scheme was warm, as
was that of both the Executive and Legislative Councils and Campbell
was able to write that he had obtained 'their concurrence in my
opinion that this undertaking if successfully executed will be very
17
conducive to the prosperity of the Country.' The two Councils
even recorded decisions in favour of the free grant of necessary land
to the Company although this was a point which was soon to become
cont rove rsial.
The Company was provisionally registered as occupying premises at
8, Broad Street Buildings, the same address as the East India Railway
Company. The avowed object of the Company, as declared at this time
was 'The Establishment, construction and maintenance and working of
Railway communications between Colombo and Kandy, and other parts and
places in the Island of Ceylon and the prosecution of all operations
and undertakings which may be necessary or convenient for the purposes
thereof or which may advantageously be prosecuted or carried on in
18
connection therewith.' A fairly comprehensive monopoly was obvious
ly envisaged and the arguments used in support of the scheme were
mainly concerned with the opening up of the country and the exploita¬
tion of its resources. Nothing is more indicative of the changes
16
The committee was composed of Parke, Darley, Wilson, Armitage,
Crabbe, Gibson, Gallway, Sanders, H.L. Lavard and G.B. Worms.
17
C054/219/241 24 November 1845.
18
Schedule to the Deed of Settlement; description of the business
of the Company BT41/135/785 C.246/23.
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which took place in Ceylon in the early fifties than the fact that a
mere ten years later the country had been largely opened up and the
driving force behind the construction of the railway had become the
need to transport the vast quantities of coffee then being produced.
It was tentatively estimated in 1845 that the line was likely to
cost around £6,000 per mile, although it was hoped that on many
stretches of track the final figure would be less than this. Late in
1845, a surveyor, a Mr Drane, was sent out to the colony to survey pos¬
sible lines and to report back to the Company's Consulting Engineer,
Mr Rendel. The execution of this survey does seem to indicate that
the Company scheme was a serious one. Drane's Memorandum, when com¬
pleted, indicated that a line could be built - not exactly from Colombo
to Kandy but from points about three miles outside each town - for
19
£798,000. Drane himself admitted that this estimate was a very
approximate one, but his figures were accepted without question by all
the parties involved. Parke, Chairman of the railway committee in
Ceylon, described the scheme advocated by Drane as 'not merely per¬
fectly practicable, but in facility of Execution far exceeding the
most sanguine Expectations which had been formed by the Promoters of
20
the Line or the Consulting Engineer in England, Mr. Rendel' .
Slightly before this, however, it had been announced that the promo¬
ters of the East India Conpany had been granted an Imperial guarantee
and this led to requests both in Colombo and London that the Ceylon
railway project should be similarly favoured. Without such a grant,
19
Drane's Memorandum can be found at C054/233/28 13 February 1847.
20
C054/233/28 13 February 1847. Letter from Parke to Tennent.
it was contended, the Ceylon Conpany would be at a great disadvantage
In April 1847, Grey turned down this request.** In the following
month, however, he announced his willingness to accept the other terms
22
put forward by the Company directors, with certain modifications.
These involved the acceptance of the idea of a colonial, as opposed to
an Imperial, guarantee and the free grant of all the necessary land
for ninety-nine years. By June, problems regarding the future pur¬
chase price and the carriage of government mail and troops had been
ironed out and an ordinance (containing the terms of the agreement)
was in the process of preparation for submission to the Legislative
Council. Unfortunately, the economic crisis of 1847-8 intervened
and, by September 1847, Torrington was forced to write to Grey admit¬
ting that the colony could not possibly manage to pay the five per
cent guarantee in the existing economic climate. He emphasised that
there was thus no prospect of plans for a railway bearing fruit in
23
the nearfiiture. The Company itself entered a period of dormancy
and almost faded from the scene.
It seems likely, though the evidence is not complete, that some
of the Company's proceedings had not been above board. To begin with
the figure in its prospectus of seventy-nine thousand cart journeys
along the Colombo to Kandy road each year was an exaggeration designed
to boost the prospects of the Company. More important was Dr Elliott
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later charge that only one-third of the original scrip had ever been
issued, with the result that the price had risen and men had been able
24
to sell their cheaply-acquired shares at a handsome profit. Cer¬
tainly, although the Company was originally registered to raise
£300,000 in twenty thousand £15 shares, the records show that just
over five thousand shares had been issued by 1847 and in 1853 the
figure was still below six thousand five hundred. Despite this, the
Company turned down a number of applications for shares saying that,
because of the immense demand, not all applications could" be favour¬
ably considered. It is hard to interpret this action in an uncriti-
25
cal light.
It is worth emphasising that this first attempt at railway con¬
struction was one for which the impetus came mainly from large mercan¬
tile firms interested in Ceylon such as Binny and Company, Bell and
Company and Philips and Son. Some Colombo firms took an interest in
the plans and were even represented on the Board and there was con¬
siderable support in the colony for the idea of a railway, but the
scheme was less a response to colonial needs and demands than a typical
example of the extension of British capitalist enterprise in the mid-
1840s. It is here that the contrast between the first and second
railway schemes is most striking, for the impetus for the next attempt
at railway construction, which involved the same Company and which was
equally unsuccessful, was to come very definitely from the colony.
24
The claim was made in a speech at a Public Meeting in Kandy on 19
July 1856 which was reported in the Observer, 21 July 1856.
25
The Observer reported on 25 August 1856 that the Company's brokers,
P. Cazenove, had withdrawn from their post because of the 'sharp
practice' carried on by the Company.
88
Steps toward a railway 1850-4
The first step toward bringing the question of a railway to the
fore once again was taken in February 1850, when the Colombo Chamber
of Commerce appointed a sub-committee to consider the matter. Follow¬
ing this, a meeting was held and a Memorial was sent to Governor
Anderson stressing that 'A railroad had become indispensable for the
26
prosperity and safety of the Agricultural interests of the Colony.'
The Governor's reaction was to reject immediately any possibility that
a railway could be financed from ordinary colonial revenue. Instead,
27
he wrote to David Wilson enquiring as to the form of extra taxation
which would be most acceptable to the planters and merchants. Wilson,
in his reply, refuted the idea that such taxation was necessary at all
and he supplied detailed suggestions as to how the ordinary revenue
28
could be increased sufficiently to pay the costs of construction.
The line proposed in this letter was one from outside Colombo to
Gordon's Bridge on the edge of the foothills, with a branch line to
Gampolla. The Chamber of Commerce estimated that £40,000 - to be
raised by the methods outlined - would be sufficient to pay the
interest on the necessary capital for three years. After three years,
it was assumed the profits of the line would be such as to render
26
Memorial to Anderson, 4 December 1850, quoted in the Ceylon Times,
7 February 1851.
27
A leading member of the Chamber of Commerce.
28
C054/314/12 12 January 1855. The letter was written on 23 January
1851 and originally forwarded to London on 16 April 1851. Wilson's
suggestions for raising money included greater land sales, the sale
of the cinnamon gardens, the Commissary stores and the steamer 'Sea-
forth' and the remission of the military contribution of £24,000 per
annum.
S°l
contributions by the government unnecessary. Not only did this letter
deny the unavoidability of increased taxation, but it also categori¬
cally stated that this would be an unacceptable price to pay for a
railway.
The colonial government remained uncertain as to whether the
profits would be sufficient to pay the guarantee after the three
years had passed, and the Governor accordingly recommended to the
\
29
Colonial Office that the scheme be turned down. Although the Colo¬
nial Office had no objection, in principle, to the construction of a
railway in Ceylon, there were doubts regarding the stability of Cey¬
lon's financial position, and the Secretary of State therefore accepted
the advice of the Governor and decided against the proposal.^0
The early fifties saw the Chamber of Commerce take an increasingly
active role on a wide range of issues and a steady flow of Memorials
ensued on a range of subjects from administrative defects and consti¬
tutional failings, to the campaign against the adulteration of coffee
31
with chicory, a practice then extensively carried out in Britain.
The railway was only one of the focal points of agitation for the mer¬
chants. In contrast, these years passed without any significant ex¬
hibition of interest in a railway from the planters in the island,
32
other than a very few isolated expressions of opinion from individuals.
29
C054/278/29 10 March 1851.
^Minutes on C054/278/29 10 March 1851.
31
Examples of Memorials from the Chamber of Commerce can be seen at
C054/282/174 8 November 1851 (abolition of the cinnamon duty) and
C054/302/162 12 November 1853 (adulteration of coffee).
32
A planter wrote to the Ceylon Times on 24 January 1851 expressing
his fears that too high a price could be paid for the railway. He
lo
Nor can the failure of the planters to seize upon the idea of a rail¬
way as speedily as did the merchants, be attributed solely to their
lack of formal organisation; there were other contemporary issues,
most noticeably the adulteration question, on which planters meetings
were held and on which some collective action in the form of Memorials
was taken. It may simply have been that concerted action was more
easily achieved in protest against an apparent wrong than in support
of any constructive measxire; it is more likely, however, that the
circumstances surrounding the coffee industry at this time rendered
transport a subsidiary problem, weighing far less heavily on the minds
of planters than the iniquities of the Surveyor-General's office, which
they believed to be actively hindering expansion. whatever the reason,
it is clear that leading planters were slower than their mercantile
colleagues to appreciate the benefits a railway could bring them."'
The mercantile community maintained the pressure for a railway
and at a meeting in late 1852 a sub-committee of prominent merchants
was formed to enquire once again into the practicability of a line.
The committee's report was presented to a public meeting in March 1853
and a resolution stating that a railway would be of incalculable advan-
34
tage to the colony was accepted. The question of how to finance
pointed out that little benefit would be felt by some districts to
compensate for the imposition of an export duty.
33
Some planters attended the Exchange meeting on the constitution
but there is no evidence that any planters were present at the rail¬
way meeting of December 1852.
34
The meeting, which was chaired by Armitage, was held on 1 March.
A resolution affirmed that 'the speedy realisation of a rail road
between Colombo and Kandy would be of incalculable advantage to the
Agricultural Community and all other intents of the Colony, and
that it would yield a fair remuneration to the shareholders.' C054/
298/21 23 March 1853. ~TTV<vo-v# ^
the line was neatly by-passed by the suggestion that a deferred
guarantee should be proposed so that interest was payable only when
35
part of the line came into operation. The meeting also accepted a
proposal that one hundred acres of land should be granted to the Com¬
pany shareholders for every mile of railway completed.
When this scheme was submitted to Anderson, it won his approval
as well as that of the Executive Council, since the proposal for a
deferred guarantee seemed to protect the financial interests of the
36
colony. The Colonial Office was quick to point out, however, that
there was no certainty that any party could be found to undertake the
work on these terms. Enquiries then uncovered the fact that the
Ceylon Railway Company was still in existence and tentative negotia¬
tions were begun. A vital step had thus been taken solely as a
result of pressure from the mercantile community. Nor is there any
evidence to suggest that the Ceylon Railway Company was in any way
behind the agitation of the merchants. On the contrary, it soon
became all too apparent that the Company was not at all prepared for
the resumption of negotiations. Nevertheless,the directors agreed
to re-open the scheme. They were adamant, however, and this is
further proof that there was no collusion with parties in Ceylon, that
the conditions which had been suggested on the island were impractical
in view of the more favourable terms recently granted to companies
The proposal was that a three per cent guarantee should be given
on £350,000 to be paid as soon as the railway was in operation from
the Bridge of Boats (outside Colombo) to Gordon's Bridge. Five per
cent would be payable on the entire sum of £800,000 once the line was
completed to near Kandy.
36C054/298/21 23 Parch 1851.
operating in Canada and India. Instead, they suggested the re-adop¬
tion of the 1847 terms, although they were prepared to concede the
principle of a deferred guarantee in return for a large grant of land.
37
A deputation from the Company met the Duke of Newcastle in June and
the Company subsequently agreed to abandon the 1847 terms, proposing
instead that a contract similar to that granted to Indian companies
38
should be adopted. This would involve entrusting the actual con¬
struction of the line to a contractor who would agree to finish the
work within a certain time and to whom the Company would pay interest
at five per cent until the railway opened. After that time, the
interest paid by the Company would be added to its capital stock on
which the Ceylon government would guarantee a dividend.
Onfortunately, the derangement of the money market toward the end
of 1853 prevented the taking of any decision; despite two attempts by
the Colonial Office to encourage action, the Ceylon Railway Company cKc<ac\ro<-<=,
39
felt unable to commit themselves until the financial climate improved.
At this stage, it is interesting to note, Newcastle believed that it
was absolutely essential to tie the Company down to a specific cost
and to a shorter period of guarantee. On 27 July the Colonial Office
wrote to the Company in clear terms: 'His Grace directs me to state
that in the first instance^and without prejudice to the ultimate right
of Her Majesty's Government to decide freely on their application, it
37
Newcastle was then Secretary of State for the Colonies.
38
C054/304 Ceylon Railway Company to Colonial Office, 15 June 1853.
39
C054/312 Ceylon Railway Company to Colonial Office, 16 December
1854.
^3
is indispensable that the Company should so far amend their proposals
as to name some specific sums as the amount of capital on which they
wish a dividend to be guaranteed by the local Government, and also
greatly reduce the number of years which [sic] such guarantee is to
40
be continued.* These were later to be the main demands emanating
from the colony. Although nothing came of this request, it was to
prove unfortunate for the colony that future Secretaries of State did
not follow Newcastle's lead.
It was only in 1854 - following the inaugural meeting of the
Planters' Association - that the planting body began to take a serious
interest in the railway question. Even at the first meeting, prece¬
dence was given to resolutions on the Survey and Road Departments and
41
the Road Ordinance. It is noticeable, too, that the resolution on
the railway was actually proposed by Keir, a leading mercantile
figure, and it called primarily for cooperation with the Chamber of
Commerce in order to secure a railway. Thus it was that the planting
interests,albeit belatedly, added to the pressure already emanating
from their mercantile colleagues.
At a Planters' Association committee meeting on 13 March a sub¬
committee was appointed to collect information about the possibility
42
of a railway and to put forward recommendations. Its Report formed
40CO55/96 27 July 1853.
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Resolution six of the Planters' Association meeting held on 17
February 1854 dealt with the railway. Observer, 20 February 1854.
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This sub-committee comprised Keir, Gerard and Pride. This was
merely one of several sub-committees appointed to look into a wide
range (^f subjects from the cost of rest sheds and wells on the North
Road, uthe system of road labour to the difficulties of obtaining




the basis of a Memorial from the Planters* Association in July.
The general conclusion was that there was an urgent need for an im¬
proved transport system since it seemed that the supply of carts
could not meet the demands placed upon it by the expanding coffee
industry. Speed, it was emphasised, was the criterion of efficient
transport and it was claimed that in the season of 1853-4, only just
over half the crops had left the island before the onset of the mon¬
soon, with the result that the cost of freight and insurance was
greatly increased. The Report concluded, 'If these drawbacks,
costly transport, high freights, low prices, dear policies, deterio¬
ration and loss - which have been entailed on Planting Interests during
a single season, by the difficulty of conveyance, be added together,
they will form an aggregate of evil sufficient to justify the loudest
clamour for the establishment of a Railway, and to show its imperative
44
necessity.* The proposal advanced was that the Imperial Government
should borrow the sum of half a million pounds, on a Ceylon government
guarantee, with the power to increase this to one million if necessary.
The Ceylon Railway Company would then be paid off and the work let to
contractors.
The scheme was clearly based on the assumption that the Ceylon
Company had already failed. The calculations on which the claims
regarding the viability of a railway were based were of some impor¬
tance for the future since it was estimated that the return from the




Planters' Association Proceedings 1854. The report was based on
the assumption that the Company scheme had failed.
possible increases) would be £69,000. If Drane's estimate of the
annual expenses, £25,000, were deducted, approximately £44,000 per
annum would be left from which the interest on the £800,000 could be
paid. The payment of interest at a rate as high as five per cent
could therefore be contemplated with equanimity, and the Report ad¬
mitted that four per cent would probably be too low a rate.
Whilst the Planters' Association gave preference to the idea of
the work being undertaken by contractors with money raised by means
of an Imperial loan, the way to alternatives was not closed. This
was wise since the Imperial Government had rejected the idea of an
Inperial guarantee in no uncertain terms in 1847 and a reversal of
previous policy was unlikely. By clearly dismissing four per cent
as too low a guarantee and by proving that five per cent or even five
and a half per cent could be paid, the committee had taken a porten¬
tous step. Apart from this one point, however, the Report was vague
on those issues which were later to become such contentious ones.
The arguments propounded by the Report and accepted by the meeting
were in favour only of a line from the coast to the interior, and
even Skinner's scheme for a line from Kandy to Trincomalee was not
rejected out of hand. Unanimity had been achieved only by the
deliberate shelving of the most important issues, such as how the
railway was to be financed, whether it should be constructed by a com¬
pany or a contractor and which route the line should take.
Chapter 6
THE GOVERNOR AND THE RAILWAY
By any criterion, Sir Henry Ward can be said to have arrived in
Ceylon at a most important stage in the development of the colony.
He was faced with largely the same problems as those faced by his
immediate predecessors, yet the increases in the revenue provided
Ward with unprecedented opportunities for solving them.
The prosperity in Ceylon and the apparent stability of the London
money market made progress on the railway more likely than it had
appeared since the days before the 'crash' of 1848. Nor was Ward
slow to throw his weight behind demands for a railway* There were
loud calls for the construction of a line from both planters and mer¬
chants and it is probable that MacCarthy reported the results of his
interview with a mercantile deputation in March to the new Governor.
This had demanded a railway at any cost. The planters had long com¬
plained of the condition of the roads and the difficulties of trans¬
porting coffee; Ward accepted the justice of their complaints that
the road system was inadequate to meet the demands of the developing
economy. In his opening speech to the Legislative Council in July
1855^ the new Governor expressed his opinion that 'no increase in the
means of conveyance now in use could keep pace with this increase of
productive power, and no ordinary Road could afford accommodation to
the number of additional Carts and feullocks that would be required^were
it possible to procure them.'*
The railway soon became the central feature of Ward's entire plan
for the improvement of the colony. His programme was based on the
1C054/316/53 1.1 July 1855.
belief that ensuring the prosperity of the coffee industry was not
only a worthwhile end in itself but that the increased revenue which
it brought to the island would allow the colonial government to take
measures to advance public works,,such as irrigation. From this wish
to develop the social and economic policy of the administration arose
the Governor's proposal that an extra £100,000 should be raised on the
railway guarantee, for use on works which would benefit the indigenous
population. The Colonial Office was horrified at the idea of corfoin-
2
ing entirely separate matters, but to Ward the idea was entirely
rational; the railway and public works were but two aspects of a
wider plan. It was for this reason that the Governor came to support
the idea of a general export duty instead of one levied on coffee
alone. Since he believed the railway would be of benefit to the
populace as a whole, whether directly or indirectly, it seemed entire¬
ly equitable that the duty which was to help finance the project
should be broadly based. Unlike his successor, Ward was reluctant to
economise on schemes of public improvement in order to finance the
railway.
Not only was Ward soon convinced of the need for a more efficient
form of public transport in Ceylon, he was also quickly convinced that
the best method of construction lay through the agency of the Ceylon
Railway Company. Ward felt the same reluctance as the Colonial Office
staff to see the colonial administration too closely involved in the
details of construction. He admitted in his Opening Address to the
Legislative Council in 1856 that he viewed 'with much apprehension,
2
Notes and drafts on C054/316/53 II July 1855.
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the complicated series of transactions, in which the Local Government
would be engaged, by the necessity of raising the Capital required
for so large an undertaking upon Bonds..'3 In a despatch a year
earlier, he had announced his general support for the Company scheme;
'the entire direction of the Railway, both during its construction,
and when at work, should, I think, be placed in the hands of a Com¬
pany, without any other intervention on the part of the Government,
than that amount of general supervision and control, which are indis¬
pensable for the Public Security, and of which the system adopted in
4
India presents the best model' It is conceivable that Ward's adher¬
ence to the Company scheme could have been shaken had a convincing
argument been made out for an alternative method of construction which
avoided the involvement of the local government in the day to day
details of construction. However, he was anxious to expedite matters
as much as possible. An energetic and somewhat impatient man, with
only a six-year term to serve in Ceylon, he had no time to waste if he
were to see his labours bear fruit.
From the beginning it was Ward's belief that a line should be
5
constructed to connect the towns of Kandy and Colombo. It was his
reluctance to sanction a partial line which persuaded Colonial Office
officials to reject the scheme for a fifty-five mile line. So reso¬
lute was he in this view that he even indicated his willingness to
3C057/2 3 13 July 1856.
4C054/316/53 11 July 1855.
5
Various schemes for a shorter route, for example from Colombo to
Gordon's Bridge had been mooted.
consider negotiation with other parties if the Ceylon Railway Company
proved reluctant to undertake the entire line. Unfortunately, he
was never over worried about the terms on which agreement was reached.
Having decided that the railway must go ahead, his only concern was
that a contract should be arrived at with some party - preferably the
Ceylon Railway Company - who would be willing to begin work quickly.8
As a result of this, he failed to adopt a firm line over the Resolu¬
tions of the Executive and Legislative Councils, passed in August
1855, and he gave the Colonial Office freedom of action to agree
whatever terms they could with the Company. He went so far as to
write to the Colonial Office, saying that 'I have little doubt that
provided the undertaking be place in safe hands, and the Colony have
the assurance that the Railway will be completed within a reasonable
time, the terms which Your Lordships may think just, upon a full con¬
sideration of the case, may be ratified here by Ordinance.'"' The
resolutions of the Councils were not, he stressed, to be regarded 'as
conditions, without which the Agreement to be concluded by Your Lord¬
ship will not be a. Joptec|. A year later, however, the failure of
the Provisional Agreement to comply with the Resolutions of the Leg¬
islative Council formed one of the main reasons for the opposition with
which that body met the Agreement.
8Much later Ward was to admit that he had felt opinion in the island
to be so divided on the question in mid-1855 that he had adopted a
deliberate policy of forging ahead with his own plan in preference
to wasting time trying to conciliate the various grovqps. C054/318/
59 15 November 1855.
'C054/316/91 16 August 1855.
8Ibid.
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By early 1856, the discontent felt by many in Ceylon over the
trend of the railway negotiations had gathered momentum. The enthus¬
iasm of the Chamber of Commerce had cooled noticeably and the merchants
were no longer preaching the necessity for a railway at any price.
Instead they tended to favour construction by the government. A
public meeting in Kandy on 2 February adopted a hostile attitude to
the idea of construction by the Company and expressed its fears regard-
9
ing the possible cost of the line. It demanded a survey to estimate
the likely cost of construction before any agreement was concluded.
News of the London meeting of December 1855 and of the subsequent Mem¬
orial from Baring Brothers and others urging that the government under¬
take the task of building the line through contracts, had also reached
the colony.^ As well as this, fears were expressed that the Ceylon
Railway Company would be unable to raise the necessary money in time
because of the difficulties which it was experiencing over the owner¬
ship of the original Company scrip.
Ward did not ignore this increasing discontent completely and his
enthusiasm for the Company scheme also cooled a little. In forwarding
a Memorial from the public meeting of 2 February, he admitted that the
)
general feeling in the island was hostile to the Company and that this
would 'present a serious obstacle to the working of any company since
9
Report of meeting in C054/321/19 6 February 1856.
^The Minute of Opinion presented to the Secretary of State after
the meeting was printed in the Observer of 14 January 1856.
^C054/316/91 16 August 1855. In 1845 all shares were issued at £2
but the price then sank to 9d. Many owners could no longer be
traced and it was feared that the scrip have accumulated into a
few hands.
the arrangements proposed by the Secretary of State must be adopted by
12
the Legislative Council.1 There are indications that Ward himself
began to lose faith to some extent in the Company at this time, prob¬
ably because of the apparent delays in the negotiations and the strin¬
gent criticisms voiced in the colony. He wrote to the Secretary of
State on 6 February admitting that he found it 'impossible to deny
that a (Company would desire, and endeavour( to add a dividend out of
profits, to the six per cent guaranteed, and that the probable mode of
arriving at this Dividend would be by a high tariff.
By the time this despatch was received in the Colonial Office
negotiations with the Ceylon Railway Company had advanced considerably
and an agreement was imminent. Ward's equivocation thus came too
late to influence proceedings. However, he continued to worry over
the likely reception of any agreement in the colony as a whole and in
the Legislative Council in particular. Whereas he had felt in the
previous year that any reasonable proposal would be acceptable, he now
had second thoughts. 'I am bound>this year, to admit,' he wrote,
•that I cannot forsee the issue of my proposal, however reasonable or
advantageous per se, supposing the Council to represent the conflict-
14
ing opinions^that unquestionably prevail out of doors.' This un¬
certainty was banished once he saw a copy of the Provisional Agreement,
however. * He immediately forgot his previous worries and wrote in
12
C054/321/19 6 February 1856. This argument ignored the fact that
the Governor could command an official majority in the Legislative
Council.
xJIbid.
14C054/322/Confidential of 9 June 1856.
^This reached the colony in July 1856.
ecstatic terms to Labouchere to express his delight at the terms
secured.*6 In order to forestall possible opposition from sections
of the colonial community, he suggested that the Royal Assent should
be withheld from the Legislative Council Ordinance incorporating the
%
Agreement until such time as a survey could be undertaken to make
certain that a line could in fact be constructed within the limit of
17
£1,200,000. On this condition, the Council accepted the Agreement,
but only after much resistance from certain members.
Unfortunately, it proved impossible,for constitutional reasons, to
suspend the grant of the Royal Assent in this way. Instead.,a Supple¬
mental Agreement was drawn up which arranged that the contract would
come into force only if the survey proved satisfactory as regards
cost. An engineer. Captain Moorsoro, arrived in the island and pro¬
ceeded to conduct the required survey with a sum of £10,000 voted by
the Legislative Council. His Report appeared to be all that any ad¬
vocate of the railway might have desired, for it seemed to show that a
line via the Parnepettia Pass could be built for only £856,557. Ward
18
was generous in his praise of the quality of Moorsom's work and was
so convinced of the accuracy of the survey that he quickly pointed out
to the Colonial Office that a substantial amount would be left within
*6Ward wrote privately to Labouchere, 'I never conceived that the
Company would have assented to terms so favourable to the Colony and
I cannot conceive that the Colony will be foolish enough to reject
them.' Letter 5^ \o. lESfc
17
This was the amount which it was generally believed the colony
could afford.
18
Ward wrote of Moorsom's Report: 'having seen his Report, I am
bound to tell you that I think he has done his work with great
judgment and that all his results are sound.' pf* M^fce Wbbe<-
bc> b-cOrao -Ki W®
( ftjvriV
io3
the £1,200,000 limit which could be used for the construction of
branch lines.®
There was no possibility of the immediate commencement of the work
however. Although the survey which Moorsom had carried out had consid¬
ered the merits of six different routes, finally deciding in favour of
the one via the Parnepettia Pass, no precise line had been traced. In¬
stead, only a general course had been drawn, which was approximately half
a mile wide. According to the contract, the exact details were to be
worked out by the Consulting Engineer, who was to be appointed to advise
the colonial government. In fact, no such appointment was ever made.
The Governor raised the question of this appointment on numerous occa¬
sions throughout the year, but the Colonial Office officials remained
20
adamant that it would be a totally unnecessary expense. Instead the
Company appointed its own Consulting Engineer in London. Ward was later
to Mame this decision not to f ill the post of Consulting Engineer to the
colonial government for many of the ensuing difficulties but at the time
he acquiesced in the alteration in the system with much less reluctance
than he was later to claim.
The problem remained of tracing the exact line for the permanent
way and the Company eventually sent out its Resident Engineer, Doyne,
to undertake the task. He had been at work only a short time when he
reported that changes were needed in the first twenty miles of Moorsom's
19co Su-1 B-xi J "2-^ rwj ^s-r.
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Minute, on 0054/330/173 29 September 1857
2^He wrote privately to Labouchere on 14 December 1857 'though the Rail¬
way Agreement was a capital one to carry, it would have been a very bad
one to work if construed too strictly.' Work would proceed better, he
felt, without a Consulting Engineer in Ceylon. Letter 46.
route. Ward agreed that the changes were inevitable, though making
the line much loss direct, but this was the first sign that all was
not destined to progress smoothly. The time clause in the contract
with the Company, within which it v-jcls obliged to complete the works,
was due to come into operation only after all the land needed for the
line had been handed over to the Company by the government. Since
the exact trace was not known and Doyne's work was confined to the
lower reaches of the route, it was obviously impossible for the govern¬
ment to purchase all the land required. Hence there was no question
of the Company's being bound by this clause. This fact was completely
overlooked by Governor Ward. Instead, with his characteristic enthus¬
iasm, he went ahead with the turning of the first sod at a lavish cere-
22
raony in Colombo on 3 August 1858.
By early 1859 it was apparent that the system by which the works
were administered was grinding to a halt. In theory, Doyne, as Resi¬
dent Engineer, was entrusted with a considerable degree of responsi¬
bility and was not subordinate to the Consulting Engineer in London.
The Board in London appeared unwilling, however, to allow Doyne the
23
freedom which his instructions promised him, and there was a series
22
Even the Directors of the Ceylon Railway Company who were not noted
for their parsimony, were_later to record 'with much concern that an
expenditure^7^" 900^appe'Srs by the accounts to have been incurred
for festivities ... and they feel bound to record their disapproval
of such uncalled for expense as inconsistent with the strict economy
so essential to the successful prosecution of the enterprise.' CO/
54/340 18 November 1858, Ceylon Railway Company to Colonial Office.
23
Clause 11 of Doyne's Instructions stated that although he was free
to correspond witti Consulting Engineer in London with a view to their
mutual cooperation 'he is not to take instructions from the Consult¬
ing Engineer.' This point was reinforced in clause 77 where the
Board stated that they had 'no desire to impose restrictions which
loS
of disputes over such apparently trivial matters as the food allow-
24
ances due to the staff. In the absence of a government Consulting
Engineer, Doyne was called upon to liaise with the government, and
hence the Governor was drawn into the disputes occurring between Doyne
and the Board at home and not infrequently called upon to arbitrate.
The desire of the Board to curtail Doyne's powers was most strikingly
illustrated by the appointment in mid-1858 of a Company Agent in Cey¬
lon who was given power to sanction every staff appointment and every
25
item of expenditure incurred by Doyne. He was also given the sole
power to issue stores. The virtual subordination of Doyne to this
man was exacerbated by the fact that Mr Cumming, the gentleman given
the post, had no previous experience of railway work whatsoever. When
he left the island in late 1858, he entrusted the affairs of the Com¬
pany to a store clerk and Doyne, on the advice of the Queen's Advocate,
applied for, and was granted, a court order restraining this man from
spending any of the Company's money.
Doyne's difficulties were increased by the deterioration of his
relationship with Gregory, the Consulting Engineer in London, and the
quarrels between them severely retarded the progress of works in Ceylon.
Should take from the Chief Resident Engineer that reasonable latitude
of action which may be necessary to enable him to discharge the
duties entrusted to him with satisfaction to the Ceylon Government
and to the Board, and with credit to himself.' Quoted in W.T.
Doyne, Causes which have retarded the construction of railways in
India ^ -16
24
At first the Directors refused to allow the Company to provide
food, as the contract stipulated ) they then refused to
agr-ao to the scale of by Doyne. Eventually
over this and several other trivial matters, a solution was reached
only after an appeal to the Governor. Doyne ^ pp O-lfc.
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Why the Board wished to curtail Doyne's powers is not clear. It
may have been part of a plan to delay works or may simply have been
the result of distrust.
fo6
Ward had no hesitation in deciding who was to blame and he was con-
Uo\tV
vinced that Gregory concerned himself too much with matters which, in
my judgement, the Consulting Engineer at Home has nothing to do, since
if the Resident Engineer be not competent to decide upon the dimen¬
sions of an Iron Bridge to connect two pieces of eirfcankment ... still
less can he be fit to conduct the Surveys for the Upper half of the
26
line on which the Expenditure of two-thirds of the capital depends.*
This particular argument referred to by Ward arose over a nurfcer of
small iron girder bridges ordered by Doyne for the track in the low
country. Gregory felt that some improvements could be made to the
specifications sent to England by Doyne and, despite the trifling
order of the changes proposed, referred the matter back to Doyne before
submitting the order. Although Doyne replied that he was unconcerned
with such minor charges, the Consulting Engineer still did not place
the full order. Instead he arranged for two of the bridges to be
built and subjected to tests. As late as April I860., the bridges had
still not arrived in Ceylon and without them there were gaps in the
27
earthworks which prevented the laying of the rails. It was thus
hardly surprising that the editor of the Ceylon Times was prompted to
write in April 1860 that 'the line is as far from being in an effec-
28
tive state as if not a shilling had ever been spent.'
Ward soon came to regard the decision to have a Consulting
26C054/343/75 14 April 1859.
27
A slightly different view of this episode was taken by the Coi^dc-^u.
See p. 11-1 '
28
Ceylon Times, 17 April 1860. Extract in Newcastle Papers NeC.
11,003.
io7
Engineer in London rather than in Ceylon as the root of all the diffi¬
culties. Writing to the Duke of Newcastle in I860, he outspokenly
criticised the * unfair.and unsafe position, in which the Governor of
this colony is placed by Mr. Labouchere's decision not to allow him
29
the protection of a Consulting Engineer of his own.' Later in the
same month)he wrote privately to the Secretary of State (who had suppor¬
ted Gregory as staunchly as Ward had supported Doyne) that 'the powers
assumed by Mr. Gregory, as Consulting Engineer, are not only not recog¬
nised by the Ordinance}and the Agreement, but are directly at variance
with them.' Ward believed most strongly that the construction of
the railway could not and should not be directed from England and the
clash between local and London management was enhanced in importance
by the warmth with which Ward defended Doyne and the righteousness with
which the Colonial Office supported the Board of Directors and Gregory.
The foreseeable difficulty over the time limit specified in the
contract came to a head in early 1859. Clause thirty-five of the
Provisional Agreement stated quite clearly that the time limit operated
only from the time when the whole of the land needed for construction
was handed over to the Company. By this time, however, the Company
was in possession of only the first twenty-six miles of the required
land, since the later course of the line had still not been finally
decided upon. In view of this, the Company claimed that the time
clause was not yet operative and the Colonial Office officials were
forced to agree that this was the case. Ward protested hard against
29
C054/352/Confidential of 6 April 1860.
^Private letter of 28 April 1860, NeC 10,989.
the injustice of this interpretation which, not unnaturally, occa¬
sioned some ill-feeling in the colony. However, the situation was
largely one of his own creation since in his haste to begin the works
he had handed over a portion of the land before the whole route had
been finalised.
Sadly, this was not the greatest cause of concern to those
interested in the speedy construction of the line. In April 1859
came the shattering news that Doyne considered the line proposed by
Moorsom to be impractical and that he thought its construction within
the £1,200,000 limit set by the Legislative Council was quite out of
the question. Moreover, he added that he believed that this amount
could well be needed to build a line as far as Gordon's Bridge, merely
at the edge of the Kandyan hills and only fifty-seven mil^s from Colom¬
bo. From that point onwards, he claimed, Moorsom's line was quite
impossible since it involved gradients which could only be undertaken
with the aid of stationary engines. He also estimated that the
working cost of the line would be much heavier than had been estimated
31
by Moorsom. This was a momentous announcement. Ward, who had
praised Moorsom's work unstintingly only two years earlier, now accep¬
ted Coyne's calculations without question and accused Moorsom of having
32
'discharged a most important duty with culpable haste and inaccuracy.'
The immediate question was how the colony and Company stood regard¬
ing their mutual obligations in the light of this new information. Ward
was forced to admit in his Railway Address to the Legislative Council
31C054/343/82 26 April 1859.
/
that, although the railway had been entrusted to the Company on the
understanding that the line could be constructed for £1,200,000, the
Company was not actually bound to construct the line for any specific
33
sum. It was merely obliged to provide whatever capital was needed
for the provision of a line^so long as this line did not exceed ninety
miles. As there was no question of this, the colony was committed to
paying the interest on all the money required^ at the rate of six per
cent on the first £800,000 and five per cent thereafter. He informed
the Council that on the basis of Doyne's computation.^this would involve
the payment of £118,700 per annum for the ninety-nine year term of the
contract. Although this was very much larger than the amount which
had been expected, Ward remained unshaken in his belief that the line
was necessary, and he urged upon the Legislative Council his conviction
that this sum could be paid. To allay in advance the fears of the
planters that the export duty might be increased to provide the extra
amount required, he outlined a scheme for paying the interest with the
existing export duty, the profits from the line once opened and a con¬
tribution, if needed, from the general revenue, each year. So enthus¬
iastic was he that the railway should be constructed that he was pre¬
pared to make sacrifices in his other plans of improvement during the
34
years before the opening of the line. It is significant^in the
light of criticisms which were later to be made of MacCarthy^ that Ward
was prepared to do this. He saw the choice as a simple one between
continuing the line at the estimated price or abandoning the project
33C054/345/8 22 July 1859.
3^Ward told the Council 'This may bear hardly o?c.«the Colony for the
last or 3> . yearSj and limit other works of internal improve¬
ment.' Ibid.
no
altogether; his argument, however, rested entirely on the belief that
the line would ultimately prove profitable, a factor about which there
was no absolute certainty. He conceded that it might be necessary
to limit the line to one stretching only to the foothills, though he
argued that it would be a mistake to commence the work with this in
mind. Termination of the line at Gordon's Bridge could be agreed
upon, if necessary, once the line had reached that place. The deci-
Coor\C\ \
sion was one to be taken in the colony, and a Legislative^sub-committee
was duly appointed to consider the situation. In the meantime, Ward
ordered that all expenditure by the Company be confined within certain
limits.
The Report which it produced in September was endorsed in its en-
35
tirety by the Governor. Whilst admitting the existence of objec¬
tions to the contract and criticising the outlay of £104,000 which
had at that time produced only ten miles of permanent way, the Report
nevertheless expressed the belief that substantial reductions could be
made in the estimate produced by Doyne. With the stability of the
coffee industry and the ensuing increase in the revenue, the sub-com¬
mittee advised awaiting the outcome of Stephenson's Report in the hope
that some scheme might still be evolved whereby the Company could
employ a contractor to undertake the work. Unfortunately, the find¬
ings of the full Council were confused by a change of view on the part
of some menbers of the Council. Other Resolutions far more hostile
to the continuance of the contract were also adopted, and these deman¬
ded some definite guarantee about the cost of the work. Ward and
35
Forwarded to the Colonial Office in C054/346/55 16 September 1859.
four official members of the Council entered a formal protest at this
which was forwarded to the Colonial Office along with the Report and
Resolutions, but the result of the confusion was to give the Colonial
Office complete freedom of action^ since every possible course had been
approved by the Council in either its Report or in the Resolutions.
The Legislative Council had conspicuously failed to seize the opportu¬
nity of exercising an influential role and it is difficult not to
blame Ward to some degree for allowing this state of confusion to occur.
The situation was further complicated by the presence in the
colony of representatives of two major contractors. They had been
called in by the Company, who were entitled under the terms of the
contract to employ contractors to build the line. Nothing was to
come of either of these tenders, but the original approaches made by
the Company representatives wece to provide the background for a major
scandal and to finally end any hopes that the line could be construc¬
ted by the Ceylon Railway Company.
Doyne was recalled to England in mid-1859, ostensibly to provide
details of his estimates. It came as a complete surprise to the Gov¬
ernor to hear in September of that year that the Company had dispensed
with his services. Ward was openly furious: 'at a moment when I was
endeavouring to carry out Your Grace's Instructions,' a despatch of
16 September ran, 'by persuading a reluctant Council that it might
rely safely upon the results of a revision of the EstimateSj to be con¬
ducted by Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Doyne, I am told that Mr. Doyne is no
longer the Engineer of the Company^ and might - indeed^ probably would
- refuse, after such unworthy treatment, to take any part in the Refe¬
rence, but for his desire to vindicate his own Professional charac-
36
ter.' Nor was Ward's anger directed solely against the Company,
for he could not believe, he said, that the Duke of Newcastle could
37
have known of this impending step and not have informed him. •, Re
also asserted that the official Colonial Office representative on the
Board of Directors should have used his veto to prevent such an
action. With regard to his own position, he was explicit and bitter,
'I cannot fairly be expected to assume the responsibility of acts,upon
/
which I am not consulted, or to pass my time in attempting to patch up
the disputes of ill-selected Agents amongst themselves^ or with the
38
Board, by which they are appointed.'
Doyne's services had been dispensed with because of alleged under¬
hand conduct by hirn^ by the new Company agent in Ceylon, Beeston,
and an assistant engineer, Fitzgibbon. They were accused by the Com¬
pany of having approached the representatives of Brassey and Company,
who were in the colony, and of having offered to aid them in their
tender to the Ceylon Railway Company for sub-contracting work, by sup¬
plying secret information to them. Furthermore, it was suggested
that the contractors' profit included in Doyne's estimate of the cost
39
of constructing the line had been unnecessarily large. Until at
least mid-January 1859, Doyne had deprecated talk of the contract
36C054/346/55 16 September 1859.
37
This was actually the cases see chapter on the Colonial Office
and the Railway, p.
38C054/346/55 16 September 1859.
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The implication was that Doyne and the others were anxious to in¬
gratiate themselves with contractors so as to secure their own
fugures if the work was taken over by a contractor.
i i-3
system, believing that the Company should build the whole line itself.
Ward admitted, however, that when he met with Doyne and Beeston on 31
March they informed him that they had decided that the best method of
construction would be for the Company to employ sub-contractors.
This was not because they had revised their opinion of the principle
of the contract system in itself, Ward reported, but 'from the convic¬
tion, at which they had both arrived, that it would be impossible to
carry out the work cheaply or quickly with the very limited authority
40
that a London Board was disposed to confide to its Local Agents.*
The possibility exists that Ward actually sanctioned am approach to
contractors at this time; Doyne amd Beeston later claimed this to be
the case though the Governor himself denied it. It may be that a
simple misunderstanding arose at this meeting and that the two men
thought that the approval expressed for a general idea was in fact
sanction to proceed with its execution.
In February 1860^Ward was asked by the Colonial Office for a
formal denial that he had known of the communications made to the con¬
tractors, particularly that from Fitzgibbon to Brassey and Company
which lay at the heart of the dispute. He was highly offended and
vented his wrath on Strachey, the official director on the Company
Board. Strachey's conduct in not making known the Board's suspicions
at an earlier date was, he said, quite unjustifiable and nothing would
induce the Governor to enter into any form of communication with him
4 41again.
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C054/352/Confidential of 6 April 1860.
41
Private letter to Newcastle NeC. 10,987, 12 April 1860.
{1^
Both Doyne and Beeston claimed that all their approaches to con¬
tractors had been fully reported to the Board, and Ward accepted
their assurances. Whilst mildly criticising Doyne for the confidence
which he had placed in Fitzgibbon, Ward's outrage at what he consider¬
ed to be his own mistreatment by the Colonial Office inclined him to
the opinion that others had probably been similarly mistreated. Why,
he asked the Colonial Office, had Doyne and Beeston not been told at
once of the charge against them and why had the Governor himself not
been informed of the situation until some eight or nine months after
42
it had come to the attention of Strachey?
In retaliation against the Company, both Doyne and Beeston levied
charges suggesting that practices of dubious propriety had been em-
43
ployed. Ward supported these accusations. Contracts for the
supply of a volume of rails far exceeding requirements were said to
have been entered into. Both Moorsom and Doyne had allowed for a line
seventy-two miles in length but the Company had ordered some ninety
miles of rails. Similarly the engines which had been ordered were
suited only to the upper part of the line on which work had not yet
begun, and they could not be used on the lower section which was the
only part of the line approaching completion. This was claimed to be
a deliberate attempt on the part of the Company to spend as much money
as possible so as to receive the maximum interest from the colony.
42
Ward wrote privately to Newcastle that 'It is the absence of all
candour, and fair dealing as regards myself, in this matter, that
forces me to believe that there has been a similar want of it as re¬
gards others.' Letter of 28 April 1860. NeC 10,989.
4\>oyne, pp 1*S ~U-l
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Even more damaging to the Company was Beeston's claim to have received
a private letter from the Chairman of the Company, Philip Anstruther,
in June 1859. in which the agent was urged to prevaricate and gain time
as much as possible so as to postpone the moment when the time limit
44
for the works would come into operation. All communications between
the Company and their agent in Ceylon were supposed to be transmitted
via the colonial government so that any letters of a private nature,
irrespective of their content, were actually in breach of contract.
Beeston was later to swear that; following his appointment both Anstru¬
ther and the Company Secretary, Cooper, informed him of their intention
to communicate privately with him. Anstruther requested Beeston to
send reports to him, not at the Company's office, but care of the Bank
of Egypt of which he was also a Director. So seriously did the Com¬
pany view these charges that they embarked on proceedings in Chancery
45
in 1860 to prevent Beeston from publishing these letters. Ward
merely saw this as an indication of the guilt of the Company.
The Governor's position in the colony was extremely delicate.
The Company had never been very popular and only the apparent guarantee
regarding the cost of the work had won it a degree of acceptance. In
1860 it appeared that the cost of the work was to be greatly increased.
The time limit had not yet come into operation, and serious allegations
had been made by the Company about its own servants, and by these men
44
No satisfactory explanation was ever furnished for the writing of
this letter, of which the Board denied all knowledge. Anstruther
subsequently resigned.
45
A copy of Beeston's affidavit is available in the Newcastle Papers
at NeC. 11,003.
about the conduct of the Company. Ward had been a staunch supporter
of the Company in his early days in Ceylon; he had more recently es¬
poused the cause of Doyne against both the Company and the Colonial
Office, yet he was still primarily the servant of the Colonial Office
in the colony. He was thus left in a quite untenable position, being
obliged to defend actions in his public capacity of which he was him¬
self privately critical. When Doyne's pamphlet was published the
Governor described his position in a despatch to the Secretary of
State; "The facts stated by him, of the truth of many of which I am
cognizant, make out so gross a case of mismanagement against the Com¬
pany, that I know not what arguments I have left against its oppo-
_ . 46nents'.
Meanwhile, whilst Doyne's conduct was under examination and fears
were being expressed in the colony regarding the future of the rail¬
way, very little progress toward a decision on the future was evident
in England. Robert Stephenson had been entrusted with the task of
deciding on the merits of the varying results of Moorsom's and Doyne's
surveys but his untimely death caused further delays and his succes¬
sor, Hawkshaw, did not complete his report until June 1860. By this
time. Ward had left Ceylon and it was left to his successor, Sir
Charles MacCarthy, to deal with the problem.
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Private letter to Newcastle, 8 May 1860, NeC.10,990.
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Chapter 7
THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND TOE RAILWAY
In 1855 the Colonial Office regarded the railway as a project to
be undertaken for the benefit of the commercial classes of Ceylon
alone. They saw in it no political or military advantage to the
government, although an indirect benefit was anticipated in so far as
the increased prosperity of the coffee industry would mean augmented
revenue for the government. Molesworth, who was Secretary of State
from July 1855, until his death in November of the same year, was ex¬
tremely sceptical of the extent to which the benefits of a railway
would be felt outside the mercantile and planting communities. This
led to a great reluctance on his part to sanction the extension of the
export duty from one on coffee alone to one on all exports. 'But
those who would not use the railway, and who would export from other
parts of the island,• he minuted, 'what benefit would they derive from
the railway which would amply compensate them for the Tax?1 * He
feared particularly that Sir Henry Ward had not been sufficiently long
in the colony prior to his espousal of the railway cause, to have con¬
sulted the representatives of any but the commercial classes?who had
the easiest access to him. Thus, when Ward put forward his idea of
adding £100,000 to the £800,000 to be raised in order to carry out
additional irrigation and other works, it was coolly received in the
Colonial Office, not only by Molesworth but by Strachey as well. The
draft reply clearly stated that there should be no combination of rail
2
and other matters.
^"Minute by Molesworth on C054/316/5S 11 July 1855.
2
Ibid. The draft reply read T.n the first plaoe, I cannot conceal
from you that I feel considerable difficulty in approving of the
IIS
Labouchere, who succeeded,Molesworth, was less worried by this
point. It is clear, however, that for some time the Colonial Office
continued to regard the venture as an isolated undertaking, rather
them as an integral part of a general policy of improvement for the
island. Officials were therefore reluctant to allow the colonial
government to become too closely involved in either the financing or
the administration of the railway project^ lest it should appear too
intimately identified with the interests of a single group of the
3
inhabitants. This was one reason why the Colonial Office was in¬
clined to favour construction of the line through the medium of a
4
Joint Stock Company. Russell, Molesworth and Labouchere would all
have agreed with Strachey's Minute that it was 'far better to entrust
the laying out of the money and the management of the concern to a
private Company than to involve the Government in details of trans-
5
actions so foreign to its habits.'
question of creating a debt for the purpose of undertaking the im¬
provements referred to, being mixed up with the question of the
Railway.'
"^The dangers of this policy had been stressed by Philip Wodehouse
when he addressed the Select Committee of 1849. He warned against
'supposing that the opinions of the coffee planters or the European
settlers in any way represent the opinion of the natives, or that
their interests are in any manner identical' (Minutes of Evidence in
Second Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1850).
It was thinking along these lines that determined Colonial Office
policy of regarding an Imperial guarantee as out of the question,
and the view that in the event of a guarantee's being offered, it
should be financed by increased taxation.
4
Governor Anderson had also put forward this view in August 1854 when
he wrote that 'it would be far preferable that such^worfc <xs a Rail¬
road should be undertaken by a private Company than by Government.'
He was so strongly convinced of this that he was prepared to suggest
offering a guarantee of as much as six per cent to a company, rather
than have the Ceylon government itself raise the loan. CO54/308/
19 17 August 1854.
5C054/316/91 16 August 1855.
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The Company scheme meant that the only commitment undertaken by
the Ceylon government would be the annual payment of interest and this
only until such time as profits were sufficient to cover the amounts
due. Even this initial payment of interest would be financed from
extra taxation and not out of general revenue. At the same time, the
colony would eventually become the owner of the line, and if the line
proved successful and the colony's finances merited such a scheme, it
would have the option of outright purchase at an interim date. It
seemed that, whatever the result of the enterprise, whether^line were
profitable or not, the financial commitment of the colonial government
would be limited. On the other hand, should the Ceylon government
construct the line itself, or employ contractors directly, then it
would not only be more closely involved in the day to day administra¬
tion of construction, but it would also have to operate the line itself
when completed, or come to an agreement with a contractor to do so.
Furthermore, if the line proved unprofitable, the loss would be borne
by the government. In addition to this, as Strachey pointed out,
there was the fact that government schemes were notoriously more ex¬
pensive than private ones. A Company would thus act as a useful
buffer to protect the Ceylon government from the dangers involved, and
any loss sustained by the enterprise would fall upon the plaiUbers and
merchants as the payers of the export duty.
Thus sympathy for the company idea in general led the Colonial
Office to look favourably upon the Ceylon Railway Company. It was,
as Strachey pointed out, 'not only composed of substantial persons
known to us^but also has a claim from having undertaken the preliminary
surveys.*** After negotiations - albeit intermittent ones - spread
over some ten years, this was understandable. Had the original Com¬
pany been by-passed, conplications would have arisen over expenditure
on the preliminary survey for which some compensation would have been
payable. Tentative enquiries were made by other companies - a pro¬
jected Colombo to Kandy Railway Conpany and an off-shoot of the
Scinde Railway Company - but these were discouraged by the Colonial
Office, their existence being used only as a veiled threat in negotia-
7
tions with the Ceylon Railway Conpany. At no time was there any
question of advertising publicly for tenders from companies. It was
felt that no other company would offer terms as favourable as those of
the Ceylon Railway Company and no other body would be likely to have
so many directors with a personal interest in Ceylon.
In 1855-6;the Colonial Office was firmly in favour of reaching an
0
agreement with the Ceylon Railway Company. Whilst seeking to involve
the colonial government to the smallest possible degree and to limit
its role to a purely supervisory one, Colonial Office officials were
nevertheless anxious to take account of the wishes of the planting
and mercantile communities, since it was for their benefit and largely
at their instigation, that the railway was to be constructed. This
6
Minute by Strachey on 0054/31^ i.5
7 '
For details of enquiries by other Companies see C054/322/Confiden-
tial 9 June 1856.
8
The only member of the Colonial Office staff who entertained doubts
was Sir John Ball, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Even he re¬
garded a contract with the Ceylon Railway Company as desirable, but
his emphasis was more firmly placed on the need to obtain the proper
terms from some party, rather than merely making the best possible
arrangement with the Ceylon Railway Company. Minute on C054/316/
91 16 August 1855.
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led to a reluctance on the part of the Colonial Office to dictate terms
outside the general framework. They were quite willing to act in ac¬
cordance with the wishes of the community as expressed through the
Legislative Council or the Governor. On some matters, of course, it
was impossible for the wishes of the planters to be sanctioned. One
such instance concerned the rate of interest here the Colonial Office
was in possession of more recent and up to date financial information
than was available in the colony. On other issues, however, the Col¬
onial Office faithfully submitted to the Company the points contained
in the Legislative Council Resolutions of August 1855. Ultimately,
any agreement reached by the Colonial Office and the Company had to be
acceptable to the Legislative Council and the Colonial Office thus had
t
an incentive to make the agreement as popularly acceptable as possible.
It was only the desire of Strachey to expedite matters (alleged
Colonial Office delays being a major source of complaint in the colony)
which led to the drawing up of a Provisional Agreement. The proposals
of the Legislative Council were submitted to the Company but were not
accepted in their entirety. The alternative to the drawing up of a
Provisional Agreement would have been to refer matters to Ceylon once
more. Hence the Provisional Agreement was in no way a definitive one
in the eyes of the Colonial Office officials and they had reservations
about some of its provisions. Labouchere stressed that the Legisla¬
tive Council was quite free to reject the Agreement if the members of
g
Although the Governor could command an official majority in the
Legislative Council, there was a genuine desire to satisfy the wishes
of the planters and merchants both inside the Council and without.
The Colonial Office scheme for a fifty-five mile railway had been
abandoned in 1855 because of its unpopularity in the colony.
122^
the Council regarded it as unsuitable. 'In case your decision and
that of the Council should be favourable to the Agreement,' he com¬
menced a sentence in a despatch to Ward, on 9 June 1856, concluding
by writing that 'Having thus afforded to you such assistance on this
inqportant question as was in my power, I must now leave the decision
to yourself and to the Ceylon Legislature.'There seems no reason
to doubt that had the Legislative Council expressed disapproval of any
of the terms and rejected the contract, the Colonial Office would have
been happy to continue the negotiations with the Company on the col¬
ony's behalf. In a previous despatch, Labouchere had even left the
way open for a complete rejection of the Company idea as a whole: 'It
is not my intention to urge the adoption of this contract upon your¬
self and your Council,' he wrote, 'if upon full consideration you
should either consider that the time is not yet arrived for the under¬
taking of so considerable a work, or if you should clearly see your
way of attaining the desired object by means more economical and which
at the same time shall give equal security for the completion of the
line in an efficient manner and within reasonable time.'*"'" In fact,
the open-mindedness of the Colonial Office is indicated by the fact
that they sent a copy of a tender from a contractor (Jackson) along
12
with the Provisional Agreement in the despatch to Ceylon.
However, the Legislative Council accepted the Agreement whilst
10CO55/98/113 9 June 1856.
11C055/98/Confidential 9 Hay 1856.
12
Jackson's tender can be found at C054/327 6 February 1856.
Letter from Jackson to Colonial Office.
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adding a clause asking that the Royal Assent be withheld until a sur¬
vey had ascertained the likely cost of the line. This request had to
be refused by the Colonial Office on constitutional grounds. In an
attempt to satisfy the Council on this point, the Colonial Office neg-
13
otiated two Supplemental Agreements with the Company. The first of
these suspended all proceedings until a survey had been carried out and
the cost of the work estimated; in the event of the cost exceeding the
sum which the Ceylon government was prepared to pay, the contract would
automatically be cancelled. This Agreement also enabled the colonial
government to buy £50,000 worth of shares in the Company which would
have given it the right to nominate an additional director to the Com¬
pany's Board. The second Agreeinent dealt with the purely financial
arrangements for the survey. The Legislative Council gave its assent
to both these additional Agreements.
The Colonial Office had tried to carry out the wishes expressed
in Ceylon about the cost of the line. Since the Council's suggestion
for delaying the Royal Assent was impractical, the Colonial Office had
found what seemed to be the next best solution. Unfortunately, al¬
though the preliminary survey appeared to offer a safeguard against
excessive cost, it did not bind the Company to execute the line for
the cost arrived at by this survey. Indeed, the Company was not even
obliged to follow the same route as that which would be adopted by the
engineer appointed to carry out the preliminary work. All the preli¬
minary survey could achieve was to show whether it was possible for a
line to be built for £1,200,000; it did not bind the Ceylon Railway
Company to do so.
^The Supplemental AGreements can be found at C054/323/163 16 Sep-
tentoer 1856.
12^
To ensure a completely impartial survey, the Colonial Office re¬
fused to allow the Company to chose the engineer to undertake the work,
14
Instead, Labouchere chose Captain William Moorsom, who duly set out
for Ceylon, carried out his task and reported that a line could be
built for £856,000. This appeared eminently satisfactory and so the
contract came into effect. It is clear, however, that whereas this
estimate was accepted at face value by both Ward and the Legislative
Council, the Colonial Office officials were silently sceptical. In
April 1859, when Doyne's greatly increased estimate was made known,
William Strachey minuted that Moorsom's estimate was one 'which it was
susnected from the first was over sanguine.'Merivale, too, in
1859, immediately made it clear that he had greater faith in the new
estimate by Doyne than he had had in that of Koorsom.^ In 1857, un¬
fortunately, doubts about the reliability of the work performed by
Moorsom were not voiced and on the basis of his work the whole railway
contract came into operation.
It was soon apparent that the Colonial Office had no intention of
following the exact letter of the contract. Under the Agreement, the
colony was given considerable powers over the proceedings of the Company
14
William S. Moorsom was the youngest son of Sir Robert Moorsom KCB
and in 1858 he was fifty-four years old. Educated at Sandhurst and
destined for the Army, he retired from the service in 1838 and car¬
ried out surveys of various lines in England. He proposed what was
then the sharpest incline in the world on the Birmingham-Glastonbury
line,which was successfully carried out. A winner of the Telford
Medal, he was also a Prussian Engineering prize winner for his design
of a bridge over the Rhine in 1850. He won this against competition
from sixty eminent engineers.
15C054/343/82 25 April 1859.
16Ibid.
in Ceylon. However, Strachey minuted that 'it by no means follows
that this control should be exercised; on the contrary, it is essen¬
tial to the efficient and speedy execution of the works that the gov¬
ernment abstain from interfering, so long as appointments of engineers
and other officers are made and proceedings conducted so as to merit
17
its confidence.' This was particularly important with regard to
the appointment of a Consulting Engineer to the Ceylon government,
which was provided for in the contract and for which the Governor cam¬
paigned throughout 1857. In view of the difficulties which such
appointments had caused in India, Strachey decided that it would be
unwise to risk making a similar mistake in Ceylon. Moorsom also ex¬
pressed this opinion in his Report, commenting that 'This appointment
may cost the Ceylon government as many thousands and as much bickering
and disappointment in working the Railway as an injudicious appointment
18
of a similar character ha3 caused palpably in Madras.' Furthermore,
Strachey claimed that those well informed about such matters felt that
the Company could not have made a better choice as its Resident Engin¬
eer in Ceylon than the man appointed. To send a Government Engineer
as well would entail paying the Government Engineer a salary comparable
to that received by Doyne, and the probability was that such an appoint-
19
ment would only hamper Doyne in his work. It therefore appeared a
needless extravagance and there was no reason in Strachey's mind why
any technical advice needed by the Governor should not be supplied by
17CO54/330/173 29 September 1857.
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C054/329/90 23 May 1857.
19C054/330/173 29 September 1857.
members of his own scientific staff. Thus no Consulting Engineer
was ever appointed to advise the colonial government, though the Com¬
pany appointed a Consulting Engineer, Charles Gregory, to advise it
at home.
Although the colony was entitled to exercise its rights to pur¬
chase shares in the Company, it did not do so. The staff of the
Colonial Office were keen that the opportunity should be taken. Xn
December 1856>Labouchere referred in enthusiastic terms to the possi¬
bility of thus acquiring a second official director on the Board: 'So
desirable indeed does this appointment seem to myself,' he wrote,
•that I should not object to the Qovernment shares being completed to
the requisite amount by purchase in the market, even at some premium,
supposing a sufficiency not thrown up by - Depositors, nor other-
20
wise obtainable at par.' Ward reported, however, that feeling in
the colony did not favour such a move and he made it clear that he him-
21
self entertained objections to it. Although still viewing the pur¬
chase as a good investment, a practical means of reducing the amount to
be borrowed and a method of keeping a closer watch on the proceedings
of the Board, the Colonial Office did not press this view in the face
of the opposition from the colony.
The position of official director on the Board of the Company was
filled by William Strachey, who agreed to serve at Labouchere's request.
20
C054/323/163 16 September 1856. Draft to Ward.
2*Ward's despatch C054/328/17 23 January 1857, acknowledging the
Colonial Office despatch completely ignored this point, as the Col¬
onial Office pointed out.
22C054/329/90 23 May 1857.
He attended Board meetings, had the right of veto over all the deci¬
sions, and received the sum of £250 per annum in addition to his Col¬
onial Office salary. His involvement with the Board meant that more
and more he became the acknowledged expert in the Colonial Office on
all Ceylon railway matters. In 1860 Merivale wrote, when a matter
concerning the railway came before him, that 'This matter has been so
entirely attended to by Mr. Strachey that I scarcely feel competent to
23
interfere,' and interfere he did not. Only Frederic Rogers and the
Duke of Newcastle ever questioned Strachey's advice and even the Duke
was greatly influenced by him.
Railway matters caused little concern in the Colonial Office
during the years 1857 and 1858. The ordinance passed by the Legisla¬
tive Council for the taking up of land for railway purposes was rejec¬
ted as being improperly worded and it was directed that a new one be
prepared, but this was not a matter of major concern. The Colonial
Office did try to insist, however, that the export duties which had
been collected from the beginning of 1857, and which were designed
purely to finance the railway, should be funded separately. Ward did
not favour this course, and argued that it would be more beneficial to
invest these sums in public works and pay the interest due to the Cey-
24
Ion Railway Company out of general revenue. The Colonial Office
was not impressed by this argument, however, and repeated its instruc-
23
Minute on C054/356 2 March 1860. Ceylon Railway Company to
Colonial Office.
24C054/337/141 27 November 1858.
tion that the duties be funded, but it was not until MacCarthy assumed
25
the Governorship in 1860 that this was actually done.
The year 1859 was the year in which the railway issue rose to
26
prominence once more. The alleged interference by Gregory in rail¬
way affairs in Ceylon, of which Ward complained, aroused little sym¬
pathy with Strachey. Nevertheless, the Ceylon Railway Company was
officially asked whether delays were caused by the differences between
27
the two engineers. The Board denied this. The difficulty which
had arisen over the iron bridges ordered by Doyne was not a minor one,
Company officials said, as it involved the outlay of between £20,000
2 8
and £30,000. Furthermore, Doyne had originally stipulated that the
bridges would not be needed until 1860, so the matter had not been con¬
sidered as one of amy great urgency. Gregory felt that the bridges
ordered by Doyne were of an unnecessarily complex design, and were
29
therefore more costly than they need be. Since a total of four hun¬
dred bridges was needed, considerable savings were possible, for
example by the omission of iron cross girders, which Gregory calculated
would reduce the cost by some £10,000. Although the failure to have
the bridges delivered by 1860 was later cited as an example of the
Company's inefficiency, the first consignment of one hundred bridges
2^CO54/355/40 13 December 1860.
26
Gregory was the Consulting Engineer in England.
27C054/349 14 October 1859.
29
Churchill, the Public VJorks Department engineer, in Ceylon agreed
with Gregory; but for a different version of this incident see the
Chapter on the Governor and the Railway, pf loS-iofc
was actually awaiting shipment when Newcastle decided that no more
equipment was to be sent to the colony pending a decision on the
future of the railway.
when news readied the Colonial Office in early June 1859 of
Doyne's high estimate it caused far less concern than might have been
anticipated. This was due partly to the view held all along in the
Colonial Office that Moorsom's estimate had been too low, and partly
to Strachey's opinion that the colony was well able to meet the in¬
creased cost. 'I really do not see,' he wrote, 'why the capital of
the colony should not be devoted to the Failway instead of to Irriga¬
tion and other Public] Works not at all more urgently required.'3^
Herman Merivale was more sympathetic to the doubts expressed in the
colony over the wisdom of paying so high a price; rather than advo¬
cate the abandonment of the line, he felt there was a good case to be
made out for a partial line to run only as far as the foothills. This
was the sort of line which had been envisaged by Lord John Russell and
supported by MacCarthy in early 1855. It can scarcely be coinciden¬
tal that MacCarthy was in London at this time and in touch with mem¬
bers of the Colonial Office staff.3* Strachey minuted in both June
and September 1859 that he had consulted MacCarthy on matters concern¬
ing the railway, and some evidence of MacCarthy's close relationship
30CO54/343/82 26 April 1859.
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Certainly the views expressed by William Strachey on the desira¬
bility of investing in the railway rather than in public works are
reminiscent of the attitude which MacCarthy is widely believed to
have held regarding investment in public works. See for example,
History of Ceylon, ed. K.M. de Silva, vol. 3, p. 141.
)!>o
with the Colonial Office over this question i3 provided by the Duke of
Newcastle's insistence that the final decision on the future of the
line should be postponed until MacCarthy returned to the island as
32
Governor, with the greatest latitude to settle the question.
The course to be adopted over the future of the railway was not
decided at once. The Ceylon Railway Company wished to send Gregory
to Ceylon to assess the accuracy of Doyne's estimate but Newcastle was
reluctant to agree to this. Instead^the matter was referred to Mr
Robert Stephenson, son of George, who was asked to advise the Colonial
Office as to the best course to pursue. In the meantime Ward was in¬
structed to confine expenditure as narrowly as possible and to make
over no more land to the Company beyond Ambepusse. It was known in
the Colonial Office that the directors of the Company also felt Doyne's
estimates to be excessive and, as late as September 1859, Newcastle
was quite firmly opposed to any idea of terminating the arrangement
with the Company. At the same time he added a significant remark
concerning Labouchere's original decision to sanction construction by
a Companyi 'I am quite prepared to express a strong opinion against
winding up the Cjompany and carrying on the Railway by Government
Agency,' he wrote, 'but I would base that opinion upon the present
state of the Affair for I am not certain that in the first instance,
it might not have been best to avoid the distant machinery of a Company
in London.'33
32
C054/356 Ceylon Railway Company to Colonial Office, 6 July 1860.
Newcastle wrote on this: 'Whatever may be the decision, it is very
important that Sir Charles MacCarthy should be in the colony when
it is taken.'
33C054/346/34 16 August 1859.
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The Company wc.s keen that agents of two reputable contractors
should be sent to the colony to tender for the line, and both Brassey
and Company and Waring Brothers sent out representatives to the colony
in June, This increased hopes that the line might still be construc¬
ted, By this time, the Colonial Office attitude had changed enor¬
mously from the days when they had regarded the railway as a matter to
be undertaken purely for the benefit of the commercial classes. Offi¬
cials were now so anxious that the work already done should not be
wasted that they were prepared to regard the completion of the line as
an essential public work. Strachey looked with favour on a suggestion
from the Chamber of Commerce that the cost of the line, or rather the
interest to be paid on the amount borrowed, should be reduced by con-
34
tributions from the general revenue. This plan marked a signifi¬
cant departure from the policy of 1855 which had been to minimise the
35
colonial government's involvement in the matter. In part, the
change was the result of dire necessity, but it is also partly attribu¬
table to the increased financial strength of the island.
For the remainder of 1859 the future of the railway awaited re¬
ports from both the Legislative Council and from Robert Stephenson.
The latter's untimely death further delayed matters since his succes¬
sor, Hawkshaw, was not appointed until the middle of December 1859 and
34
The suggestion was contained in a Memorial from the Chamber of
Commerce found at C054/346/56 17 September 1859. The Chamber fav¬
oured construction by a railway contractor and the payment of
£300,000 from current revenue toward costs.
35
in some ways, this was no more than the logical extension of the
desire of Strachey that the colony should buy shares in the Company,
for this plan was at least partly motivated by the desire to reduce
the amounts of money to be borrowed on the open market.
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did not complete his report until July 1860. Meanwhile,the whole
question of Doyne's conduct loomed large and consumed much time at the
Colonial Office. Doyne was well regarded in Ceylon, especially by
the Governor, and the scandal in which he was involved severely marred
the relationship between the Colonial Office and its representative in
the colony. Doyne had been officially recalled in July 1859, ostensi¬
bly at the request of Robert Stephenson, to furnish data in person re¬
garding his estimates. By this time the Ceylon Railway Company Board
had been put in possession of information acquired in confidence by
Gregory some months earlier, indicating that Doyne had made secret
overtures to contractors without the authorisation of the Board, and
had encouraged other members of his staff to do so as well.^ Gregory
had been honour-bound not to impart this information but, in an attempt
to forestall Doyne, he had recommended to the Board that they them¬
selves request tenders from two major contractors. By June, Gregory
felt that the information could no longer be kept to himself and he
obtained permission to inform the Board. Unfortunately, no written
evidence was available of Doyne's actions.
Sometime after hearing all the facts, Strachey informed the Under-
Secretaries at the Colonial Office and Newcastle of what had occurred.
The lack of written corroboration persuaded Newcastle not to inform
Ward of the true reason for Doyne's recall. It was for this that
Ward so bitterly criticised Strachey, although Newcastle wrote defend¬
ing both his own conduct and that of Strachey and saying that he was
36
The source of the information was the father-in-law of one of
Thomas Brassey's partners, Ogilivie.
'33
•at least as liable as Mr. Strachey to the charge of unfairness in not
informing Sir Henry Ward of what I heard in November but I believe it
was only right toward all parties concerned to say nothing about it
37
until it came before us in a substantive form.'
In October 1859, the Report and Resolutions of the Legislative
Council were received in the Colonial Office. The confusion between
the recommendations of the Report and those embodied in the Resolutions
meant that the Colonial Office was tied to no specific line of action.
Both Strachey and Newcastle were convinced that any idea of limiting
the amount of capital which the Company could spend was both unreason¬
able and impractical. The Company shares stood at that time at a low
price and in the unlikely event that the Company would agree to make
the guarantee a limited one, the price of its shares would undoubtedly
drop still further. There is no evidence of any desire on the part
of the Colonial Office to see the Conpany wound up at this time, but
by early 1860 Strachey had come round to the idea that a partial line
38
of some fifty or sixty miles might be the test solution. Little
action could be taken, however, until the receipt of Hawkshaw's Report.
Further trouble soon came to light in connection with the opera¬
tions of the Conpany in Ceylon. Beeston, the former Agent in the
colony, claimed that while employed by the Company, he had received
private letters from Philip Anstruther, the Chairman of the Board.
^Minute on C054/352/Confidential 6 April 1860.
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One can only speculate as to the influence of MacCarthy on this,
but this plan had been advanced by him in 1855. Strachey wrote in
a minute on C054/351/24 24 February 1060 that *1 think it was a
mistake of this department to extend the scheme as we did to the
terminus at Kandy.•
This claim was formally advanced in an Affidavit in Chancery on 7 March
1860, whence the Company had taken him to gain an injunction to prevent
39
the publication of the letters in question. The significance of
these letters lay not only in the fact that they were secret and not
forwarded by the means prescribed in the contract between the Company
and the Ceylon government, but also that they contained instructions to
delay the coming into operation of the three-year time limit on the
works. This was to be done by simply not taking up the whole of the
land required for the first section. The exact words of Anstruther's
letter of 9 June (a copy of which was later supplied to the Colonial
Office) were» 'You will of course be cautious to take no more land
than you actually want as the three years for the first section dates
ooWoW o V
from the^land for that section being delivered to you. You cannot re-
40
fuse if called upon by the Governor but you can procrastinate.1
When asked for an explanation of these instructions the Board denied all
41
knowledge. Anstruther's own explanation of his words was received
in the Colonial Office in July 1860 but failed to redeem him. His
answer appeared to Sogers to be totally unsatisfactory and Chichester
Fortescue, Newcastle's Parliamentary Secretary, suggested that it
should at least be considered whether the Company should be asked to
39
A copy is available in the Newcastle Papers at reference NeC.
11,003.
40
Enclosed in C054/357/Anstruther to the Colonial Office, 17 July
1860.
41
C054/356/Ceylon Pailway Company to the Colonial Office, 16 July
1860. The directors wrote that 'to the best of their
belief no communication within the scope of this article (22)
has been transmitted to Ceylon otherwise than through the Office
of the Secretary of State.'
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change their Chairman. In fact, Anstruther did resign soon after
this, but undoubtedly this unsavoury matter had a detrimental effect
on the standing of the Coitpany in the Colonial Office.
In May 1860, the tenders from both Brassey and Company and from
Waring Brothers were received, and on 18 June the Colonial Office came
into possession of Hawkshaw's Report on the whole railway question,
43
including his comments on these tenders. The main features of his
Report were that he believed a railway line in Ceylon would be a pay¬
ing proposition and that, given the situation then in existence, he
thought the line wou<M best be constructed by a contractor employed by
the Ceylon Railway Company. Of the tenders received, Hawkshaw recom¬
mended that the one from Brassey and Company be accepted; this put the
cost at £1,433,010. If the cost of the work already undertaken by
the Ceylon Railway Company were added tottiis, then the total cost of
the line would be almost two million pounds.
Hawkshaw's Report was well received in the Colonial Office.
Strachey felt that the colony could afford this amount if an initial
sum of around £320,000 were contributed from the general revenue and
he added; 'Sir C. MacCarthy will I believe bear me out in saying that
£80,000 a year may be set aside for railway purposes, without any mat-
44
erial inconvenience, from the Colonial Revenue.' This statement
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Minute on C054/357/Anstruther to the Colonial Office, 17 July
1860.
43
Hawkshaw's Report is available at C05T/27 or C054/357, Hawkshaw
to Colonial Office, 18 June 1860.
44
Minute by Strachey on C054/357/Hawkshaw to Colonial Office, 18
June 1860.
shows that the idea of contributing to the railway from the general
revenue had been fully accepted by the Colonial Office, despite the
emphasis once placed on keeping the colonial government as far removed
from the mechanics of railway construction as possible. This change
was a significant one and was to be at the root of the criticisms of
MacCarthy's policy in the early sixties.
Although the Colonial Office was prepared to sanction the course
recommended in Hawkshaw's Report, much clearly depended on the willing¬
ness of the Ceylon Railway Company to proceed. When approached, the
directors showed a marked reluctance. Claiming that the contract had
been entered into with misconceptions on both sides as to cost, the
Board wrote on 6 July 1860 that: 'Under these circumstances, it appears
to the Directors that it would not only be equitable but satisfactory
45
to both the contracting parties that the agreement^be annulled.*
Possibly the reason behind the directors' lack of enthusiasm was the
difficulty which they anticipated in raising the extra money required,
since they were committed by the original contract to a rate of only
five per cent on capital above £800,000. Vhatever the directors said
about not wishing to continue without the approval and confidence of
the colony, was shown to be meaningless by the fact that they did sketch
out certain conditions under which they would be prepared to continue
the work. These included raising the rate of interest to six per cent
on all capital, in return for which they were willing to grant the col¬
onial government increased powers.46
45
C054/356/Ceylon Railway Company to Colonial Office, 6 July 1860.
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The proposals of the directors were, of course, subject to the
approval of the shareholders.
The matter, then, was clear. Either the Company's proposal for
revising the contract was accepted or the Company shareholders would
have to be paid off at par as requested. The Colonial Office referred
the issue to the colony, though its own officials were now united in
favour of the dissolution of the Agreement. Even Strachey, whilst
still arguing that many of the complaints against the Company were un¬
founded, recognised that it was unlikely that a proposal for a new con¬
tract would prove popular in the colony. Nor did he feel that it
would be proper for the Duke of Newcastle to recommend it. The situa¬
tion had changed so drastically since the original decision in favour
of construction by a Conpany had been made, that many of the arguments
in favour of that course no longer existed. On the whole he was wil¬
ling to see the dissolution of the Company scheme. Rogers also took
this view, writing, after considering the merits of the proposals for
a new scheme advanced by the Company, thatt 'It seems to me therefore
on the whole that the proposal of the Company is merely calculated to
give them certain additional advantages.' He was highly critical,
however, of the idea of paying off the shareholders at par. The Com¬
pany and colony had entered the contract as equal partnerst 'Why
should the one party be wholly indemnified at the expense of the other?'
When the shareholders of the Company met to consider the proposals
of their directors, they, rather surprisingly, expressed the view that
the whole matter should be referred to the colony. At the Extraordi-
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Minute on C054/356/Ceylon Railway Company to Colonial Office, 6
July 1860. The answer to this question was supplied by Rogers him¬
self. 'The Company should be indemnified because the colony has
agreed to indemnify it.' Clause 35 of the Provisional Agreement
laid down that the only penalty for default was to be paid off.
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nary Meeting held in July, the shareholders appeared far less willing
to see the Company wound up than the directors had anticipated. It
may well have been that many of them had purchased shares at higher
than the par price and thus stood to lose financially, or they may
genuinely not have understood the Company's position. Whatever the
reason, the shareholders, like the Colonial Office, wished the deci¬
sion to be taken by the Governor and the Legislative Council. Ward
had left the island to take up his new appointment in Madras, and it
fell to the new Governor, Sir Charles MacCarthy, to deal with the sit¬
uation.
Soon after MacCarthy assumed the Governorship, he was able to
forward the Report of the Legislative Council recommending that the
46
contract with the Ceylon Railway Company be terminated. In the
meantime^ the Company's new Resident Engineer, Molesworth, had hit upon
another possible line from Colombo to Kandy, which he claimed could be
constructed for under £1,500,000. The Ceylon Railway Company was
therefore technically able to meet its commitments once more, though
it seemed likely that it would still experience difficulty in raising
the money required. The shareholders, however, were now definitely
against continuing with the contract and accepted the colony's offer
of annullment. It is difficult to interpret this as anything other
than a complete loss of faith in the directorship. The second attempt
at the construction of a railway in Ceylon thus ended, to the relief
of all the parties involved.
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C054/355/42 15 December 1860.
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Chapter 8
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE RAILWAY
The railway was the most controversial question in Ceylon in the
middle and late 1850s and the one which highlighted most vividly both
the importance and the impotence of the Legislative Council. Over a
matter in which the Colonial Office had no direct interest, the Sec¬
retary of State wished to act as far as possible in accordance with
the views of the articulate inhabitants of the colony; the Legisla¬
tive Council thus had a large advisory role to play. The Provisional
Agreement negotiated by the Secretary of State came before the Council
for discussion and could have been rejected by it.
In the early fifties the Council had not acted as a vehicle for
bringing pressure to bear on the administration for the construction
of a railway. Its unofficial members possessed no right to introduce
subjects for discussion and they could comment only when their views
were requested by the Governor. At a time when opinion in the colony
was divided, and often bitterly so, over the construction of the rail¬
way, it is significant that the Council did not provide a real channel
for the expression of divergent views; rather it was in public meet¬
ings at the Chamber of Commerce and later at the Planters* Association
that views were aired.
Peplying to the Governor's Opening Address in July 1855, the
Council emphasised its approval of the importance which he had attached
2
to the Railway in his opening speech. He had suggested that the
"'"One of the few occasions prior to 1855 when the railway was dis¬
cussed, albeit briefly, in the Legislative Council, was in June
1854, when Darley ashed for a statement of the attitude of the Cey¬
lon government in view of the apparent lack of response from the
Colonial Office to previous despatches on the subject. Observer,
5 June 1854.
2C054/316/53 10 July 1855.
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colony should try to secure a six per cent guarantee not only on the
£800,000 which it was estimated the railway would cost but also on an
extra £100,000 which would be devoted to works of improvement. So
well did Ward feel that his speech had been received in the Council
that he was able to report definitely to the Secretary of State that
'Your Lordship may now consider the Legislature of Ceylon distinctly
pledged to a six per cent Guarantee, to be provided for by an export
puty ... upon a capital of £900,000. This was something of an ex¬
aggeration at the time, since the Council had been meeting for the
first time that year on the occasion of his speech and had expressed
only general approval of its contents.
A sub-committee of the Council was appointed during the session
to give the Council an opportunity to express its views in more detail.
The committee's main proposals were in broad agreement with resolutions
passed simultaneously by the Executive Council, namely in favour of a
4
line from Colombo to Kandy, rather than merely part of the distance.
Moreove^it felt any guarantee should be limited to a twenty-five year
period and the government should be responsible for providing only
such land as already belonged to the Crown. Further provisos were
also added. The members suggested that the amounts which would be
paid by the colony as guaranteed interest should be considered as ad¬
vances to the Company, repayable to the colony when the net Company
3C054/316/53 10 July 1855.
^Forwarded with C054/316/91 16 August 1855.
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receipts exceeded five per cent. Concern was also expressed about
the likely level of Company profits once the line was opened and it
was suggested that profits should be restricted to a specific level
and fares reduced once this was exceeded. The committee also fav¬
oured the incorporation of a definite time clause within the contract,
as well as an option for the government to purchase the line after
five years. The total cost of the line was thought likely to be
about £800,000 and the sub-conmittee recommended that a guarantee of
five per cent should be offered. However, the members were prepared
to leave this to the discretion of the Secretary of State, who they
realised (was in a better position to gauge the rate required in the
conditions prevailing on the London money market. These conditions
were fairly stringent but, pending their acceptance}the Legislative
Council was prepared to agree to the construction of the line by the
Ceylon Railway Company. On the other hand, if they were not obtain¬
able, the Council inclined to the view that it would be preferable for
the government itself to raise the money needed.^
Unfortunately, Ward tended to minimise the importance of these
conditions. He wrote that 'the recommendations now made, are to
be regarded, rather? as expressing the feeling prevailing here upon par¬
ticular points, with regard to which it is conceived that the interests
of the Colony have not been sufficiently considered in the proposals
made by the Railway Company^ than as conditions without which the Agree-
5
An attempt was made by Darley and Morgan, strong opponents of the
proposed railway scheme, to have discussion of the Report in full




ment to be concluded by Your lordship will not be adopted.' This
seems to illustrate Ward's over-riding concern to press ahead with the
railway as soon as possible. Certainly, he made it very plain to the
Colonial Office staff that they need not worry too much about the con¬
ditions which the Council had laid down. 'I have little doubt,' he
wrote, 'that provided the undertaking be placed in safe hands, and the
Colony have the assurance that the Railway will be completed within a
reasonable time, the terms which Your Lordship may think just, upon a
7
full consideration of the ca^e, may be ratified here by Ordinance.'
Thus despite the anxiety of the Colonial Office to consult informed
opinion in Ceylon, the importance of the views expressed by the Coun¬
cil was minimised by the Governor as he relayed them to London.
When the Provisional Agreement was received in Ceylon it clearly
failed to live up to the conditions which had been set by the Legisla-
tive Council. The guarantee was not restricted to twenty-five years
nor was the total capital expenditure limited to £800,000. The pro¬
posal that the interest should be treated as an advance had also been
ignored. The rate of interest to be paid was set at six per cent on
the first £800,000, and five per cent thereafter, but since it was not
anticipated that the cost would much exceed £800,000, the lower interest
rate on the extra capital could hardly be seen as a great concession.
On the other hand,certain adjustments had been made by the Company; a




The Provisional Agreement was received in the colony in July 1856.
ciently ambiguous for it to be a source of trouble at a later date),
the whole line, and not merely a section of it was to be built and a
fair proportion of the Company's shares was to be reserved for sale
in Ceylon. Some limitation of the fares was also incorporated. If
the Provisional Agreement was not a masterpiece, it was very far from
being a complete failure. Although the Secretary of State had sent
the provisional contract to the colony in the knowledge that it might
not prove acceptable to the Legislative Council and with the idea that
some modifications might be needed, Ward was adamant that it must be
9
accepted or rejected in its entirety. The first discussion of the
matter by the Legislative Council took place on 13 August and the
10
second on 27 and 28 August. It had been agreed that the decision
of the Council on this second reading would be decisive and that no
attempt would be made to amend it in the committee stage. Possibly
in return for this undertaking, Ward allowed a completely free vote on
this vital second reading. The Bill to put the Agreement into effect
was carried by nine votes to seven, a majority of only two. Despite
his reluctance to see the Agreement altered, Ward did allow the inser¬
tion of a clause which would delay the grant of the Royal Assent until
a survey had taken place to confirm that the line could be constructed
9
Ward's arrangement with members of the Legislative Council was
shown in his report to the Secretary of State concerning the passage
of the bill through committee 'where the understanding previously
come to, that the Vote upon the Second Reading was to be considered
as decisive of the fate of the Bill^was honourably adhered to, and
no attempt was made to get rid of the measure by Amendments incom¬
patible with the terms of the e,greement, such as the reduction of
the Interest from to ' (.'c, su J Zi.%) \"S5(>
*°For a report of the discussions in the Legislative Council see
Observer, 14 28 August 1856. C054/323/153 30 August 1856.
wLthin the limit of £1,200,000. The acceptance of the Agreement by
the Legislative Council therefore centred around this one extra provi¬
sion. As Ward described the situation to the Colonial Office 'if the
Company accept the condition^ upon ^our recommendation^ the Contract
is, to all intents and purposes, concluded so far as this CfSlony is con¬
cerned, without the necessity of any further reference to Ceylon.*^*
Unfortunately,this condition was largely meaningless for, if the out¬
come of the survey confirmed the possibility of construction at a
reasonable cost, there was still no legal means by which the Company
was obliged to construct the line for this amount.
Opposition to the railway contract in the Legislative Council
came not only from the unofficial members but also, most forcefully,
from Charles MacCarthy, the Colonial Secretary. Charles Layard, the
Government Agent for the Western Province also voted against the Bill.
MacCarthy's main line of argument was that at six per cent, the rate
of interest was too high and the guarantee was to run for too long a
period. He also argued that an export duty should not be imposed in
the face of what he claimed to be almost universal opposition. The
argument that taxation should be imposed only with the consent of
those who were to pay it, was a novel one for MacCarthy to expound and
is an indication of the fact that he considered the opposition to the
existing railway scheme to be sufficiently strong outside the Council
to embarrass the government. Apart from criticising the
rate of interest and the period of the guarantee, MacCarthy also fore¬
cast difficulties about the working of the contract, which were to
nC054/323/153 30 August 1856.
prove well founded. The first duty of the directors of the Company,
he pointed out, was to their shareholders, and the relationship of the
colonial government with the Ceylon Railway Company was unlikely to
work well with the former in possession of at least nominal powers of
supervision over the latter. Moreover,in the event of a disagree¬
ment between the Company and the Consulting Engineer ■ it would fall to
the Governor to arbitrate, but how he would be able to decide matters
of great technical detail was unclear. The whole Contract, in Mac¬
Carthy's eyes, was not only impractical but also contrary to the con-
12
ditions previously laid down by the Legislative Council.
Apart from being supported by Layard, MacCarthy was also joined
in his criticisms of the contract by five of the six unofficial mem¬
bers of the Council. Pdchard Morgan, the Burgher representative,
was strongly in favour of the government constructing the line itself,
and agreed with MacCarthy that the particular agreement before them
was open to abuse. Dawson, Bird and Ederemanesingam all presented
12
MacCarthy was here pursuing what seems for him a very strange ar¬
gument. He claimed that the Legislative Council was intended to
be an indirectly representative body. In Council he was reported
to have saidt 'I can conceive no other object in summoning Members
from every class and every race of which the population of the
island is composed, if it be not that they should have a voice in
the adjustment of their own burden, the settlement of their own
taxation.' v?ard suggested in a; private letter to Labouchere of
30 August (Labouchere papers, letter that MacCarthy was merely
trying to enhance his popularity, referring to what he considered
to be MacCarthy's 'morbid dreac1 of unpopularity'. There was also,
Ward felt, a desire to show that the Governor could do nothing in
Council without his support. Neither of these arguments is par¬
ticularly convincing. It seems likely that, convinced of the
dangers of accepting the proposed contract, MacCarthy merely sought
to argue against it in the way which he felt would win most sup¬
port. Full details of his speech are given in the Observer, 1
and 4 September 1G56.
petitions against the plan from the communities which they represen-
13
ted. Bird summarised his own case, and that of those planters who
opposed the bill, on mainly financial grounds. • It must be borne in
mind,' he said, 'that all the applications for a Railway during the
past nine years commencing from 1847 are based upon the estimates of
the Ceylon Railway Company, not exceeding £800,000, and the planters
never contemplated paying more than 5 per cent guaranteed interest on
14
that sum.* The chief objection was the uncertainty as to cost,
and the fear that the proposed export duty of two per cent would be
insufficient to pay the interest at the rate of six per cent and would
therefore have to be increased. Dawson, a prominent merchant on the
Legislative Council, argued that so greatly had the economic situation
improved since the terms had been negotiated that a better bargain
could now be made. He quoted a recent speech in the House of Commons
in which Mr Vernon Smith had spoken of the prospect of railways being
constructed in India without any guarantee regarding interest at all."^
The only unofficial member of the Council who voted for the con-
16
tract was W.A. Swan, and even he criticised the interest rate,
through he believed that it might be reduced by the Company. He
appeared concerned that the rejection of the terms offered might jeo¬
pardise the whole future of the railway and this argument might well
"^They were the members for the mercantile, European and Tamil
interests respectively.
14
Observer. 4 September 1856.
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Observer, ^ Septenber 1856.
16
Member of the Council for the planting interest.
have carried more weight had it not issued from the brother-in-law of
one of the directors of the Company.
The idea of adding a suspensory clause, which would make the con¬
tract effective only after the completion of a satisfactory survey,
was sufficient to win support for the bill on its second reading.
P I so1, it undoubtedly contributed toward making the bill more pala¬
table in the committee stage, since it at least appeared to offer some
safeguard against excessive cost. The constitutional practicality of
adding such a clause was not widely discussed. Ward obviously fore¬
saw no problems and only MacCarthy expressed doubts which were later
17
seen to be realistic.
The Railway Bill then^passed the Legislative Council despite the
opposition of two prominent members of the government. Hie unofficial
dissentients lodged a formal protest at the passage of the Ordinance,
claiming that it contravened the Resolutions of the Executive Council
of 2 August 1855 and those of the Legislative Council passed on 9
18
August in the same year. MacCarthy and Layard did not sign this
document. Ward argued that the Agreement had not been definitely
accepted because of the suspensory clause; this was not quite the
case, however, because the colony was irretrievably committed to the
contract with the Ceylon Railway Company if the survey was satisfac¬
torily completed. Unfortunately, the Company was not similarly bound
to construct the line within the limit of the estimate provided by the
survey. Had this been properly thought out, it is probable that more
17
Speech to the Legislative Council reported in Observer, 1 Septem¬
ber 1856.
18
The unofficial protest is at C054/323/163 1^September 1856.
of the officials and possibly even Swan would have voted against the
Bill. Instead, by clever handling of the Council, Ward was able to
have his own way.
In the hope that the results of the survey would be satisfactory^
an Export Duties Bill was passed in September to raise the money for
19
paying the interest should the project proceed. The sub-committee
which considered the Bill substituted a series of fixed duties in
place of a general ad valorem duty, and categorically turned down the
earlier proposition that those paying the export duty should eventually
receive their money baci: in the form of debentures.
The survey was undertaken by Captain Moorsom and the results
proved quite acceptable. The contract thus came into operation and
work on the railway commenced. No further demands were made on the
time of the Legislative Council, apart from a vote of money to pay for
Moorsom's survey, until 1859. Thenthe future of the project was
once more placed in jeopardy by the revelation that Doyne no longer
believed the line could be constructed within any of the previous es¬
timates. The Colonial Office sought opinion on the course to be pur¬
sued from an expert in England and from the Legislative Council in
Ceylon. A sub-committee was appointed on 20 July to collect evidence
and report to the full Council. The members were Sim, Layard and
Braybrooke on the official side and Lorenz and Jolly from the unoffi-
cials. Although the Report produced by the committee was accepted by
the Council as a whole, a number of Resolutions were also passed and
these were at variance with the Report on some points. This element
19
Ibid.
c£ confusion and contradiction meant that the views of the Council
members carried far less weight with the Colonial Office than should
20
have been the case.
The Report was a work which much impressed the Governor. It
summarised the work that had been carried out on the line, pointing
out that the company had already spent the sum of £104,000 for u>hich
the colony had received only working plans for the. first thirty-six
miles of the route and an actual ten-mile stretch ready for the laying
of the permanent way. By any standards this was not a large return
for the time and money expended. Nonetheless, no great confidence
was shown in Doyne's estimates and it seemed likely that various eco-
21
noraies could be made. It was known that Robert Stephenson was then
working on the estimates in England and the hope existed that he could
substantially reduce the cost. Although objections were expressed to
several of the terms of the contract £ the length of the guarantee, for
exampl^, it was felt that the future of coffee, and thus the revenue
of the island, was fairly well assured and that the colony could there¬
fore pay more for the line than had originally been anticipated. The
Report thus advised that the best course of action would be for the
Company to hire a contractor to complete the work, on the assumption
that such a contractor would agree to undertake the task at whatever
cost was proposed by Stephenson. If this plan were put into effect^
then the Company would act as little more than bankers for the colony
20
The Report and Resolutions were forwarded in C054/346/55 16 Sep¬
tember 1859.
21
For example, the salaries which he proposed to pay were consider¬
ably higher than those usually paid in India at that time.
and the problems which had arisen regarding the administration of
the work would be solved.
Unfortunately, the Report was approved by the sub-committee in
the absence of two of its members, Braybrooke and Bird, and they sub¬
sequently refused to accept the document as representative of their
views. Instead, they lent their support to a series of Resolutions
which w,as, also passed by the Legislative Council and which, in many
22
ways, ran contrary to the findings of the Report. The first two
Resolutions came out strongly against continuing with the work if the
cost were to approach that estimated by Doyne, and emphasised that
there was no way of insuring against the line's costing even more than
Doyne had estimated. Resolution three announced that, in view of the
unlimited guarantee and restricted nature of the traffic on the Colombo
to Kandy road, the members of the Council regarded the continuation of
the contract with apprehension because of the heavy charge which it
might impose on the colony. A fourth Resolution suggested that since
the contract had been entered into tinder a misapprehension on both
sides as to the cost, steps should now be taken to modify it. These
Resolutions were far less favourable to the Company than the Report
and there is no single explanation for the divergence of view between
23
them. It may well have been, as Ward suggested, that as time went
22C054/346/55 16 September 1859.
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What seems to have happened is that the Resolutions were first
passed by the Legislative Council on a motion by Lorenz, with only
the Major-General, the Governor, the Queen's Advocate and the Sur¬
veyor-General voting against them. To Ward's amazement, the Col¬
onial Secretary inexplicably moved the adoption of the Report as
well, and he and J.K. Jolly joined the officials in voting in its
favour. There is no apparent reason for this, other than sheer
confusion.
on, the members of the Council became increasingly susceptible to
pressure brought to bear on them from outside the Chamber. In this
way,both official and unofficial members reflected the confusion felt
in the colony. Strong hostility toward the existing Company scheme
was evident but there was no united view as to the best course of
action. The old fears regarding excessive cost reasserted themselves
in some sections and distrust of the Ceylon Railway Company was fairly
widespread.
In the Council Chamber, the whole matter was found to be too com¬
plex a question for any constructive attitude to be adopted. A body
of disunited individuals could not reach a common policy on so diverse
an issue. The Legislative Council, having been given the opportunity
for a decisive expression of opinion, failed to rise to the occasion.
The Report and the Resolutions which were sent to England provided no
indication for the Colonial Office of what course the Legislative Coun¬
cil wished to see pursued, for the Council itself did not know. The
burden of decision taking was once more returned to the Colonial
24
Office, who could do nothing until the receipt of Hawkshaw's Report.
When in June 1860 this Report^advising that the Company should
employ a contractor to complete the work, was received in the Colonial
Office, the reluctance of the Company to follow this course made a
further reference to the colony essential. The Board of Directors of
the Company clearly wished to extricate itself from what the contempo¬
rary economic situation made it regard as an unfavourable position.
24
Hawkshaw's Report is reprinted in the Minutes of the Legislative
Council, 1860. Cc <,") I CO
This could only be done with the consent of the other party to the
contract, the Ceylon government.
Once again, the Legislative Council was called upon to make an
important decision. Was the contract to be annulled, or not? The
Colonial Secretary, the Auditor-General and the Government Agent for
the Central Province were appointed to a sub-committee, along with
Lorenz, Nicol and Robertson. This time, there were no doubts, no
hesitations and no differences of opinion. A unanimous report was
presented to a full Council in early December, in favour of annulling
the contract. It recalled the consternation with which the contract
with the Ceylon Railway Company had been regarded originally and the
consequent attempt to safeguard the colony's position by the insis¬
tence on a preliminary survey. This had proved inefficacious and the
committee was adamant that further attempts to negotiate with the Com¬
pany would be inadvisable. 'The contract,' the Report said, 'is, in
itself, open to serious objection; and in the experience the Colony
has had of its workings, and of the mismanagement of affairs both in
England and in Ceylon, has so entirely verified the apprehensions en¬
tertained in 1856 by those who opposed the measure that the Committee
are persuaded it would be extremely imprudent to continue a connection
25
which has already proved so unprofitable to the colony.• If the
contract proceeded, it was felt the Company would merely spend all the
capital it was able to under the terms of the contract and the colony
would then be left with an incomplete railwav.
25
The sub-committee report is reprinted in the Minutes of the Leg¬
islative Council for 1860. Co
There is no doubt, from the Report of this committee and its
unanimous approval by the Legislative Council, that feeling ran high
against the Company and that considerable bitterness was felt. In
contrast to 1859, when the Legislative Council had been divided in
its attitude to the railway works, there was new a concerted view that
all connections with the Company should be severed. So anxious were
the committee members to rid themselves of the contract that they re¬
jected the idea of calling for a strict enquiry into the expenditure
of the Company, not because any doubts were entertained that such an
enquiry would not prove highly unfavourable to the Company, but because




PLANTERS AND THE RAILWAY
If the planters had been much slower than some of the merchants
to make their voices heard in favour of the construction of a railway
in the early fifties, some amends were made for this after the forma¬
tion of the Planters' Association in 1854. At a meeting of the As¬
sociation in December of that year, an important Memorial was framed
on the subject."'' It expressed a great sense of urgency regarding the
difficulties of transporting the coffee crop to Colombo, and unequivo¬
cally criticised what in its view, was the Imperial Government's lack
2
of action and 'apparent supineness.' The Memorial advanced the view
that if the coffee yield increased significantly, it would be impos¬
sible to transport the crop to Colombo before the onset of the mon¬
soon, however good the condition of the roads might be."* The Ceylon
government was urged to act quickly and to pass an ordinance giving a
five par cent guarantee on the money needed for construction, without
waiting for Imperial sanction.
The Planters' Association committee expressed its complete will¬
ingness to agree to the imposition of an export duty to pay any amount
4
in excess of the sum which the colonial government was able to meet.
This was a very handsome offer and it is hardly surprising that the
*"The Meeting was held on 9 December 1854, and the Memorial was for¬
warded to London in C054/314/12 12 January 1855.
2Ibid.
^Once the rains came, not only did transport in the island become more
difficult but freight and insurance charges increased also.
4
It should be noted that this offer was made by the Planters' Assoc¬
iation Committee and had not been authorised by a vote at a general
meeting of the Association.
>55
idea met with the full approval of the colonial government. Anderson
duly suggested that the duty should be imposed at a rate which would
cover half the amount of the guarantee, the remaining half to be met
by the government. Eventually, however, this proposal faded from
sight and the export duty was destined to pay the whole of the interest.
The Memorial of the Association illustrates the state of near
desperation felt by some of the planters. There seems to be no doubt
that the transport situation in the season of 1854-5 was particularly
bad, and the Memorial itself complained that, as the year ended, 'Our
produce which ought to be on the way to the English market is lying
locked up and at the risk of deterioration in our Stores in the Inte¬
rior, and what we are able to send by the limited means at our dis-
5
posal is at an exorbitant cost for transport.•
Little action was forthcoming immediately after this Memorial and
in March 1855 Andrew Nicol wrote to the Association Secretary, Brown,
criticising the Association for having fallen asleep with regard to the
matter. It had become known in Colombo that the Ceylon Railway Com¬
pany was still in existence, and Nicol was anxious that a Planters'
Association meeting be convened to exert whatever influence it could
on the local government. The following month, such a meeting was
called by Jolly and others. In view of the fact that an export duty
5
C054/314/12 12 January 1855. Also reported in Colombo Observer,
11 January 1855.
6
The direction in which Nicol felt the influence should be exercised
was clear. He wrote, 'I fear we are not sufficiently emerged from
that dark era of Railway corruption to warrant us'*receiving as imma¬
culate a self-elected family of Railway Directors.' He reported
that feeling in Colombo was generally hostile to the Company. This
letter was published in the Colombo Observer, 1 March 1855.
on coffee had been voluntarily proposed by the planters, and also due
no doubt to the qualms felt in some quarters about possible dealings
with the Ceylon Railway Company, it was suggested that planter repre-
7
sentation on the Company's Board should be sought. The immediate
result of this claim was a meeting between Jolly and the Governor at
which Ward agreed with Jolly's suggestion that an export duty would be
more equitable if levied on all products rather than on coffee alone.
As a result of this, Jolly was obliged to forego the demand for plan¬
ter representation on the Board, although he reported that the Gover¬
nor had remarked that he would like to see the planters represented in
g
the management of the concern all the same.
For the remainder of 1855, London became the centre of activity
for railway affairs. In early 18561 the need for a railway was still
being voiced in Ceylon but feeling against the Company was hardening
in many quarters. A Public Meeting at Kandy on 2 February 1856 came
out strongly in opposition to construction by the Company and favoured
instead a plan whereby the government would construct the entire line
with money raised on a colonial guarantee. Resolution two of this
meeting stated that 'whilst appreciating the advantages of a Railway
communication when carried out with Economy, this Meeting would depre¬
cate the formation of the proposed Railway by means of a Guaranteed
7
This claim was advanced at a Planters' Association Meeting on 21
April 1855, reported in the Colombo Observer, 26 April 1855. It
is an indication of the shift of opinion in 1856 that when Jolly
accepted a seat on the Board of the Ceylon Railway Company in order
to put forward planting views, he was loudly criticised for doing
so.
8
Ward and Jolly met on 7 June 1855 and their discussions were re¬
ported in the Colombo Observer, 5 July 1855.
)5l
Company and would earnestly recommend to the local Government to under-
9
take the work itself.1 Two further important points were made.
First, it was proposed that a survey should be carried out before any
final decision was made and second, the paramount need for economy was
advanced by Wall and Tytler as a basic principle underlying the rail¬
way scheme. This was a reversal of previous demands. Formerly, the
universal cry had been for a railway at any price. Now these two
men, the latter in particular, advanced 1he proposition that a line
which cost over one million pounds to build would not be worth the
expense.
Further evidence of dissension in the ranks of the planters
appeared at the Annual General Meeting of the Planters on 16 February.^
At this meeting, George Wall criticised the fact that in his absence
from Ceylon, some members of the Planters' Association had volunteered
that all planters be taxed in order to finance the railway which was,
after all, 'an undertaking of an essentially public nature, involving
the interests of all.'** Re was scarcely able to believe that this is
what had happened, he said, and he stressed his belief that 'A railway
was certainly a desideratumvbut one towards which all classes should
12
equally contribute.' This view would have been of less importance
had Wall not been unanimously elected to succeed Tytler as Chairman of
the Association on the latter's departure for England.
9Reported in C054/321/19 6 February 1856.
*9Reported in the Observer, 18 and 21 February 1856.
^Observer, 21 February 1856.
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Later in the month, the Planters* Association received a letter
from Ward announcing Labouchere's negotiation of a Provisional Agree¬
ment with the Company. A public meeting was called by the Association
so that this document could be discussed. Shortly before the meet¬
ing, Wall wrote to all members advising caution with regard to the
railway. He suggested that 'the magnitude of the undertaking as
originally proposed, in proportion to the amount of traffic the country
affords, may well make us pause and consider whether some smaller rem¬
edy, more suited to our means and requirements^might not suffice, at
least for the present.'*3 It is thus scarcely surprising to find
that a preliminary committee meeting on 12 July resolved in favour of
a railway only as far as the foothills as an interim measure. How¬
ever, this decision was amended at a further committee meeting held
immediately before the General Meeting on 19 July. This committee
meeting was attended by an unprecedentedly high number of the members
of the committee and it was agreed to put a proposal to the General
Meeting that the full line be constructed. This was accepted by the
Public Meeting - a blow to Wall - but with a proviso added by Christo-
14
pher Elliott that the cost should not exceed £1,500,000. Clearly,
however, the planters in general were less enthusiastic about the rail¬
way than had previously been the case and there was evidence of a re¬
luctance to bear the export duty. Sabonadiere and Northmore, two
prominent planters, even suggested that the original offer to pay the
13
Letter from Wall to Planters' Association members on 14 July 1856.
Planters' Association Proceedings, 1856.
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The committee and General meetings are reported in Planters' As¬
sociation Proceedings, 1856.
export duty should be rescinded altogether. In fact, a kind of com¬
promise was reached at the Meeting with the acceptance of a resolution
by Bird that the Ceylon government be asked to provide for the payment
of interest in such a way as not to press unduly on any one section of
the community.
Despite the proviso added by Elliott, the Provisional Agreement,
or rather, Ward's precis of its terms, was accepted. A clear differ¬
ence of opinion had emerged, however, between a small group led by
Selby, the editor of the Times, and John Gavin, who praised the govern¬
ment, the company and the contract, and those sceptics, most noticeably,
Christopher Elliott, who put very different interpretations upon cer¬
tain clauses in the contract.
The public meeting had been attended by around two hundred and
fifty planters and others. It did not, however, have the final word
on the subject, since, as a result of criticisms that those attending
the July meeting had seen only a precis of the Agreement, a further
meeting was summoned for 23 August. This was a meeting for planters
only. Only thirty-seven attended, eleven of whom were proprietors and
the remainder, according to Governor Ward, superintendents. The
meeting reversed the decision of the general meeting, voting against
the agreement with only one dissentient voice, that of John Gavin of
Keir, Dundas and Company.^ A Memorial was adopted which set out the
16
objections to some of the clauses. There is some evidence to sug¬
gest that Ward's precis of the Agreement, which was all that the
^Keir, Dundas and Conpany were the Kandy agents of the Ceylon Pail-
way Company.
^Forwarded in C054/323/153 30 August 1856.
previous meeting had seen, was somewhat favourable to the contract.
In this case, the change in attitude may be attributable to the pub¬
lication of the entire document, but the increasing fear of a high
17
export duty was also a factor. Bird obviously voiced the view of
many when he said that a railway had never been wanted on the terms
now proposed and that a five per cent guarantee on £800,000 was all
18
that had previously been envisaged.
Many planters changed their view in late 1855 and early 1856 and
this was particularly noticeable in the case of some of the most pro¬
minent men among them. Alexander Brown showed himself to be one of
the most active of planters, and had been an enthusiastic advocate of
the railway project. He had helped to draw up the Memorial of Dec¬
ember 1854 offering to pay an export duty and at the Planters' Assoc¬
iation meeting of 21 April 1855, he stressed the urgency of the situa¬
tion. 'It is not now a matter of importance merely, but a necessity,
19
he said, 'which can neither be denied nor delayed.' At home in
Britain in 1856 he was much less fervent. At the first railway meet-
20
ing held in London he advanced the view that while the railway was
needed, it wets too soon to rush into the arms of the Ceylon Railway
17
Middleton summarised this view when he addressed the meeting and
said, 'v;e must bear in mind that our Estates are the only security
that exists for the formation of a Pailway( so if any disastrous con¬
sequences result from the undertaking the brunt of it must be borne
by the planters.' Ibid.
18
Bird's speech to the Legislative Council. Reported in the Colombo
Observer, 4 September 1856.
19 '
Report of the speech in the Colombo Observer, 30 April 1855.
20
See Appendix ^ on London meetings.
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Company, bearing in mind the lavish manner in which money had been spent
by Railway Companies in Britain. By the time of the second meeting, he
was openly opposed to the Company, arguing that it was impolitic to
agree to the six per cent guarantee on an unlimited sum for an unlimited
time.
R.B. Tytler and Captain Bird were also staunch supporters of the
railway campaign in 1854 and like Brown they helped to draw up the
Planters' Association Memorial of December 1854. By early 1856, how¬
ever, Tytler became convinced of the need for economy and maintained
that a railway which cost over £1,000,000 would not be worth the ex-
21
pense. Bird also cooled noticeably and he pointed out to the Leg¬
islative Council in August 1856 that it had previously been supposed the
22
line would cost only £800,000, which now seemed unlikely.
The Planters' Association, and probably the planting body as a
whole, were very much divided on the railway question and ceased to
express united or consistent views once both the Imperial and the local
government proved favourable to the idea of a railway. Initially,
there had been a small amount of opposition to the scheme from planters
who felt their estates were so remote they would scarcely benefit from
the effects of a railway; this was particularly true of the planters
of the Badulla area, who were so far removed from the centre of plant¬
ing activity that a separate Uva Planters' Association was formed.
There was also a group who, at an early stage, declared their opposition
21
Report of the meeting on 2 February 1856 in the Colombo Observer,
4 February 1856.
22
Bird's speech to the Legislative Council. Reported in the Colom¬
bo Observer, 4 September 1856.
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to any scheme involving a company and as 1855 progressed, this oppo¬
sition hardened. There were a number of causes, not least of which
were the tales of corruption in railway companies. Tales also cir¬
culated of jobbery within the Ceylon Railway Company itself and these
23
were given anple coverage in the Observer.
Other planters quite simply became fearful of the final cost of
the work. It had originally been thought that a rate of one shilling
per hundredweight would provide a sufficient export duty to pay the
guarantee. Kith the prospect of a six per cent guarantee on a sum
likely to exceed one million pounds, there was a distinct possibility
that this duty would have to be increased. To those operating on
small profit margins, this might mean the difference between reasonable
success and bankruptcy. Many also feared that a company with no real
interest in Ceylon might have a disastrous effect on the labour market,
by enticing coolies away from estates with the offer of higher wages.
It might, therefore, be necessary for planters to increase wages in
order to keep their labour force, thus reducing their profit still
further. In the years following the inauguration of large public
works in Madras, there was an ever-present threat of a labour shortage
and it seemed likely that arrangements about labour could be made more
easily if the government rather than a private company were in charge
of the works.
23
A letter published in the Colombo Observer, 28 June 1855 from a
London correspondent reported that 'the most disgusting jobbery is
being carried on, a set of people who have no interest in Ceylon are
the Directors ... what do the present Directors care about Ceylon,
or whether the Railway is a failure or not? so being they make a
pot of money out of the issue of shares.^got on our Guarantee.'
Perhaps the basic reason for the modification of view by some
planters was the change in the conditions under which coffee was grown.
In the 1855-6 season, the market appeared to be more stable and the
position of coffee more secure than it had been for some time. Fur¬
thermore, the conditions encountered in Ceylon during this season were
better than those of the previous year which had been an unusually wet
one. This had affected the state of the roads, led to an increase in
the cost of rice and caused cattle disease. The only solution had
seemed to be a railway. As the 1855-6 season was drier, the crop was
conveyed to Colombo at a reasonable rate and before the onset of the
24
monsoon, so the need for a railway was much less apparent. In addi¬
tion tothis, there had appeared in the colony in mid-1855 an obviously
active Governor who was clearly willing to spend money on public works
in general and on roads in particular. An efficient road network no
longer seemed an impossible dream. The basic problem of the inade¬
quacy of the supply of carts remained, but the urgency of the transport
problem was so reduced that it became possible to confront the problem
with equanimity, rather than enter into a commitment to what might
prove a very expensive railway scheme.
It would be a mistake to assume that all the changes of opinion
among planters were in a single direction. There were those who were
won over to the Company during 1856; these included three prominent
planting names, Elphinstone, Gerard and Jolly. The first of these, a
large absentee proprietor with aspirations toward the Governorship of
24
The Ceylon Times reported on 29 January 1856 that the 1855-6 sea¬
son was one of the best ever for shipping coffee. 'Never has a
Crop season progressed with so few complaints.'
Ceylon, was an enthusiastic railway supporter, who asserted quite
categorically in a letter to Sir George Grey on 14 March 1855 that he
was 'of opinion that the best way would be for the Government to make
25
the line,' He was quite confident, at least untilthe end of 1855,
that the main line could be made for well under £800,000, but despite
the general scepticism about this in between the first and second
London meetings, Elphinstone became a supporter of the Company. This,
26
he admitted, was due to his friendship with the directors. J.K.
Jolly was converted to support of the Company for the same reason.
There is no reason to doubt, however, that his acceptance of a seat on
the Board arose from anything more than a desire to see the interests
of the colony represented at that level. His conversion was not well
received in Ceylonj neither was that of R.D. Gerard, who also aban¬
doned his stand in support of a government loan and construction by
contractors, in favour of a seat on the Company's Board of Directors in
1856. There is nothing to indicate that these changes of opinion were
brought about by anything other than a more sure understanding of the
situation, following a closer acquaintance with Company personnel in
London. Nevertheless, suspicions were aroused, and the appointment of
Jolly and Gerard failed to produce the favourable response in Ceylon
27
which might have been expected.
25
Letter published in the Colombo Observer, 4 June 1855.
26
This was reported in an account of the second meeting regarding
the Railway in the Colombo Observer of 13 March 1856. Elphinstone
continued to accept the contract plan, but was prepared to favour
the Ceylon Railway Company as a means of raising the money necessary
for the project.
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The Colombo Observer published letters from both Jolly and Elphin¬
stone, explaining their action, on 24 March 1856. The paper commen-
The Provisional Agreement was very far from being universally un¬
popular among planters in Ceylon. After its publication, many who
had previously entertained doubts about a company scheme, found suf¬
ficient reassurance in the contract and the promises of a preliminary
survey, to make the scheme acceptable. Although the Company idea had
had few supporters in principle, in practice, when presented with a
virtual fait accompli, there were many who were prepared to accept the
contract in order to hasten the advent of the railway. There were
others whose distrust of the Company made them wary of the contract.
Two possible explanations have been advanced for the differing atti¬
tudes among planters; first, was an idea propounded by Sir Henry Ward
in mid-1856, that the division was essentially one between proprietors
and superintendents; and second, there is the possibility that the
location of estates dictated the planters' attitudes.
Ward claimed that proprietors, as a class, whether in London or
resident in Ceylon, were favourable to the Company scheme, whereas
2 B
opposition to it could be traced to the Superintendents. These men
ted that these letters were not likely to impress in favour of the
contract.
28
Ward's general view on the attitudes of superintendents and owners
can be found at C054/323/153 30 August 1856. He felt that the pro¬
prietary interests had greater concern for the future of the colony
than the superintendents, who, he argued, had no stake in the future
of the colony. This is a rather naive argument; large proprietors,
such as Elphinstone, had a close personal interest in the Company (as
a Director) and the large agency house of Keir, Dundas and Company
also had a definite interest in the future of the Company, being its
Kandy agents. Ward tried to dismiss opposition to the Company very
lightly, and it is interesting to note that he also informed the
Colonial Office that he believed a Tamil petition to the Queen on
the subject, to have been drawn up by 'one of the Editors of the
Observer Newspaper' who obtained the signatures of many Tamils under
the misapprehension that the document concerned Verandahs. 0054/
323/177 30 September 1856.
Hi
he said, had no long-term interest in either the estates or the col-
'Jk
o?£frand often worked for an owner whose view of the railway was com¬
pletely different. In support of this argument, Ward cited the long
29
list of proprietors who had signed a pro-Company petition in London.
He ignored the fact that it was much more unusual to find an absentee
superintendent in London. The Governor also claimed that at the
second Kandy meeting in August only eleven of the thirty-seven present
were actually owners of estates and that this small block was outvoted
by the managers present. Again^he chose to ignore the fact that
only one vote was recorded in favour of the Company scheme at this
particular meeting so that even the proprietors present were opposed
to it. Neither the petition circulated on behalf of the Company in
the colony in September 1856, nor the letters received by Captain
Bird in opposition to the railway scheme, appear to lend any support
to Ward's theories. Both seem to indicate that numbers were fairly
evenly divided and that each camp drew its support from a cross-section
of the planting community,^
It seems clear that no simple theory can account for the differing
attitudes adopted by planters over the method of railway construction.
Instead, the factors previously mentioned, labour, ability to pay export
duties, scepticism over railway companies in general and difficutics
29
Ward mentioned that'several'signatures on Bird's petition
against the Company were those of Superintendents of estates, the
owners of which had signed the London Kemorial in favour of the
Company. C054/323/153 3C August 1856.
"»A
C054/525/163 16 September 1856.
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in obtaining transport at a moderate rate, all exerted varying degrees
of influence on different planters at different times. The evidence
suggests that prior to the negotiation of the contract, planting opin¬
ion was overwhelmingly opposed to a contract with the Ceylon Railway
Company. After the publication of the Provisional Agreement, however,
there was a slow erosion of opposition which was greatly hastened by
the knowledge that}in the event of an unsatisfactory preliminary sur¬
vey, the contract could be annulled. With the knowledge that the line
could be constructed within the limit of £1,200,000 and the consequent
final commitment of the colony to the contract, further opposition
seemed pointless and acquiescence was deemed the best course.
Planters and Merchants and the Railway after 1856
Although opposition to the Company scheme lived on among planters
after 1856, it was far less frequently voiced, since it could not hope
to have any effect when the contract with the Ceylon Railway Company
was actually in operation. As the works on the line began, the pros¬
perity of the planters not only increased but also began to look much
more firmly established and the export duty seemed less harsh a burden
to bear than had been feared. Furthermore, worries about possible
labour shortages as Company and planters competed for coolies, were
partly allayed by the willingness of the Governor to involve the gov-
31
eminent in immigration.
The seasons of 1856-7 and 1857-8 were far from disastrous ones for
the planters. The transport problem was not unduly troublesome and
32
The Immigration Ordinance was the high point of this policy.
the appalling conditions of the 1854-5 season, which had encouraged
demands for a railway, were not repeated and began to fade from memory.
The planters became less and less interested in affairs outside their
own narrow sphere of interest; in most cases there were few causes of
complaint and less need to participate in public matters. In 1859,
both the Planters* Association and the Chamber of Commerce found it
impossible to find a suitable representative to serve on the Legisla¬
tive Council and Ward complained very bitterly of the lack of interest
3*
exhibited. Generally, the planters were satisfied with the colonial
government and were content to occupy themselves only with matters of
immediate concern.
When news broke of Doyne's high estimate, there was no immediate
outcry from the planting community such as would have been heard in
the same circumstances in 1855 or 1856. The planters reacted calmly
and almost indifferently to the possibility that the line could cost
over two million pounds. A Memorial was forwarded to Newcastle from
the planters of Kandy in October 1859, stating that they considered
Doyne's estimate put such a railway beyond the means of the colony,
especially in view of the fact that it was far from certain that the
line would not actually cost more. It would be preferable, these men
felt, to continue without rail transport than to carry on the agreement
with the Company.
See C054/345/9 2 3 July 1859^ for a somewhat acrimonious correspon¬
dence between Ward and Wall on this subject.
34
rhe Memorial from the planters to be found at C054/346/79 15 Oc¬
tober 1859 read, 'in this state of uncertainty as to time and amount
your Memorialists are of opinion that the interests of the island
would be better promoted by our being without a Railway for the pre¬
sent than by carrying out the agreement with the Company.'
161
In general, the Planters' Association took little interest in the
matter. The subject of the increased estimate was discussed at a
meeting in late April 1859 and the Chairman advised that, in his view,
the colony would do well to extricate itself from an unfavourable con-
36
tract. Other than this, there is an impression that the troubles
of the Ceylon Railway were regarded by the planters as matters of
small concern to them. In part, this was due to the weakness of the
Association, which was torn by the rivalry of owners and superinten¬
dents and the attempts of the former to restrict the voting rights of
the managers. It was also symptomatic of a dramatic improvement in
transport conditions, brought about by both an increase in the supply
of bullocks and the financial aid granted by Governor V?ard to pro¬
grammes of road works.
The planters and merchants of the colony had played a major part
in bringing about the recognition by the Imperial Government of the
need for a railway. They had also vociferously urged their views on
the desirability, or otherwise, of a contract with the Ceylon Railway
Conpany. By 1859, however, their interest in the construction of a
railway line had receeded and when difficulties occurred they were un¬
willing and unable to offer any constructive plans for the future.
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Chapter 10
THE RAILWAY TO 1865
In early 1861, an Ordinance dissolving the contract between the
Ceylon Railway Company and the colony, and repaying the capital of
the Company, received the Royal Assent.* The future of the railway
remained undecided. Fifteen years had gone by since the railway idea
had first been mooted and nearly five had elapsed since agreement had
been reached with the Ceylon Railway Company. Yet little progress
was visible. In return for the expenditure of £300,000, the colony
had received only ten miles of incomplete track, a large quantity of
rails and a number of locomotive engines, which might or might not be
of use in the future. The contract with the Company had been little
short of a disaster for the colony.
Several factors had contributed toward this misfortune. In the
first place, the contract with the Company had had several serious
loopholes. Of these, the most obvious was the fact that the Company
was not committed to constructing the line for a fixed amount. Fur¬
thermore, the provisions regarding the operation of the time clause
were also unsatisfactory since all the land had to be handed over to
the Company before the time limit commenced.
Difficulties arose also because several provisions in the contract
which were intended to protect the interests of the colony were never
brought into operation. One such safeguard was the appointment of a
Ceylon government Consulting Engineer. Clause four of the Agreement
^Ordinance 9 of 1861 dissolving the railway contract was forwarded
to the Colonial Office in C054/355/54 29 December 1860. Considera¬
tion of Ordinance 10, raising one million pounds on debentures, was
reserved until after the meeting of the Company shareholders. CO
54/355/55 29 December 1861.
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laid down that the Ceylon government should select the route and dir¬
ection of the line, but this required the appointment of a competent
engineer to undertake the work. The Colonial Office, however, was
averse to such an appointment and hence the Ceylon government was
forced to rely on the Company's Resident Engineer, Doyne. The powers
of supervision granted to the Ceylon government, or rather, vested in
its Consulting Engineer, were thereby lost and there was no effective
supervision of the work carried out by the Company.
The Company scheme itself, had, of course, never been particu¬
larly popular in Ceylon. The low regard in which many contemporary
railway companies were held gave the Ceylon Railway Company a poor
start and rumours of corruption in London did nothing to improve its
standing. Its conduct of affairs, both in England and in Ceylon, was
also open to criticism. It may be that it was merely ill-served by
its enployees; Doyne and Beeston were almost certainly not as guilt¬
less in their conduct as Ward believed. However, the letters of
Philip Anstruther to Beeston, exhorting him to deliberately delay the
works, must inevitably cast doubt on all the proceedings of the Com¬
pany. The delays which occurred in choosing the route and in argu¬
ments between Doyne and Gregory were instrumental in the failure of the
scheme. They convinced the Legislative Council that the contract
should be annulled. Furthermore, the difficulties of raising money
at the agreed rates in 1859-60 provided the Company with an excuse to
withdraw from the Agreement.
Opinion in the colony had ceased to be united regarding the need
for a railway soon after the end of the disastrous 1854-5 season.
From being a cardinal necessity, the railway became merely a desirable
nz.
advantage to some and a sheer extravagance to others. The price
which it was deemed worthwhile to pay to secure a line, varied accord¬
ing to the desire of the individual to see a railway built.
By 1859, it was clear that all was far from well with the Company
and with the progress of the line. Even then, the Legislative Coun¬
cil was unable to put forward any single, clear proposal as to the
course of action to follow. Only when the Ceylon Railway Company
showed its desire to be released from the Agreement, did the colony
grasp the opportunity, and terminate the contract.
It was necessary for the colony to raise money on debentures to
pay off the Railway Company. MacCarthy agreed with a Colonial Office
proposal that as large a sum as possible should be contributed from
cash in hand so that the amount of interest payable in the future on
2
the debentures could be kept to a minimum. The use thus made of cash
in hand may appear entirely reasonable, but it represented a momentous
step, creating a precedent which was to prove far from popular among
certain sections of the community in Ceylon. In particular, the appro¬
priation of export duties in this way inevitably proved controversial
since their imposition had originally been the result of a purely vol¬
untary gesture on the part of the commercial community. The use made
of the duties meant that they had been paid for three years without any
tangible result. Those who had paid them had received no benefit what¬
soever since the duties had been spent partly on interest to the Company
2C054/361/136 12 July 1861. £200,000 was made available. This
comprised £72,600 export duties, £25,600 from the Ceylon Railway
Company account with the Oriental Bank and the remainder was appro¬
priated from cash balances p. a.Sv 0\"\ "V"Nj
113
and were now to be used to help rid the colony of its contract with
the Company.''
The Planters' Association, predictably, voiced a complaint about
the appropriation of the surplus cash in hand in this way. John Gavin
argued forcibly that the debt should have been left for posterity to
4
pay. However, the Planters' Association was again anxious that a
railway be constructed and the scheme not be completely abandoned.
In July, the apparent lack of action on the subject prompted the draw¬
ing up of a Memorial urging that a railway was necessary and that a
5
line even as far as the foothills would be worthwhile.
MacCarthy had told the Colonial Office that he would be reluctant
to see the work postponed, but he had also made it clear that he was
far from be^hg enthusiastically in favour of it. He wrote to New¬
castle in December 1860 voicing his apprehension 'that the very large
Expenditure of the last few years, treading as it has done, closely on
the heels of the Revenue, may necessitate a very careful husbanding of
our resources for some time to come, scarcely compatible with the
g
undertaking of so important a work.' Loth as he would be, he con¬
tinued, to see the postponement of the work, 'I can foresee the possi-
'
3
The total export duties which had been paid at that time was
£103,366. From this, interest of £39,800 had been paid to the Pail-
way Company. CO54/355/40 13 December 1860.
^Planters' Association Proceedings, 1862. Vc
5
Planters' Association Proceedings. A committee meeting held on 12
July 1862 appointed a committee to draw up the Memorial and resolved
that 'a line to the foot of the hills would be far preferable to no
Railway at all, and it hopes that this obstacle of the ascent will
not longer delay the formation of the Railway to the foot of the hills.•
^C054/355/42 15 December 1860.
bility of its being found necessary to postpone it, at least for a
7
year or two longer.*
A decision on the future of the railway was needed so the matter
0
was referred to a sub-committee of the Legislative Council. The
decision at which it arrived wets that the line should proceed provid¬
ing an English contractor could be found who would be prepared to
undertake the work. The knowledge that Doyne's successor as Company
Resident Engineer had found a new line, which he believed could be
built at a reasonable cost, undoubtedly influenced the thinking of the
9
committee. With the decision approved by the full Council, it re¬
mained only for the Colonial Office to be asked to advertise for
tenders.
In the early part of 1861 the Colonial Office had been preoccupied
with details arising from the cancellation of the contract with the
Ceylon Railway Company. Several firms which had entered into agree¬
ments with the Company to produce rails or girders or engines had
begun to press the Colonial Office for instructions as to the future
of these goods which, in many cases, they had been storing for some
time.*0 Hence the Colonial Office awaited a final decision on the
7Ibid.
0
The sub-committee, which had recommended paying off the Company,
had decided that the future of the railway project should be de¬
ferred for consideration in depth. C054/355/42 15 December 1860.
g
The report of the sub-committee is available at C057/29 and shows
that Molesworth's estimate did receive consideration. The sub¬
committee wanted the government to continue work on cuttings, but
the full Council did not agree.
*°See C054/364 Ebbw Vale Company to Colonial Office, 4 February 1862
regarding five thousand tons of rails. Also Messrs Westwood,
ns
future from the colony with some impatience. Officials were pleased
to act once the decision was made by arranging for the invitation of
tenders. When the tenders were submitted they were forwarded to the
colony but were not accompanied by any instructions, the subject of
the railway being then under examination by the Treasury. Both the
Treasury and Colonial Office officials soon agreed that one of the
tenders, by Faviell, was highly suitable, and the Governor was informed
of this fact. MacCarthy had already acted, however, by setting up a
sub-committee of the Legislative Council to consider all the tenders
received.
This sub-committee duly reported in late November and also recom-
12
mended the adoption of the tender submitted by Faviell. The attrac¬
tion of this tender lay in its estimated cost, for when this was added
to the amount already spent on the Ceylon Railway Company scheme, the
13
total was still under one and a half million pounds. In view of
the colony's unfortunate experience with the Railway Company, the sub¬
committee recommended various safeguards this time. Circumstances were
outlined in which it was envisaged the colony could take the work into
its own hands and devices were put forward to guarantee the reliability
Baillie Campbell to Ceylon Railway Company (13 March 1861) and Cey¬
lon Railway Company to Colonial Office (12 April 1861) regarding
engines made by Messrs Stephenson and Company.
^Reported in C054/370/17S 4 September 1862.
12
C054/371/233 29 November 1862. Molesworth was recommended as the
Pesident Engineer.
13
Faviells' tender was £873,039, and the value of the works already
conpleted £509,000 making a total cost of £1,382,039.
14
of Faviell himself. Of particular significance for the future was
a proposal that a limit of £20,000 per annum should be set upon the
amount to be contributed from general revenue toward the cost. Mac-
Carthy agreed, in his covering despatch, that no greater sum could be
spared if, as had been intimated to him, the military contribution was
to be increased.*^ On 20 November, the Legislative Council as a
whole agreed to ask the Secretary of State to complete a contract with
Faviell. So, a third railway scheme was embarked upon.^
In January 1863, the 1863 Supply Ordinance was forwarded from
Ceylon; the contribution which it provided for railway purposes was
limited to the £20,000 which had been recommended by the sub-committee.
Although the Colonial Office approved the Ordinance, MacCarthy was re-
minded1 all the same, that contributions to the railway from current
revenue should be as large as possible. The Governor responded by
suggesting that a substantial amount of capital might be used to reduce
the total amount of the debt. In this way, it might no longer be nec¬
essary to vote annual contributions from general revenue and any pos¬




A personal bond of £20,000 was recommended.
15C054/371/233 29 November 1862.
16
Ordinance 19 of 1862 to raise one million pounds on debentures
for the construction of a railway was sen-; to England by C054/374/
1 2 January 1863.
17C054/374/l 2 January 1863.
1 ft
C054/377/126 31 July 1863.
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This proposal was referred to the Treasury for comment, whilst
Strachey continued the financial calculations on which he was engaged
regarding the colony's military expenditure. Although MacCarthy had
suggested the appropriation from capital in order to avoid the neces¬
sity of spending revenue on the railway, the eventual result of his
proposal was that the contribution from surplus capital funds was made
as well as, and not instead of, the annual votes from revenue. This
was not what MacCarthy had intended, and although the idea of reducing
the railway debt as far as possible was dear to the Treasury, it was
far from popular in Ceylon. In mid-August 1863, the reply of the
Legislative Council to the Opening Address of the Governor warned
against such a policy: 'althoucfa His Grace the Secretary of State pru¬
dently calls attention to the advisability of contributing from current
revenue as largely as possible to the Railway construction funds, the
acknowledged improvement of the Colony under the past liberal expen¬
diture justifies, in the opinion of the Council, the continuance of a
19
similar policy.' Any new plan by Strachey was therefore unlikely
to receive an enthusiastic welcome.
In the event} Strachey's idea was adopted, and the sum of £250,000
was appropriated from surplus funds toward the cost of the railway, by
20
Ordinance 3 of 1864. The Supply Ordinance for the year also inclu-
21
ded a £30,000 contribution from the revenue. The inclusion of this
amount had not gone unopposed in Council, however, and the vote passed
19C057/33 19 August 1863.
20
C054/385/12 13 January 1864.
21C054/386/34 16 February 1864.
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the full session of the Council only on the casting vote of the Acting
22
Governor.
The application of surplus funds and annual revenue in this way
attracted the predictable adverse criticism in the colony. Opposi¬
tion was forcibly expressed at a Planters* Association meeting in May
at which Alexander Brown denied the duty of the generation then in the
island to reduce the railway debt for those to come, who would also
have the benefit of the improved communications. 'What has posterity
done for us?* he asked, 'that we should submit to be taxed and squeezed
23
in order that they might enjoy ease and affluence ' Later in the
year, when outrage at the very existence of surplus funds had increased
because of the demand for an increased military contribution, Brown
outlined a series of ways in which the surpluses could be reduced.
By this time, even he had come to accept the idea of using the surpluses
to finance the railway, in preference to seeing the money handed to the
Inperial Government for military purposes. When Wall proposed a
motion in the Legislative Council in November against the vote of
£70,000 from the current revenue of 1865 and 1866 toward railway costs,
24
he could find no support. Nothing is more indicative of the furore
which the military expenditure question aroused than this. with the
third scheme for the construction of a railway under way, it is to the
question of military expenditure that attention must now turn.
22
The sub-committee tried to reduce the contribution to £15,000.
23
Planters' Association meeting, 24 Mity 1864. Report in Observer,
30 May 1864.
24
C054/394/240 4 November 1864.
PAET III
Chapter 11
INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY EXPENDITURE
The end of the Revolutionary V?ar with France found Britain in
possession of a larger number of overseas territories than at any pre¬
vious time in her history. Some were of trading value, some of pure¬
ly strategic significance, but in all cases the task of defending
these far-flung corners of the new Empire devolved on the Mother
Country."'' Some 48,000 troops, or half the strength of the British
army, were engaged in the defence of the colonies after the end of the
war, at an annual cost of £3,000,000, towards which the colonies con-
2
tributed only £300,000. The duties performed by these troops varied.
In the obviously strategic posts, such as Gibraltar, their duties were
purely those of imperial defence. On the other hand, in some of the
West Indian islands, for example, the soldiers were cast, at least
partly, in the less obviously imperial role of internal peacekeepers.
The cost of maintaining these troops was high. In 1829, despite
attempts at retrenchment, British forces overseas still cost the
Treasury around £2,500,000 and colonial contributions had risen only to
£335,000.^ Successive administrations were faced with the problem of
how economies in imperial defence could be made. Two obvious altema-
tives presented themselvesi first, the numbers of the troops stationed
in the colonies could be reduced, or, second, those administrations
which had sufficient financial resources to contribute to the cost of
their own defence could be encouraged to do so. The latter idea had






been suggested by a House of Commons Finance Committee in 1817 but had
4
not been introduced with any marked success.
During the course of the 1820s reductions were made in the size
of the overseas garrisons. By 1829, one authority has claimed, the
nuntoer of troops used to man overseas garrisons had been reduced from
5
48,000 to just over 30,000. Further reductions took place during
the early 1830s and by 1835 only North America and Ceylon still housed
£
garrisons of more than 4,000 men. Whatever the relative accuracy of
the figures, it was clear by the mid-1830s that the reductions in the
number of troops were insufficient to appease the critics. Fortu¬
nately for the Government, the critics had by then lost much of their
initial support and the subject of the Empire's defence was not a
dominant issue in British politics.
In 1834 the Whig Government appointed a Commons sub-committee to
enquire into the military establishment and expenditure in the colo¬
nies. The menbers of this committee included Charles Buller, Henry
Ward and Lord John Russell and it recommended that the strictest econo¬
my should be observed as regards colonial military expenditure. It
even proposed that in any colony where surplus funds remained after
civil expenses had been met, they should be used to K*;et the military
costs. No drastic cuts in the nuitbers of troops were recommended, how¬
ever, Nor was the duty of the Imperial power to provide for the de¬
fence of its dependent territories renounced. Article 1 of the Report
4




emphasised this, saying that it did not intend, by any of its sugges¬
tions regarding the size of forces, 'to relieve the Executive Govern¬
ment from the Duty which constitutionally belongs to it, of providing,
on the responsibility of the King's Ministers, a Force sufficient for
the Security of His Majesty's Possessions abroad, which Experience has
proved is liable to vary in time of Peace, according to several con-
7
tingencies arising out of internal or external forces.' The Cana¬
dian rebellion of 1G37 and the onset of the Kaffir V.'ars also increased
the difficulty of cutting back the number of forces employed abroad.
The increasing cost of imperial defence came under attack again
in the 1840s and 1850s from two sides. Both the Free Traders and the
Colonial Reformers criticised the expense to the Mother Country of
maintaining garrisons in countries such as Australia, New Zealand and
the Cape, where, they felt, the British colonists ought to be
capable of keeping internal order and where there was no obvious danger
of external attack. The connection between representative government
and self-defence was expounded by Molesworth, the leading Colonial Re¬
former, who insisted that it was better both for the colonies and the
long-term interests of the Empire that the former should be thrown upon
their own resources as regards defence. He did not deny that troops
necessary for an Imperial war should be an Imperial expense, but he
stressed that those colonies with representative institutions were
themselves responsible for any local wars in which they became involved
and should pay the costs which they incurred. Furthermore, Molesworth
favoured the abandonment of all but eight or nine of those imperial
7
Quoted in Schuyler, p. 209.
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possessions which were primarily of military importance. Since Ceylon
was neither included among those possessions which Molesworth regarded
as having military significance nor was a colony with representative
institutions, he favoured its being handed over to the East India Corn-
Two main plans were advanced during these years for reorganising
and effecting economies in military expenditure. The first scheme was
evolved by the staunch Free Trader, Earl Grey, who was Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies from 1846 to 1852. He suggested that
if the colonies took over the cost of military works and barracks,
Britain could svqpply a fixed number of troops in return. Any troops
required above this number could be supplied at the expense of the
colonial government. This plan was put into practice with some success
in parts of Australia and North America, but made little impact on the
Empire as a whole.
An alternative plan was propounded by Denison, the Governor of
New South Wales. He felt that the colonies themselves should decide
on the number of troops which they required, should undertake to pay
for works, stores and similar items and that the main cost should then
be equally shared by the colonial and Imperial Governments. This plan
had its critics, among them the Duke of Newcastle, who felt that it
afforded too much power to the colonies in calculating the nunfoer of
troops needed. Newcastle became Secretary of State for the second




vious tenure of office of reducing the number of troops stationed in
the colonies. This was successful in the early 1860s with regard to
Australia, the Cape and the West Indies, though the effect of the re¬
ductions in these colonies was not noticeable in the Empire as a whole
as additional troops had to be sent to Mediterranean bases because of
the fear of war with France. Newcastle's policy was founded on the
firm belief that the most sound defence policy was to rely on naval
supremacy. The reductions which he made in the garrisons of self-
governing colonies stemmed as much from a belief in self-defence as
the corollary of self-government as from the need to economise. As
regards other colonies, he maintained that the discretionary power of
the Secretary of State should be used in the light of his knowledge of
local circumstances.
Such was the importance of the whole question of colonial mili¬
tary ejqpenditure that it was referred to an Inter-Departmental Commit¬
tee in 1859. This consisted of one representative from each of the
interested Departments, the Colonial Office, the War Office and the
Treasury. The establishment of the Committee was largely the result
of increasing embarrassment in the War Office at being held accountable
for aspects of colonial military organisation when its Departmental
knowledge of the colonies was scanty. Until 1854}the War and Colonial
Offices had been combined under one Minister who had thus had easy
access to all the relevant facts. The division of the Office into two
separate departments created an anomalous situation of which the War
Office was only too aware. As Hawes, the Under-Secretary at the War
Office, pointed out in a letter to Merivale in March 1859, 'The duty
and responsibility of dealing with such demands ffor troops and stores],
and of explaining and defending to Parliament the expenditure incurred
or proposed in respect of them, now devolve on a Minister who has no
official knowledge of the political and social circumstances of the
9
Colonies, and no means of communicating with Colonial Governments.*
The Report of the Committee achieved nothing because of the fun¬
damental difference in the approach of the Treasury and the War Office
on the one hand, and the Colonial Office on the other.^ As the 1860s
dawned,the situation remained unsettled. Both the War Office and the
Treasury, which was preoccupied with the need for economy, were bring¬
ing pressure to bear upon the Colonial Office to change the existing
organisation of military defence in the colonies. The Colonial Office,
however, sought to resist these pressures so that it could solve the
problem in its own way and in the light of its superior knowledge of
the individual colonies. Whereas the War Office saw only general
categories of colonies, the Colonial Office approach was much more
flexible, as its conduct with regard to Ceylon illustrates.
The Background in Ceylon
Very soon after the occupation of Ceylon by British forces in
1796, the Imperial authorities made their intentions regarding future
expenditure clear. In an often quoted despatch of 13 March 1801,
Dundas wrote to North, 'I cannot doubt that at a period not very dis¬
tant the revenues of the island will be found fully adequate to defray
9
Hawes to Merivale, 14 March 1859, published in the Report of the
Committee on the Expense of Military Defence in the Colonies, BPP
vol. 41, 1860, p. 573 eb
^Elliott's conclusions can be found in a separate memorandum on
pp. 11-19 of the Report.
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all its expenses, civil and military, and that a considerable over¬
plus ... will remain disposable for the benefit of this country.A?"*
Twenty years later Bathurst echoed this view in writing to Sir Edward
Paget. In an equally well-known despatch, he re-affirmed the Impe¬
rial Government's wish to transfer to the colonial establishment the
I
military charges which were then still paid by the British Government.
These hopes, expressed in the early years of the century, bore no
fruit, however, and Ceylon continued to be a drain on Imperial re¬
sources. In 1857-8^Britain still paid around £100,000 per annum
toward the military expenses of an island which had neither hostile
tribes within its frontiers nor any real fear of aggression from with¬
out. Thus Ceylon was a prime target for those seeking to reduce the
British Government's financial commitments overseas.
The constitutional position regarding the payment of military
expenditure at this time requires a brief explanation. The military
costs which the colony paid were charges incurred upon the authority
of Her Majesty's Government and were an outlay over which the Legisla¬
tive Council had no control. Earl Grey had, however, outlined a plan
in 1848 whereby control of the colonial budget would devolve onto the
Legislative Council.As regards civil expenditure, it was promised
that this would happen whenever a revision of the civil establishment
^Dundas to North, 13 March 1801, quoted in BPP vol. 38 1865, Papers
on the cost of the Military Establishment in Ceylon, p. 14.
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Bathurst to Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Edward Paget,
21 August 1821, ibid., p. 15.
*3Grey's despatches of 18 May 1847 (despatch 216) and 17 July 1847
(despatch 252) CeJ^-elv (ei, Vo cix-v PfWOYo^—| *\c) - ^!
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took place. This was finally completed in 1858, but no condition or
plan was ever set out with regard to military expenditure. It there¬
fore remained quite clear that the Legislative Council had no control
over the military budget. There were those who contended that this
was the most suitable arrangement and who did not favour the implemen¬
tation of Grey's promise. Governor Ward, for example, wrote privately
to Lytton on 29 Septenber 1858, and referred to Grey's promise 'which
14
I hope will never be claimed.or fulfilled'. Ward felt it desirable
that the Imperial Government should retain the ultimate control of
military expenditure and he feared the consequences which would ensue
if the Legislative Council possessed significant power on the matter.
The size of the military bill might well have proved acceptable
to the colony had the advantages of the military presence been more
apparent. Instead, it was clear that both the inadequacy of the force
and the condition of the fortifications would render any real resis¬
tance to external attack quite hopeless. In 1859, Ward reported to
the Colonial Office his full agreement with the Major-General's view
of the deplorable state of the defences and he gave his opinion that,
in the existing conditions, nothing could render Colombo defensible
15
for even twenty-four hours. Some guns were quite unserviceable, he
reported, whilst the walls were unlikely to prove sufficiently strong
16
to withstand even the recoil of new guns.
14
Private letter of Ward to Lytton, 29 September 1858, letter 1.
15C054/343/81 23 April 1859.
15 |b?d.
Nor did the internal situation appear to merit such a sizeable
military outlay. There were few, perhaps, who denied the need for a
force of some kind to safeguard internal security, but many claimed
that a civilian police force could undertake many of the functions
which were being carried out by the military. Despite the troubles
of 1848 and the Mutiny in India in 1857, the internal threat seemed
too vague to warrant such high military costs, particularly during the
early 1850s and 1860s when retrenchment was practised with regard to
civil expenditure. when money was spent, as it was during Ward's
Governorship, on objects close to the hearts of the most vociferous
members of the community, then the high level of military expenditure
was tolerated. Once economy became the order of the day and public
works expenditure ceased to satisfy demands, discontent over the ex¬
penditure for military purposes grew and became the focal point for
criticism of the government.
The most unpopular part of the military expenditure, and the item
on which attention was usually focused, was the £24,000 direct contri¬
bution made annually by the colony to the Imperial Exchequer. This
was actually but a small part of the total military bill met by the
colony and it was the only part paid direct to the Imperial authori¬
ties. It had been first levied in 1836 when there was apparently an
amount of surplus revenue. It was subsequently claimed by colonists,
and on occasion by Governors, that it was an unfair impost, since they
maintained that the supposed surplus had been caused by the omission
from the accounts for that year of an £87,000 issue of government
notes and the inclusion in receipts of amounts from the Pearl Fisheries,
f?1
a far from permanent feature of the accounts. Strong feelings
against the contribution were expressed by Governor Stewart Mackenzie
in 1841 and he claimed that 'if some temporary financial relief is
not afforded to the Colony till these resources are developed, the
progress the Island is now making must be retarded, if not altogether
18
arrested.1 Had a boom in land sales not taken place in the 1840s,
the colony might well have found great difficulty in paying the impost
demanded. Certainly, in the difficult economic climate of 1849,
Torrington pleaded with the Colonial Office for the remission of the
contribution, writing to Grey: 'I feel it my duty to represent to
Your Lordship the strong and increasing conviction in the minds not
only of the Members of the Council but of all Classes of the people
conversant with public affairs, that this payment was made under a mis¬
apprehension of the real state of the Finances of the Colony, that it
is a payment which no other Colony is called upon to bear, that it is
highly injurious to its interests, being in fact a sum which would be
19
otherwise employed in public works and roads.*
There were intermittent murmurings from the Europeans about the
contribution. The Chamber of Commerce expressed their hope in eafb
1851 that the need for a railway, and the apparent impossibility of
financing it, would lead to the remission of the annual military con¬
tribution so that the amount in question could be appropriated to
17
CO54/246/40 11 February 1848, Torrington to Grey.
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C054/187/19 12 February 1841.
19C054/261/159 14 November 1849.
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railway purposes. In January 1851, The Tiroes had thundered against
what it termed 'the shameful exaction of £24,000 per annum for Ijili-
21
tary purposes'. Of undoubted significance for the future was the
fact that many who protested about this contribution were unaware that
22
this was not the entire military burden shouldered by the colony.
Another item of military expenditure which aroused interest was
the question of military allowances and in 1858 Ward established a
Commission to report on this. They were paid by the colony to the
troops over and above their normal remuneration, and were meant to
compensate for the additional living costs incurred in a tropical cli¬
mate. These allowances were widely held to require revision» the
military authorities, however, argued that increases were necessary
whilst their civilian critics demanded reductions in the amounts al¬
ready paid. The Commission actually reported in favour of augmenting
the allowances, and Ward sanctioned the arrangements without consulting
23
the Legislative Council. This was despite the fact that the rent
and travelling allowances had been separated from the general island
allowances for the first time and were supposed to be voted by the Leg¬
islative Council and not incurred solely on the authority of the Imp¬
erial Government. Although the new arrangements were eventually sub¬
mitted for Legislative Council approval, Council members were quick to
point out that the Council had been by-passed.
21
Ceylon Times, 16 January 1851.
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Ward wrote in a private letter to Labouchere on 12 April 1856 that
'nine people out of ten, believe the Military Contribution to be
£24,000 not £80,000, at which you correctly state it.' Letter 1.
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See Chapter on the Legislative Council and Military Expenditure,
p^ o-n - ~l\%
Military expenditure was an emotive subject and one destined to
come to the fore during the years 1855-65. In Britain, the Colonial
Office was under pressure from other government departments and from
Parliament. In Ceylon, the topic was a rallying point for those
critical of the Imperial authorities. It was impossible for both
those in Britain who saw Ceylon's contribution as too small, and those
in Ceylon who felt the payments made to be too large, to be satisfied.
Hew the question developed and was eventually resolved will now be
Chapter 12
THE GOVERNOR AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Governor Ward implied soon after his arrival in Ceylon in 1855
that he considered the colony's military costs were too high consider¬
ing the relatively small size of the force stationed there.* This
was a view which both he and his successor, MacCarthy, stressed repea¬
tedly over the next ten years. In particular, both Governors, and
many sections of the public, had in mind the number of permanent staff
stationed in the island. Ward made no secret of his desire to see a
reduction in their numbers but the military authorities showed no in¬
clination to comply with his wishes. Instead, the Major-General in¬
sisted that the reduction of troops in the colony over the past years
had not led to a corresponding reduction in the work load of the per-
2
manent staff. MacCarthy also felt that reductions could be made in
the size of the establishment and the strength of the medical staff in
particular aroused his attention. His belief in the necessity of re¬
ductions led him to urge that any settlement of the military expenditure
question should include provision for the revision of the establishment
3
by the Legislative Council at the same time.
MacCarthy did not adopt a blindly anti-military stance, however,
for he was willing to concede that the Major-General himself was pos¬
sibly underpaid, considering the amount of work which he was called
upon to perform. Nevertheless, as he pointed out to Newcastle, he
felt that there existed 'a cloud of inferior functionaries, Adjutant-
1C054/316/70 1 August 1855.
2C054/316/88 15 August 1855.
"^MacCarthy to Newcastle, 29 March 1863. NeC. 10,997.
General, Quarter-Master-General, Military Secretary, etc. etc. each
with a staff of Clerks and office Establishments, who have little or
4
nothing to do, and draw high allowances for doing it.1 It was here,
he said, that reductions should be made.
Although he was anxious that the Legislative Council should be
granted this power of revision, MacCarthy fully endorsed the fears
which Ward had expressed regarding the advisability of allowing the
Legislative Council any voice in deciding the actual size or distribu¬
tion of the force to be stationed in the island, or any matter relat¬
ing to pay or rations. He strongly asserted that this power should
be retained in the hands of the Crown. Ward had felt that, despite
the validity of many of the criticisms made of the amount of military
expenditure by the Legislative Council, it would be altogether impoli¬
tic to allow it wholesale powers. 'Like all Colonies and all Colo¬
nists,' he wrote, 'there is a disposition to be profuse, or saving,
according to the circumstances of the moment; and the \Zste to be
taken would^often^depend less upon the justice of the proposal, than
upon the time at which it was made.'^ For this reason, MacCarthy dec¬
lined to look favourably upon an Address from the Council requesting
that it be empowered to investigate the whole question of military ex¬
penditure.^ Instead, he suggested that the colony should be charged
a fixed annual sum to cover its entire military budget, with the admin-
4
MacCarthy to Newcastle, 29 March 1863. NeC. 10,997.
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0054/346/90 8 November 1859.
s
MacCarthy's comments can be found at C054/367/37 13 February 1862.
They were essentially an endorsement of the opinion previously ex¬
pressed by Ward.
istration of this amount being left entirely to the military authori-
7
ties.
This was essentially the plan which had already been recommended
by a Colonial Office sub-committee for Mauritius. It formed the
basis of Strachey's plan for Ceylon. MacCarthy received an outline
of the proposed scheme in a private communication from Newcastle and,
as early as February 1863, learnt of the intention of the Colonial
Office to levy an additional £35,000 at once and an additional sum on
0
completion of the railway. Opposition from him at this stage would
have carried some weight in the Colonial Office, but none was forth¬
coming. Instead, he termed the proposal *a very moderate and reason-
9
able one,* and declared himself fairly certain of being able to meet
the demand without either increased taxation or any curtailment of
public works. He did, however, suggest the desirability of postpon¬
ing any increase until after the completion of the railway, but this
was a proposal with which Newcastle was unable to comply.
7Ibid.
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Newcastle to MacCarthy, 26 February 1863 (unnumbered).
^MacCarthy to Newcastle, 29 March 1863. NeC. 10,997.
^Newcastle to MacCarthy, 26 February 1863 (unnumbered). Newcastle
expressed sympathy with this idea, but pointed out that he had not
demanded the whole of the increase at one time because of the rail¬
way construction. However, he felt that given the increased wealth
of the colony, some interim payment was reasonable.
^MacCarthy continued to stress the need for a revision of the mili¬
tary establishment. After Fortescue's speech in the Commons in
April 1863 which warned of an increased military contribution from
Ceylon, there was a resurgence of interest and concern in Ceylon.
MacCarthy wrote to Newcastle: • I always expected a little thunder
of this kind on the first announcement of an intention to increase
the military charges on the Colonial Revenue. It will, however,
The view adopted by the Governor and members of the civil admin¬
istration toward military expenditure was not unaffected by the fact
that relations between the civil and military authorities on the island
were not always as cordial as might be imagined. This added an extra
dimension to the controversy over the military question. In particu¬
lar, island allowances payable to soldiers over and above their normal
pay, proved a bone of contention. Torrington had given some indica¬
tion of the difficulties encountered, when writing to the Colonial
Office as early as 1850 concerning a difference between the civil and
military authorities as to whether or not an island allowance was pay¬
able to a doctor then on the island. He pointed out then that 'it
needs my utmost vigilance to keep down the numerous military charges
12
which are daily sent in.' Although^on this particular occasion^
Grey supported the case advanced by the military authorities, he was
well aware of all aspects of the problem and tried to bring pressure
to bear on the War Office to reduce costs in 1848, but to no avail.
A difficulty flared up in 1858 over the military reserves and
this also created ill-will between the civil and military authorities
and between the latter and some sections of the civilian population.
The War Office ordered the revival of claims to any military lands
which had not been officially abandoned, and many areas in Ceylon which
had not been used by the military for decades were involved. In many
cases, the lands had fallen into civilian use. The only quarry near
oa easily met, if we are permitted, concurrently with the increased
charge , to revise and modify our military establishment.' 16 May
1863. NeC. 10,998.
12C054/270/112 8 July 1850.
m
Hanfeantotte, for example, was situated on land which strictly belonged
to the military authorities. The revival of claims to it led to a
refusal by the military to allow the quarrying to continue, even for
stone which was needed to repair a local customs house.Further¬
more, lands within the Eastern redoubt at Kandy, which had originally
belonged to the military authorities, had been sold in lots in 1848,
with the full consent of those authorities. However, no formal aban¬
donment of the lands had ever been authorised so that these too fell
14
strictly within the bounds of the War Office claim. Although by
the end of the year a scheme had been worked out by which the military
retained possession of only certain sites on the island, the incident
did nothing to improve the standing of the military authorities in the
colony, either with the civil administration or with the colonists.
The situation was exacerbated during the Governorship of MacCarthy
by the need to curtail expenditure as far as possible. The military
represented not only a major source of expense but also one where ex¬
travagances seemed obvious and possible remedies clear. Much depended
in these circumstances on the personal relationship which evolved be¬
tween the Governor and the Major-General. MacCarthy, despite his
widely acknowledged charm, failed to establish any rapport with the
elderly Major-General O'Brien. Instead there occurred, in the early
years of the decade, a series of wholly unedifying disputes between the
civil and military authorities occasioned, in the main, by claims for
13C054/336/77 10 September 1858.
14C054/335/63 29 June 1858.
i*n
island allowances for officers who were in excess of the usual comple¬
ment. MacCarthy and the colonial government interpreted the existing
arrangements in the strictest possible sense; they complained, for
example, of the existence of four surgeons in 1861, when only one had
15
been required to attend a much larger garrison in 1834. The arrival
of a new chaplain to the forces in 1861 was also criticised and, after
many months, representations by the civil government were successful in
securing his recall."^ Even so apparently trivial a subject as the
allowance due to store keepers was a matter on which the civil and mili-
17
tary authorities could not agree. These disputes not only marred
relations between the two but also convinced the Colonial Office of the
need to arrive at a speedy settlement of the military expenditure ques¬
tion, so that such time-consuming arguments could be prevented. *1
cannot help thinking,* minuted Robinson in 1864 when forced to devote
time to consideration of a disagreement over pensions payable to the
Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 'that no question of this sort would arise if
there were a clear and cordial understanding between civil and
18
military authorities in Ceylon.* Whilst appreciating that the desire
of the civil government to curtail expenditure played a not inconsider¬
able part in provoking these disputes, Newcastle also recognised that
the military leadership in the colony since the advent of Major-General
15C054/361/144 23 July 1861.
16See 0054/361/152 29 July 1861, C054/365 3 Ao*® igbi
War Office to Colonial Office, and C054/365 31 August 1861, War
Office to Colonial Office.
17C054/367/36 12 February 1861.
1 R
C054/393/205 9 September 1864.
O'Brien had been far from cooperative. 'The military in Ceylon,' he
minuted in October 1861, 'no doubt under the inspiration of the Major-
General, have lately become very persevering in demands of question¬
al i19able reason.'
Relations between the civil and military authorities deteriorated
still further over what may be termed the Sikh affair of 1863-4. The
necessity of recruiting more extensively than hitherto for the Pioneer
Corps of the Public Works Department led the government to look to
India, where the colony's plantation labour was already recruited.
with the aid of the Indian authorities and a Major MacMullen, one
thousand Sikhs were recruited from the Punjab to join this Corps.
The first five hundred of these arrived in Ceylon in mid-1863. It
was soon apparent that the Sikhs had either been deliberately misled
or had totally misunderstood the nature of the work for which they
had been recruited. A martial sect, many of the tasks involved in
road-making were repugnant to them. Three of the five divisions into
which they had been divided refused to commence work and the remaining
two soon ceased operations. The Ceylon government was placed in a
quandary. Uncertain of the terms upon which MacMullen had recruited
the men, it could do nothing more than await his arrival in Ceylon to
clarify the matter. This was unfortunately delayed for two months by
illness. In the meantime, the unfortunate Sikhs were kept on three-
quarters rations. To exacerbate the position, alleged cases of ill-
treatment of the Sikhs by government officials were brought to the fore
20
by native proctors in Kandy. Some Sikhs, in desperation, even begem
19
C054/365 4 October 1861, War Office to Colonial Office.
20
Despite isolated cases of hostility, the treatment of the Sikhs in
Ceylon was probably reasonable by contemporary standards.
the long trek back to India along the infamous North Eoad, and fears
grew among the planting community that the tales which they might tell
in India of their treatment in Ceylon would deter prospective immi¬
grant workers. Eventually, the majority of Sikhs were sent home by
sea at government expense. Although opinion in the colony tended to
lay the blame for the whole affair on the shoulders of the Indian gov-
21
ernment, the incident did not improve relations between the civil
and military authorities because the latter saw fit to support allega¬
tions of misconduct by the civil government.
Major O'Brien, the son of the Major-General, and himself a staff
officer in Ceylon, espoused the cause of the Bikhs and wrote a letter
to a friend in India which was severely critical of the civil govern¬
ment. The friend to whom he wrote happened to edit an Indian news¬
paper, the Mofussilite, and he duly published the letter. The
authorship of the document was soon discovered and MacCarthy requested
that the Major-General formally censure his son for writing in such
terms. The Major, however, took the apparently extreme step of demand¬
ing a Court Martial, to which his father assented. Colonial Office
officials were appalled when informed of the impending proceedings, for
it seemed clear that the Major-General was determined to use the inci¬
dent to present a critical review of the conduct of the civil government
22
over the whole episode.
21
Given the undoubted unpopularity of the Ceylon government with the
planting community at this time, it may seem strange that the plan¬
ters did not grasp the opportunity to attack the government over this
issue. The answer almost certainly lies in the fact that when the
standing of the European settlers vis-S-vis the 'natives' was involved,
the planters identified wholeheartedly with the government, especially
if the Burgher community showed itself to be on the other side.
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C054/385/14 13 January 1864. Rogers noted that only MacCarthy's
In December 1863, Major-General O'Brien assumed the Acting Gov¬
ernorship of the colony when MacCarthy was forced to depart because of
his deteriorating health. Even when in Office, O'Brien continued to
espouse the cause of the Sikhs and he bombarded both the Colonial
Office and the War office with details of their alleged mistreatment,
and with attacks on Major Skinner, one of whose officers was accused
23
of having flogged Sikhs. The Major-General's criticisms of Mac¬
Carthy were thinly veiled, and he claimed that MacCarthy had not re¬
plied to his demands for an enquiry when the accusations were first
. 24
made.
The Court Martial of Major O'Brien lasted seventy-two days and
finally he was found guilty on only one of the five charges levied
against him, that of falsely claiming that the Colonial Secretary had
tried to persuade him to say that the Sikhs had been well treated.
His father ignored the order of the Court that his son be admonished
for writing the offending letter. Instead, he claimed that this was
not necessary since his son had not been found guilty of conduct unbe¬
coming an officer and a gentleman. In his capacity as Head of the
forces in the island, he laid aside the verdict.
opposition to the charges as originally framed prevented the heart¬
ing becoming£att:ifial of the Ceylon government.
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C054/389/91 7 May 1864. Rogers particularly resented the attacks
made on Skinner. 'I think an old, honourable and most valuable
officer must have boiled with indignation when he had to answer
General O'Brien's sixteen questions'. Rogers did not dispute that
the officer concerned, Captain Oldfield, deserved to be severely
reprimanded 'but that I hesitate to recommend that he or any other
public officer concerned in this affair should be placed in any
degree at General O'Brien's mercy.'
24
Letter to the Commander in Chief enclosed in C054/385/14 13 Jan¬
uary 1864.
Any possibility that the Major-General's conduct over the Sikh
affair was inspired by righteous indignation over the treatment of the
Sikhs is dispelled by his conduct over his son's Court Martial.
Immediately it was over, he wrote to the Colonial Office complaining
that the evidence given by the Colonial Secretary had been hearsay and
25
that of the Surveyor General merely opinion. Furthermore, he pro¬
tested against the undue vehemence with which he considered the Prose-
26
cutor, an army Captain, had pursued his case. The officials at the
Colonial Office had no doubts that he had favoured his son throughout,
and Rogers minuted that 'General O'Brien would be better anywhere else
than administering the Government of Ceylon. '27 Nor was this an iso¬
lated view. Newcastle wrote in January 1864 that he feared 'Sir C.
MacCarthy's absence will be much longer than it will be safe to leave
28
such a man as General O'Brien at the head of affairs.' Fortescue
29
also favoured his removal from the Acting Governorship.
Nor did the Ceylon Press support the view taken by the Major-
General over the Sikh affair. The Examiner was sympathetic to Major
O'Brien (Lorenz in fact, conducted his defence at the Court Martial),
but even it did not blame the government for the situation which had
2^C054/387/Confidential, 27 February 1864.
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This charge was contained in a letter from General O'Brien to the
Field Marshall commander in Chief and a copy was enclosed in C054/
387/Confidential, 27 February 1864.
27C054/387/36 16 February 1864.
C054/385/14 13 January 1864.
29
Fortegcue minuted on C054/387/36 'I think that the Administration
of the Government of Ceylon should be taken out of General O'Brien's
hands....'
arisen. However, it did accept the charge of ill-treatment made by
Major O'Brien. The Observer, not noticeably inclined to support the
government, took a very different view, criticising O'Brien's indis¬
cretion and welcoming the news that the Major had been relieved of
his staff post and been sent to rejoin his regiment in India. An
editorial asked a most pertinent question concerning O'Brien's inter¬
ference! 'is anyone so green as to ,<> vje that the sole actuating
motive was generous sympathy for his old companions in arms - with no
mixed motive in the shape of a desire to "feed fat on an ancient
grudge" against the Governor and the Colonial Secretary who had
opposed unlimited military expenditure?'30 Certainly, the attitude
adopted by both O'Briens had at least part of its roots in the treat¬
ment accorded the military by the civilian government. When writing
to the Colonial Office in January 1864, the Major-General could
scarcely disguise his pique as he described how a memorandum on re¬
cruitment in India drawn up by his son had been ignored by the civil
government.31
The Sikh affair was used by the military authorities to avenge
themselves for the attacks made upon them in previous years. It can
scarcely be coincidental that the man roost singled out for attack was
the Colonial Secretary, W.C. Gibson, who had been most incisive in his
criticisms of high military expenditure. In this situation, the
assumption by Major-General O'Brien of the Acting Governorship was a
most unhappy chance. Lacking the tact to heal the divisions in the
30
Observer, 21 April 1864.
31C054/385/23 29 January 1864.
administration, O'Brien invited attacks on his predecessors' policies
by his own open opposition to them. In forwarding the Address of the
Legislative Council on 30 August 1864, which had been amended by the
unofficials to contain criticisms of MacCarthy's policy, he pointedly
refrained from objecting to the content of the amendment, merely wri-
32
ting that he could not approve of its tone. He took exception to
the Executive Council Minute of August 1864, particularly the section
which defended MacCarthy's actions and those of the Council by empha¬
sising how necessary economy had been after the profuse expenditure of
33
Ward\s Governorship. O'Brien responded to this by arguing that
Ward's liberality had repaid ample dividends and he openly criticised
34
the existing state of roads and public buildings in the colony.
When the official members of the Legislative Council resigned, O'Brien
showed a sympathy with them which was wholly inappropriate to the
Acting head of the colonial administration. He wrote to the Colonial
Office that he had no desire to blame them unduly for the step which
they had taken, adding his own belief that the action 'was the final
manifestation of the feeling of dissatisfaction originally produced in
35
consequence of their former Memorials remaining unanswered.'
Thus the significance of the Sikh affair and the Major-General's
conduct lies in the fact that his views on his predecessor's government
positively encouraged criticisms of it. Unfortunately for him, the
32CO54/392/200 30 August 1864.
33C054/392/Separate 30 August 1864.
34Ibid.
35C054/394/265 30 November 1864.
criticisms which emerged were made by those who opposed any increased
military contribution. By fomenting attacks on MacCarthy* s govern¬
ment, he also encouraged an increase in solidarity within the ranks
of the members of the civil administration. Those who had previously
been opposed to increased military expenditure now gave priority to
defending the government of which they had been a part.
Zo5
Chapter 13
THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE
Throughout discussions of the Imperial military expenditure ques¬
tion in Britain, the Colonial Office was subject to pressure not only
from the colonies but also from Parliament and from other Government
offices. The other departments most closely concerned with the
matter were the War Office and the Treasury, and it was with their
permanent staff, and in particular J.R. Godley, that most difficulties
occurred. These were highlighted in the Inter-Departmental Committee
of 1859. The Colonial Office had agreed to the establishment of this
committee only with reluctance and had stipulated that its findings
should not be mandatory upon them. This was fortunate since Godley
and the Colonial Office representative, Elliott, were quite unable to
agree, and Elliott ultimately produced a Minority Report."''
The two Reports differed not in superficialities but on basic
points of approach. This highlighted a deep-rooted difference of
attitude in the view adopted of the colonies by the different depart¬
ments. Godley and Hamilton divided all colonies into only two groups,
military bases and others. They proposed that each colony within this
latter category should have the right to decide on the nature and the
extent of the force stationed inside its boundaries. This plan, the
Report stated, was bound to convey, 'in the most marked and enphatic
way, the determination of the mother country that the Colonies should
2
be governed through and for their own peoples....' The emphasis in
this scheme was on the fact that the colonies ought to assume the main
1
2
responsibility for defending themselves, receiving Imperial aid only
if absolutely necessary. An opposing view was advanced by Elliott.
Whilst anxious to obtain a contribution toward defence costs wherever
possible from those colonies able to afford it, he nevertheless be¬
lieved that such a contribution bought no right to share in the overall
management of the forces. The idea that all contributions should be
raised at a uniform rate, irrespective of the financial condition of
the colony was quite unacceptable to him and he argued instead that
colonies should be asked to make payments according to their financial
means. To illustrate his view, he pointed to the marked differences
which existed between some of the colonies within the broad group of
military bases, for example, between North America and Ceylon.
This Report precipitated no action, but Godley's viewpoint was
widely quoted in Ceylon in the following years as an example of the
anti-colonial feeling which existed within the British Government.
Continued agitation in Britain regarding colonial military costs meant
that the Colonial Office was obliged to accept the establishment of a
Parliamentary Select Committee on the subject in 1861. Among the
recommendations of the Committee was one that Ceylon should bear the
3
cost of troops stationed in the island to a much larger decree.
Furthermore, there were signs that a campaign had begun to have Ceylon
4
annexed to India, and questions were raised in the Commons about this.
3BPP 1861, vol. 13.
4
On 23 March 1863, Lyall drew an unfavourable comparison between
India, which he portrayed as a source of wealth to the Mother coun¬
try, and Ceylon, which was 'rich, flourishing and with an over-flow¬
ing exchequer' yet which cost Britain some £110,000 each year.
Hansard, vol. 169, 20 March 1863, question 1659.
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The suggestion was most unpopular in Ceylon and, although the Colonial
Office viewed the proposal with similar disfavour, officials realised
that it provided a useful weapon against possible colonial opposition
to paying an increased share of the island's military costs. Some
three years later, the Secretary of State again referred to the sugges¬
tion, reminding the Acting Governor that 'The views of Her Majesty's
Government have been opposed to such a measure as inimical to the best
interests of Ceylon,but it has been felt that the necessary consequence
of such opposition is to call upon Ceylon to do more fully than hereto¬
fore that which India does completely - provide for its own defence.
Partly in response to Parliamentary pressure and partly as a re¬
sult of the new railway project, a reappraisal of Ceylon's financial
position was embarked upon in the Colonial Office in 1862. At this
time, the Imperial and Ceylon Governments contributed approximately
£100,000 each toward military costs every year. An examination by
William Strachey of the returns of colonial revenue and expenditure
for 1861 uncovered a surplus of revenue over expenditure of £92,013.6
Strachey saw no reason to suggest that this situation would not be re¬
peated but, to allow for unforeseen circumstances, his calculations
were based on a surplus of only £70,000. So buoyant did the colo¬
nial economy appear, that he estimated £224,039 could be contributed
toward the railway over the next four years. This would reduce the
capital to be borrowed to £800,000. The colony would thus have to
pay an annual £35,000 toward the railway from general revenue until the
5Draft on C054/378/141 20 August 1863.
^Minute on C054/367/37 13 February 1862.
line was operational. Until then, Ceylon could afford to contribute
the difference between the annual surplus and the amount needed to
pay inb^c«<st on the railway capital. On Strachey's figures, this
would be £35,000. Once the annual contribution toward railway costs
became unnecessary, the whole of the £70,000 surplus could be devoted
to military costs.
Not only did Strachey plan to increase the colony's share of total
military costs, he also planned to reduce the size of the military
budget by around £35,000 a year. These reductions, it was planned,
would be centred mainly upon the medical establishment and the Poyal
Engineers. If this could be carried out in addition to an immediate
increase of £35,000 ^ the prospect of a furtKer increase of this size
once the railway was complete, the Imperial authorities could ultimately
be relieved of any part of the burden of Ceylon's military expenditure.
A different method of payment was also envisaged, Strachey suggesting
the colonial government should pay the sum of £100,000 direct to the
War Office. This would cover the £24,000 direct contribution as well
as colonial pay and allowances and travelling and hired quarters
allowances. These items usually amounted to £65,000 per annum so the
additional amount which Strachey felt the colony could afford was inclu¬
ded in this sum. This would not relieve the colony of its obligations
completely since it would continue to pay for several peripheral items
such as pensions and repairs to military buildings. Strachey suggested
that the Crown should warn the Ceylon government that an additional con¬
tribution of between £10,000 and £35,000 would be appropriated over the
7
next few years, depending on the state of the colonial finances.
s was money which he calculated the completion of the railway
would make available.
The scheme sketched out by Strachey had two other interesting
aspects. First, it is clear he envisaged the establishment of a
local commission to report on the nature and cost of the force needed
in the island. In this way, the colony would be given a say in the
details of the new arrangements although the local enquiry would be
followed by a British Foyal Commission which would settle the finer
details. Since it seemed obvious that it would be some time before
these arrangements could be made, he proposed that a directive be sent
to Ceylon at once, securing an immediate increase in the military con¬
tribution as an interim measure.
Another most important feature of the plan was the suggestion
that the Crown would relinquish its power to appropriate revenue at
will once the whole question of military expenditure was put on a sat¬
isfactory footing. This was a reasoned, and reasonable, proposal,
intended less as a bribe to win acceptance of the plan in the colony
than as the logical execution of Grey's promise of 1848. The civil
expenditure had been settled by the Report on the Fixed Establishment
of 1858 and, if the military question could be equally satisfactorily
concluded, Strachey saw no reason why the Crown should retain its
power of arbitrary appropriation.
Strachey's proposals were officially adopted. He summarised the
new policy when he wrote that he was 'aware of no reason why Ceylon,
if its finances admit of it, should not pay the whole of the cost of
the Military Establishment maintained for local purposes ... if framed
0
on a reasonable scale.' This policy implied, of course, that the
^Minute on CO 54/367/37 13 February 1862.
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troops which were stationed in Ceylon were there for purely local
purposes, and this was not a view which had previously been widely
held within the Colonial Office. Rogers, for example, had once re¬
garded Trincomalee and Galle as Imperial stations, and both Fortescue
and Newcastle had regarded the former, at least, as an Imperial station
9
since it housed a Naval Dockyard. Strachey's view prevailed, how¬
ever, and dominated Colonial Office thinking in the following years.
Why this was so is not clear. His predominance may have been a re¬
sult of the hardening of attitude on Newcastle's part which one recent
writer has detected,*0 or it may merely have been the result of in¬
creased specialisation.**
Many of the subsequent criticisms of Strachey's plan in Ceylon
centred on the argument that the money appropriated to military expen¬
diture was money which would otherwise have been devoted to public
works. It is therefore interesting to note that, in his Memorandum
on the subject, Strachey anticipated this point. He remarked upon
the fact that twenty-one per cent of the total revenue cf the island
was spent on such works, a proportion which he compared unfavourably
with the two per cent spent in India. It seems reasonable to infer
that Strachey either wished to see, or at least was prepared to coun¬
tenance, a reduction in the scale of public works, should such a
measure prove necessary.
9Ibid.
*°C.C. Eldridge, 'The Fifth Duke of Newcastle', University of Not¬
tingham PhD thesis, 1966.
**As with railway matters in the 1860s, Strachey came to deal so
exclusively with milikacu matters that his knowledge became much
more extensive than that of any other member of the department.
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Strachey's Memorandum received official approval too late in
1862 for the new scheme to be introduced in the following year. New¬
castle decided that the outline of the plan should be forwarded to
MacCarthy all the same. He also directed that in future communica¬
tions with the colony upon the subject, the Colonial Office staff
should show no signs of hesitancy or uncertainty. In private, how¬
ever, he admitted that he was quite prepared to consider changes in
1
the scheme once the wishes of the Legislative Council were made known.
When the revenue statement for the first quarter of 1862 was re¬
ceived in the Colonial Office, it considerably strengthened Strachey's
argument as it showed surplus revenue for the quarter of the year of
13
no less than £45,000. This indication of the increased prosperity
of the island was reinforced by the Supply Ordinance for 1863 which was
14
sent from the colony in February of that year. This estimated the
total surplus revenue for 1862 at around £100,000. Strachey noted
that this ' is a most important corroboration of the conclusions pre¬
viously arrived at as regards the ability of the colony to bear a
largely increased rate of Hilitary Contribution.'Nor was any
intimation of possible difficulties received from the Governor. On
the contrary, MacCarthy wrote privately to Newcastle announcing that
In this circumstance, it was probably difficult for his view to be
seriously questioned.
"^Minute on C054/367/37 13 February 1862.
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Contained in CO54/370/176 4 September 1862.
14Minute on C054/374/15 9 February 1863.
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he was quite confident of carrying the measure.*** He laid emphasis,
however, on his opinion that it would be politic to empower the Leg¬
islative Council to investigate military expenditure, at the same time
as the increased amount was demanded.
In September 1863, the Colonial Office received a Memorial from
the Planters1 Association arguing against an increase in the island's
military contribution.*7 This communication attracted less attention
than might otherwise have been the case, since a despatch which it was
felt would cover all the points raised was in the course of preparation.
Unfortunately, this was to be the pattern regarding representations
from the colony. So often did the arguments put forward appear to
have been met or to be about to be dealt with in despatches, that
little real attention was paid to them. Moreover, much which could
have been said to mollify opinion in the island was not said because
wrangles with the Treasury prolonged the finalisation of the scheme.
In Ceylon, however, it appeared to Memorialists that their communica¬
tions were ignored. This undoubtedly played a major part in inflaming
the situa^on.
Due to the length of time which had been taken to officially
approve Strachey's original memorandum, much of the data on which it
was based had soon been superseded. Accordingly^in September 1863 he
18
prepared a new draft. Although the official returns for 1862 *ere
still not available, he was able to utilise a private estimate provided
*^See Chapter on Governor and Military Expenditure, p. Mk-
17C054/377/123 21 July 1863.
18
Minute on C054/378/141 20 August 1S63.
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by the Governor. This calculated that the surplus for the year would
19
be around £132,000, and became the basis of the revised calculations.
MacCarthy had suggested that a considerable part of the surpluses
should be contributed toward the capital required for the railway, so
that the amount to be borrowed could be kept to a minimum. Since this
naturally reduced the interest to be paid on the debt from general
revenue, the overall ability to pay an increased military contribution
was nt»t affected.
The whole scheme had been due to come into operation on 1 April
1S64, and it had been planned that the initial demand would be followed
by the appointment of a local commission to review the military estab¬
lishment. A revised demand, based upon its findings, would be issued
later. Unfortunately, MacCarthy's illness made a change in the time¬
table unavoidable. Although the Governor at one stage announced his
intention of remaining in the colony so that he could oversee the im¬
plementation of the scheme, the deteriorating state of his health ren¬
dered this impossible by November 1863. So the initial demand for an
increased payment was made, but the proposed enquiry had to be post-
20
poned until such time as MacCarthy might be fit to resume his post.
If the Governor's illness caused a delay, difficulties occurred
at home also. Both the Treasury and the War Office were involved in
the proposals and the agreement of both was needed before the plan
could proceed. No reply was received from the War Office until
19Ibid.
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The Colonial Office was unwilling to see supervisory duties of
this nature devolve on the Acting Governor, Major-General O'Brien,
because of his military position.
February 1864. But in that month officials there finally wrote ex¬
pressing general agreement with the Colonial Office plan, whilst at
the same time stressing their reluctance to consider a reduction in
the actual number of troops stationed in the island, for reasons of
21
morale. Other minor conditions were also laid down, and the Sec¬
retary of State for War categorically insisted that the plan should
not be implemented in the absence of the Governor. 'in the absence
of Sir C. KacCarthy^/ ' he wrote, 'it will be desirable to postpone the
proposed enquiry into those subjects whether by means of a Commission
or otherwise. ' ^
The Treasury, on the other hand, wished to see matters such as
the Commissariat Establishment settled before the full local changes
23
were brought fully into force. Whilst raising no objection to the
idea of a fixed contribution, their Lordships nevertheless warned
against basing the provisional settlement on a prospective reduction
of military expenditure. They doubted 'whether it would be right to
hold out such an inducement to the Colony of Ceylon to agree to the
proposed increased contribution before the result of the proposed
enquiry into the Military Establishments and allowances were ascer-
24
tained.* However, by July 1864, the differences with the Treasury
V\oV
had been resolved^ the Colonial Office staff able to use the
rejection of the rent and transport allowances by the Legislative
21
C054/397/War Office to Colonial Office, 23 February 1864.
Ibid.
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C054/397/*reasury to Colonial Office, 23 April 1864.
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C054/397/Treasury to Colonial Office, 23 April 1864.
Council to convince the War Office of the need for speedy agreement
25
to a general plan of settlement.
A despatch to the Acting Governor on September 1864 emphasised
that the guiding principle to be adopted was not that of the 1859 Com-
26
mittee but rather that put forward by the 1861 Select Committee.
This was that the burden of the payment should fall on either the Im¬
perial or Colonial authorities according to whichever received the
benefit of the forces maintained in the island. The 1861 Committee
had also made it clear that the forces in Ceylon were to be regarded
as stationed there for local purposes only and had stated 'there is
no reason why Ceylon, if considerations of finance allow of it, should
not defray the entire charge of its entire Military Force and military
works, upon whatsoever scale it may be expedient for local reasons to
27
maintain there.' This despatch formalised the demands previously
outlined by Strachey. An extra £300,000 was to be paid in 1864 (a
reduced amount since the scheme would not take effect until April) and
£35,000 in both 1865 and 1866. From 1867, when, it was thought, the
railway would be operational, additional amounts of £10,000 at a time,
would be called for, until the entire military burden was eventually
borne by the colony. It was anticipated that an Enquiry would lead
to reductions which could be effected before 1867. If, on the other
hand, no reductions resulted from such an enquiry, then the amount to
be demanded from the colony would be restricted to £135,000.
25 Co S H-j '?,<§■ \ I S \l b 1
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Draft on C054/378/141 20 August 1863.
27
BPP vol.11 Report^ paragraph 16.
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The plan which came into operation was that which had been worked
out by William Strachey. The only part which was omitted in 1864 was
the provision for the simultaneous Commission of Enquiry in Ceylon.
This was due solely to the unavoidable absence of the Governor.
There is no doubt that the decision not to allow an Enquiry to take ■
place during the administration of Major-General O'Brien was a wise
one. It was this decision, however, which precipitated a wave of
protests throughout the island. without this provision, the demands
of the Colonial Office appeared autocratic and arbitrary. Unfortunate
timing and bad presentation were as much to blame for the troubles
which ensued as the actual contents of the plan.
'xn
Chapter 14
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE
In 1858 Governor Ward appointed a commission to examine the scale
of island allowances paid to officers serving in Ceylon. The signi¬
ficance of this event was not immediately apparent, but it was to have
important repercussions in the following years. A noteworthy feature
of the review was that it was undertaken by a Commission and not by a
committee of the Legislative Council. Moreover, the recommendations
o-j" the Commission for the increase of existing allowances and for a
separate allowance for house rent and travelling were then accepted on
the sole authority of the Governor. Members of the Legislative Coun¬
cil were aggrieved, not only that they had been denied the opportunity
to examine the question of allowances but also that the report had been
accepted without reference to them. *
Ward was conscious of the criticisms levelled against him and
accordingly referred to the findings of the Commission in his opening
2
Address to the Council in 1859. He attenpted to defend his action
by arguing that every Governor was forced to act independently on occa¬
sions and he asked that his decision be approved. The reply from the
Council left him in no doubt as to the view taken of his proceedings.
The Council announced that its members 'would take leave to remark,
that the better course, in providing for an increase, would have been,
to lay the matter before the Legislative Council, so as to afford them
the opportunity of exercising that control over the proposed expendi¬
ture which is so peculiarly within their province.'3
1C054/345/7 & 8 22 July 1858.
2C054/345/8 22 July 1858.
3Ibid.
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The most significant feature of the Commission Report was the,
allowances in respect of house rent and travel for officers whilst on
duty jwere separately established. These were voted by the
Council each year ; thus providing it with the power^ which
hot .
it hadjhitherto . to voice an effective protest on the subject
of military expenditure. This opportunity the Council immediately
grasped.
In 1859^a sub-committee of the Council referred to the despatch
from. Earl Grey of 19 May 1848> stating that the power of the Legisla-
4
tive Council extended over all the public expenditure of the colony.
In the light of this verdict they argued that any revision of the
existing rates ought to have been entrusted to a Committee composed
of Council members and that any other method of dealing with the sub¬
ject was objectionable in principle.^ This sub-committee agreed to
vote the travel and house rent allowances purely as a temporary measure
and in the following year the allowances were again voted as an inte¬
rim measure only, the Council stressing that 'the present vote is not
£
to be taken as in any way sanctioning those allowances.' The clear
implication was that if such a review were not authorised, the allow¬
ances might meet a less than favourable reception the following year.
The attention which the military expenditure question attracted
among members of the Council in this and successive years was only
partly due to the increased interest in financial affairs brought
^For details see CO54/346/90 8 November 1859.
5Ibid.
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about by the construction of the railway. It was also to some extent
the result of constitutional frustration. The high regard in which
Ward was held was the result of his achievements, but his methods were
often open to question. The settlement of the Civil Establishment in
1858 brought Grey's statement regarding the relationship between the
Council and the public expenditure of the colony to the fore once
again. Grey had affirmed the desirability, in principle, of allowing
full control over public expenditure to the Legislative Council once
the Civil and Military Establishments of the colony were placed upon a
permanent footing. The Report on the Fixed Establishment had achieved
this with regard to the civil side of the administration, but the Gov¬
ernment failed to indicate that the corollary, a review of the Military
Establishment, was imminent. Hence the frustration which led to re¬
peated Legislative Council requests for the matter to be put before it
for consideration. On 19 December 1861, Thomas Rust gave notice of a
resolution that an Address be sent to the Queen begging her to empower
the Council to examine the question 'with an especial view to ascertain
the proportion that ought to be contributed by the Colony as a fair and
just compensation for the services rendered by the military and that
such an anount ... may be made a fixed annual charge upon the revenues
7
of the island.' When this address was actually framed, the wording
recalled that the revision of the island allowances had been carried
out without reference to the Council, thus depriving it of the control
Q
which it had been promised over expenditure. However, the Governor
refused to budge.
7
Motion on 19 December 1861. C057/29.
^30 December 1861. C057/29.
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In late 1862 the Supply Bill for 1863 came before the Legislative
Council for discussion. Due to the discontent felt about the Military
Expenditure issue, a majority of the members of the sub-committee
formed to report on the bill voted for the omission of the allowances
9
for house rent and travel. "When this recommendation was placed be¬
fore the full Council, it was defeated by nine votes to three. Never¬
theless^ the sub-committee resolution is indicative of the continuing
irritation on the subject and this was increased by the apparent lack
of response from the Colonial Office to the Council's previous Address.
MacCarthy, who was aware that the whole subject was then under scrutiny
in the Colonial Office, was able to mollify the Council on this partic¬
ular occasion and on others during his Governorship. However, the
problem of persuading the Legislative Council to pass military votes was
a recurrent one and when the Supply Bill for 1864 arrived before the
Council in December 1863, the conciliatory MacCarthy had left the island
and the Officer Commanding the Troops, General O'Brien, had assumed the
position of Acting Governor. Furthermore, news of the imposition of
the additional £30,000 military contribution had also been made public
in Ceylon and had not been well received. On this occasion^the addi¬
tional allowances were doomed. So annoyed was Thompson, one of the
unofficial members, that he took the step of moving that no vote for
any military purpose whatsoever should be sanctioned until such time as
the power to review military expenditure was expressly granted to the
Co uncil. Despite general anger, this motion was felt to be too ex¬
treme and attracted no support. A more moderate suggestion came from
^13 December 1862. C057/31.
Dias, the Sinhalese member, who proposed that the rent and travel
allowances be omitted from the Bill as a protest against the lack of
response from the Colonial Office to previous entreaties and as a
warning against the imposition of a further annual contribution.
Thus the Bill forwarded to London for Royal Assent contained no provi¬
sion for the payment of these allowances.*^
Early in December 1863^ a proposal by George Wall to have a sub¬
committee appointed to consider military expenditure had been ruled
out of order,** but his later proposal that another Address on the
subject be sent to the Queen was accepted. This was yet another in¬
dication of the growing irritation felt by members of the Legislative
Council. The Address was forwarded to England in January 1864 and
complained, in particular, of the exaction of the further £30,000,
which, it said, would cause money to be diverted from roads and other
vital public works. The question of whether Trincomalee was a local
or an Imperial base was also raised, since the latest Colonial Office
communication had tacitly assumed that this base was for colonial use
12
only, and this was a view which had little support within the colony.
The Colonial Office could not accept the omission of the vote for
rent and travel allowances without creating problems with the War
Office. In August of the same year, a directive was therefore re¬
ceived in Ceylon ordering that the allowances omitted from the Supply
Bill should be paid from the Colonial Treasury, with retrospective
*^Report of the Supply Bill for 1864. C057/33.
**9 December 1863. C057/33.
*2C054/385/15 14 January 1864.
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effect from the beginning of 1864. No alternative course of action
was open to the Colonial Office officials who wished to avoid hardship
to military officers from the withdrawal of these allowances. At the
same time, it was unfortunate that the protest of the Legislative
Council should have been answered by the exercise of the very power
against which they complained. Not only had the Council been coerced,
but the Government seemed guilty of bad faith.
The comprehensive and long-awaited despatch on military expenditure
14
finally arrived from the Colonial Office toward the end of the year.
Predictably, it was not well received when placed before the Legislative
Council. When the day came for the Bill encompassing the proposals to
be presented to the Council, the unofficial members absented themselves.
As their ultimate act of protest, they simply refused to attend. It is
probable that they hoped by their absence to paralyse proceedings in
Council, but in this they miscalculated. Instead, legal experts dec¬
lared the Council competent to carry on without them and new merfcers
were easily found when required in the following session. The effects
of their action were non-existent. As one historian has put it! 'The
significance of this bloc resignation lay in its dramatic rather than
15
its far-reaching effects.' The gesture was a futile one giving rise
only to the founding of the Ceylon League, which in itself proved a
largely ineffectual organisation.
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O'Brien's despatch acknowledging the instruction and containing
minutes by Executive Council members is at C054/392/189 17 August
1864.
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|c054/394/265 30 November 1864.
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This summary of the stormy events of 1860 to 1805 is incomplete
without some reference to the viewpoints of a number of the main par¬
ticipants. The years 1860-5 were stormy ones for the Legislative
Council and. with a summary of the main events in mind, a closer look
may now be taken at the two elements which comprised the Legislative
Council, the officials and. the unofficials. Neither of these was a
cohesive group, and one of the most significant factors to emerge from
the events of these years is that there was no real divergence of
opinion between them on the military question until mid-1864. Indeed,
until that time, some of the official members of the Council played a
leading role in the agitation on the subject. It was only when the
emphasis moved from the purely military aspects to the issue of Mac-
Carthy's Governorship as a whole, that a closing of ranks occurred.
The protest over island allowances, the general review and the
alterations undertaken in Ward's Governorship were led not merely by a
member of the official group on the Council, but by no less a figure
than the Colonial Secretary, W.C. Gibson, himself. Nor did he act
alone. On several occasions his views were supported by Braybrooke,
the Government Agent for the Central Province, and by Vane, who was
the Collector of Customs at Colombo. Furthermore, after the appoint¬
ment of Richard Morgan as Queen's Advocate in 1863, an additional
voice was heard in the Council chamber in support of Gibson's views.
The Address to the Queen, which was approved by the Council in
December 1861 was drafted by a sub-committee among whose members were
16
Lorenz, Rust, Gibson and Braybrooke. It is certain that the views
16
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which the Address expressed were ones in which the two officials con¬
curred and it is likely that they were, in fact, the authors of the
draft. It is interesting to note how wide a divergence existed be¬
tween the view of the constitution expressed in this Address, with its
emphasis on the Council's privileges as laid down by Grey, and that
concurrently held by the staff of the Colonial Office.
The unofficial group on the Council played only a supporting role
in the early skirmishes over allowances and expenditure. Gibson was
the motivating force and this was recognised in the colony. In an
editorial of 1863, The Observer referred to the debt which the colony
owed him for his stance on this question. It commented: 'The great
point for which our Legislative Council has fought since the new scale
of Colonial Allowances was framed;is the right to control the ejqoendi-
ture in that direction according to our necessities? and again and
again has our Colonial Secretary and his supporters tried to bring
this matter to a crisis - by disallowing the allowances entirely from
17
our Sv$>ply Bill.'
The attenpt to omit the votes for travel and rent allowances from
the Supply Bill for 1863 originated in a resolution of the sub-commit¬
tee which examined the Bill. The recommendation failed to win the
approval of the Council as a whole, but the significant fact is that
this sub-committee was composed of Gibson, Braybrooke and Pennefather
on the official side, with Rust and Corbet representing the unofficials.
It was unfortunate that when the motion was debated, in full Council,
both Rust and Corbet were absent, but their absence did not affect the
17
Observer, 30 April 1863.
fate of the recommendation. The three votes cast in favour of the
omission were those of Gibson, Braybrooke and Dias. Hence two offi¬
cials and one unofficial were defeated by eight officials and one un¬
official. The one unofficial who voted against the omission was,
rather oddly, George Wall, who was later to become such an active
opponent of the administration over the military expenditure question.
Over the following year attitudes hardened. This was,at least
partly^due to the lack of response, other than intimation of the in¬
crease in military contribution, from the Colonial Office to the
Address of 1861. When the Supply Ordinance for 1864 came before the
Council for consideration, an attempt was once again made to omit the
rent and travel allowances. Although this time the vote in the sub¬
committee was indecisive, the omission was overwhelmingly approved by
the Council as a whole. Only the Major-General, the Surveyor-General
and the Auditor-General voted against it. Four officials of the
colonial administration voted in favour of the measure, including two
members of the Executive Council.
Gibson's motivation is not entirely clear and it seems that a
number of factors may have conspired to influence his actions. It is
likely that he and some of his colleagues were at least partly influ¬
enced by the poor relationship which had existed during MacCarthy's
Governorship between the civil and military authorities on the island.
Despite the protestations in Memorials that the Council had every
desire to accord the military authorities what was due to them, the
numerous disputes which had occurred between the civil and military
authorities made it likely that some resentment was still felt by the
civilian officials on the Council. It may also be that Gibson was a
man of as genuinely parsimonious a disposition as his critics sugges¬
ted and that he genuinely resented the amounts of money spent upon the
military in Ceylon. Another possible explanation is that the Colonial
Secretary was merely trying to protect the position of the officials on
the Council by asserting its rights to the control of expenditure
along the lines drawn by Grey. In a Minute submitted to the Governor
in August 1864, after the order of the Secretary of State to pay the
omitted allowances had been received in the colony, Gibson related
how the allowances in question had been voted by the Council since
1859 only on condition that an enquiry into military expenditure would
18
be granted. Rather than see the allowances paid by the arbitrary
order of the Secretary of State, however, Gibson said that both he and
Morgan were prepared to vote for them in Council if they were resub¬
mitted. In a corresponding Minute, Pichard Morgan stressed the fact
that the allowances had been omitted 'simply because the Council felt
dissatisfaction with the conduct of the local government in revising
the rates independently of the Legislature to which it is believed the
19
duty properly belonged.' There is an indication that Morgan and
Gibson were defending what they saw as the legitimate privileges of
the Council. Since there was an official majority on the Council
which they did not suggest should be altered, their struggle must be
seen as an atterpt to safeguard or to increase the power of the offi¬
cials. This could only be at the expense of the Governor. The Gov¬
ernor against whom this was directed was not MacCarthy (for whom Gibson
1 D




had a high regard), but Ward, who had caused offence by his sometimes
cavalier treatment of the Council.
• \ V
Until 1864, the protests in Council against aspects of military
\
expenditure were essentially the work of the Colonial Secretary, sup¬
ported chiefly by one or two other officials. The unofficials played
only a secondary role at this time. They were in no sense any more
united a group than the officials, for the six men who filled the posi¬
tions came from a variety of backgrounds and were responsible to no-
one. As individuals, their views frequently clashed. One of the
fiercest debates which raged in the colony in the early 1860s concer¬
ned the position of the unofficial Justices of the Peace. Here C.A.
Lorenz, the Furgher member, was as prominent in his support of the
criticism levelled against some of these men, as George Wall, the mer¬
cantile member, was in their defence. Furthermore, W. Thompson's
voting behaviour was sometimes eccentric, to say the least. When the
proposal to exclude all votes for any military purpose whatsoever from
the Sutpply Ordinance for 1864 was defeated, for example, Thompson re¬
fused to vote for the milder measure aimed at omitting only the rent
and travel allowances.
The most dominant members of the unofficial group on the Council
were George Wall and C.A. Lorenz. Wall was put forward by the Chamber
of Commerce as their representative in May 1862 and remained on the
Council until the resignation of the unofficials in 1864. He was
severely critical of the level of the colony's military expenditure,
particularly since he felt that much of the money spent related to ex¬
penses incurred wholly in the interests of the Imperial Government.
His motives are difficult to assess; his vote against the omission of
the rent and travel allowances from the Supply Bill for 1863, for
example, is hard to reconcile with some of his later actions, but may
have been the result of fear of Colonial Office reprisals. In fact,
at least one contemporary writer noticed that Wall's actions were far
from consistent. During the 1860s, Wall often praised Ward as a
liberal and model Governor. Yet Ferguson has shown that 'during his
term in the Legislative Council up to 1858, Mr. Wall does not seem to
have been quite so enthusiastic about the Governor, at any rate in his
role of President of the Council. Distance in this, as in so many
20
other cases, it may be, lent "enchantment to the view".' Some of
his criticisms seem to indicate a deep-seated hostility to the nature
of the government in Ceylon. In his book, Ceyloni Her Present Con¬
dition , published in 1868, he wrote that 'the history of the past
proves beyond a doubt that Ceylon is not governed for its own people,
or for its own interests; but by a policy for which both would^if
21
necessary;be sacrificed*. In particular he objected to the kind of
government and financial policy carried out by MacCarthy. As a plan¬
ter and merchant, he was especially concerned with the export duties.
These, he felt, had been imposed for a particular purpose, but in the
early 1860s were not used for this but were merely augmenting the sur¬
pluses. The duties, hoarded by the government along with other items
of revenue, prompted the Imperial Government to issue demands for an
increased military contribution. 'Every interest in the colony', he
Ferguson, yd. p. 7^
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wrote after, 'was ruthlessly sacrificed for the purpose of accumulating
22
a hoard of the public money,'
Charles Ambrose Lorenz, who became co-owner and editor of The
Examiner, was a Burgher and thus did not share Kali's over-riding con¬
cern for the welfare of the planting and mercantile communities. He
viewed the difficulties over the military expenditure question purely
as an example of the inadequacy of the constitution in operation in
Ceylon. His opinion of the constitution was best expressed when the
news arrived that the Secretary of State had ordered the payment of
the omitted allowances. He wrote then that 'The proceeding will
simply result in confirming the belief that after all the Legislative
Council of Ceylon is a piece of skilful machinery, contrived and
worked so as to delude the people into the belief that it has a motive
of its own, - but virtually an inanimate and powerless thing, intended
only to carry out the purposes of an individual, who, to all colonial
23
interests, is an irresponsible and often unreasonable agent.' Like
Wall, Lorenz was critical of the government's actions in the early
1860s, but he tended to lay the blame at the door of the Secretary of
State. He viewed MacCaithy a little more sympathetically, writing of
him that, 'with but a little more freedom of action, he would have
24
been a prosperous and a highly popular Governor'. It seemed apparent
to him that the remedy for the constitutional ills lay with the exten¬
sion of the power of the Council. He expounded this view in The
22
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Examiner, writing that the Council had 'for)many years struggled for a
principle the concession of which it had a right to demand and in which
we recognise our only safeguard. Give to the Legislative Council
the control over all the public expenditure of the Colony, and the
25
great Military problem will be easily solved.' It is noticeable
that there was no demand here for an increase in the numbers of the
unofficials on the Council. At this time there was not sufficiently
wide a divergence of view between the officials and the unofficials for
this to be necessary. Lorenz could quite reasonably expect the poli¬
cies which he supported to win the approval of at least some of the
official members.
If the unofficials were far from being united on either a perso¬
nal or political level, the military expenditure question provided
them with one subject upon which some degree of unanimity was possible.
In August 1864 they managed to insert a clause critical of MacCarthy's
Governorship into the draft of the reply to the Governor's Opening
Address. Unluckily, several official members of the Council were
absent when this was debated and hence the clause was accepted. Thus
the full Council put on record its desire to record dissatisfaction
and discontent with the fact that revenues had been exacted for seve¬
ral years so far beyond the requirements of the public service and so
much larger than could be devoted to public purposes. The members
further complained that whilst the revenues had been so abundant, the
efficiency of nearly every Public Department had been seriously im¬
paired by the parsimonious policy of the Governor. This was a major
25
Examiner, 29 April 1863.
^3 |
and highly significant departure from previous protests in the Legis¬
lative Council. Not only did it emanate entirely from the body of
unofficials, but its content was not directly related to the military
26
question, even though this was the inspiration behind it.
This action can be explained only by the deep concern and frus¬
tration felt by the unofficials over the apparent Colonial Office dis¬
regard of their previous Memorials on military expenditure and the lack
of reference to the subject in the Governor's Opening Address. The
paragraph which was inserted was meant to be a fairly moderate one.
Wall had originally proposed the exclusion of the section congratu¬
lating the Auditor-General on the state of the colonial finances.
Five of the six unofficials voted for this motion; only five officials
were present and the motion was lost only because the sixth unofficial,
Thompson, unexpectedly cast his vote with the officials. A second
resolution was then proposed by D'Alwis, claiming that the prosperity
of the colony was the result of private labours and not due to any en¬
couragement afforded by the colonial government. This motion met a
similar fate. The third motion was also put forward by Wall. This
was apparently successful only because of the remarks made by Layard
in debate about the poor standard of engineering ability in the Public
Works Department. Since Thompson's son was employed there, these com¬
ments offended him, and he therefore cast his vote in favour of the
motion, thus tipping the scale. It seems likely that the attack on
the government was a premeditated move on the part of the unofficials
26
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2.32-
who were determined to express their discontent publicly. This would
explain the bitter reference which D'Alwis made to Thompson's voting
Whatever justification existed for the criticism of MacCarthy's
administration, it was something with which the official members of
the Council could not be expected to sympathise. This marked the
parting of the ways between the two groups on the Council. Though
Gibson and his supporters were prepared to criticise the Imperial Gov¬
ernment, they were not, and could not be expected to be, prepared to
criticise the administration in which they served.
When the long-awaited despatch on military expenditure arrived in
the colony, it not only failed to appease the unofficial members, but
further incensed them. They tendered their resignation as a body,
28
outlining their reasons in an Address. This Address covered three
main issues. First, it dealt with the privileges of the Legislative
Council and took its stand on the principle laid down by Grey in 1848
that 'appropriation of Revenue in every case should without exception
rest on a Legal enactment and in no case on a simple instruction of
29
Secretary of State.' This was a reference to the demand in the
Colonial Office despatch for an interim increase in the military con¬
tribution and the warning that a further increase might be subsequently
requested. The unofficials recognised that the principle expounded by
behaviour. 'We ne.ooce that Thompson would
27
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Grey had not operated in practice, but they resented the Inperial Gov¬
ernment's promise to allow its operation in future, once the whole
question was settled to Imperial satisfactions 'we might reasonably
have expected,' the Address ran, 'it would at length have been gra¬
ciously and unreservedly conceded, whereas it is offered only on con¬
ditions. We are in fact to purchase it and the price demanded for
its enjoyment in name, is no less than its renunciation in fact.'3<3
Furthermore, the Address pointed out that, although an Enquiry was
promised once the increased military demand had been met, it was not
certain that it would be the Legislative Council which would possess
the right of making this enquiry, since the Imperial Government had
reserved the right to decide between the virtues of a Commission and a
sub-committee of the Council. 'For sixteen years,' the unofficials
protested, 'we have waited for the promised despatch on the subject,
and if this Bill were passed we know not how long we might have to
31
wait for the promised enquiry.'
The second point made by the Address was one which had been em¬
phasised on many occasions by critics of the level of military expen¬
diture, namely the willingness of the unofficials to contribute what¬
ever was required toward military costs onee an enquiry had decided
what this amount should be. Their protest was in no way intended to
slight the military authorities in the island, or at least so they said
in the Address. Obviously, however, it was expected that any enquiry
would find the amount which should be paid would be smaller than the
existing payment. The third section of the Address covered the
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
colony's financial position, particularly the surpluses, the existence
of which was widely held to be the chief cause of the increased demands
made by the Colonial Office. The responsibility for the demands from
the Inperial Government was laid at the feet of the creator of the sur¬
plus, MacCarthy. The surpluses, it was claimed, 'have been produced
at the expense of the efficiency of nearly all the public JJ.epartments
of the colony, by a culpable neglect of public workSjand by a generally
parsimonious policy, which has been universally stigmatised and has
/' 32
brought the Government to public censure.'
The split between officials and unofficials was now complete.
Gibson and Morgan expressed their views in an Executive Council Minute
33
on the resignations. This was basically a refutation of the charges
of the unofficials about the state of the colony. After reiterating
the view that Grey's words on the constitutional position of the Coun¬
cil had been a statement of intent only and not, as such, of any dir¬
ect relevance to the point now at issue, the Minute went on to deal
with the surpluses. These, it was claimed, existed only because of
the unforeseen inability of the Public Works Department to spend the
full amounts allocated to it, and to totally unexpected increases in
the size of the revenue. Complaints regarding the state of some roads
were either brushed off as exaggerations or attributed to the difficul¬
ties with which the government had to contend from the lack of suitably
qualified staff. The Address by the unofficials required and brought





supported the criticisms voiced by certain officials on military ex¬
penditure for several years, the unofficials at last had taken the
initiative and attacked what they saw as the root cause of increased
demands. In doing so, they alienated the officials and discovered
the truth of their own impotence.
The Ceylon League
The immediate difficulty encountered by the unofficial mairfoers
following their resignations from the Council, lay in finding a chan¬
nel through which their views could be voiced. Having resigned
from the Council they had lost their public platform; the Chairber of
Commerce was moribund, the Planters' Association disinterested. So,
the Ceylon League was formed to fill the gap. Its task, its inaugu-
rators felt, was to strengthen the hand of the Governor against the
Secretary of State, or as the Examiner described it,
The objects of the League are not (as some suppose) to com¬
pel the Local Government to do what it has no power to do,
viz., to reform its own Council and to resist the aggression
of its own master, the Secretary of State; but (as the
Resolutions amply declare) to secure, by respectful agita¬
tion here and in England, those constitutional rights.the
Colony was supposed to possess, and which it ought to possess
but which Mr. Cardwell has, for his own particular purposes,
withheld from it.,,34
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The Public Manifesto of the Ceylon League was issued on 29 May.
It was an attempt by the unofficials to widen the base of their support
so as to increase their chances of influencing the government in Ceylon
It criticised the so-called arbitrary action of the Secretary of State,
in increasing the military contribution and made its rallying point the
34
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call for agitation to secure the rights and privileges to which all
British subjects were entitled. The legislative Council was described
as nothing more than the tool of the government and changes in its com¬
position were said to be necessary to prevent the enactment of measures
repugnant to the public at large. Precise details of what was envi¬
saged were not forthcoming. The theme underlying the Manifesto was
that the wrongs suffered had been caused and could only be righted by
the Secretary of State. All agitation should therefore be directed
toward him, and not the Governor, since the latter was a mere figure¬
head.
Thus, despite criticisms of MacCarthy's government, no basic anta¬
gonism to the colonial administration was implicit in the League.
MacCarthy had had many critics but the style of his administration was
now widely attributed to the orders of the Imperial Government. A.M.
Ferguson summarised the position when he spoke at a meeting in June,
saying that he 'neither considered the League as a body necessarily in
opposition to Government, nor did he believe that the members of the
Government looked on it as other than what it really was, an associa¬
tion to strengthen the hands of the local government against the arbi¬
trary proceedings of the Secretary of State.George Wall, one of
the founders of the League and probably the driving force behind it,
pointed out that the Colonial Office would never have demanded econo¬
mies at the beginning of MacCarthy's reign had it not possessed the
authority to appropriate any consequent surpluses. Wall believed,
that what was necessary was to have the case 'clearly exposed to every
36
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■Timber of Parliament and whence once clearly apprehended it could not
37
fail to secure effectual advocacy and to be carried in our favour.•
The League provided a permanent platform for the expression of
opinion amongst its supporters in much the same way as the Planters'
Association performed the function for the planters. However, the
cause for which the League was fighting was never closely identified.
The reconstitution of the Legislative Council was certainly an aim but
firm proposals were never advanced. It is possible that a simple
guarantee that in future each official would be allowed to vote accord¬
ing to his conscience would have satisfied the League. Unfortunately,
in the absence of detailed proposals, many came to fear that what the
League really stood for was the increased power of the Burgher and
native communities.
The chief problem with which the League was confronted was that
its possible courses of action were very limited. Once meetings had
been held and signatures gathered on petitions, the scope for activity
narrowed considerably. Its main hope was mere survival, for the fact
of endurance and the moderation of its proposals, might eventually win
it the approval of the Colonial Office. Beyond that, all it could
aspire to was to become accepted as a source of opinion in the same way
as the Planters' Association had been. Cut off from the Legislative
Council on principle, it had no means of influencing the local govern¬
ment other than by meetings. Despite Wall's journey to London to try
to win support there, no line of communication was ever established
37
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between the League and the Colonial Office or between the League and
Parliament. ®
In Ceylon, an attempt was made to build up a large organisation
with a permanent structure. A central committee was formed and attempts
were made to organise local committees in outlying areas. The member¬
ship increased throughout 1865 until it reached three hundred and eighty-
39
eight in Septerrfoer. Despite this, the League was not destined to
enjoy much success. Its fundamental failing was that it protested
against something which had happened and which could not be undone.
Agitation on the military expenditure question died down as it was
bound to do. Nor could the League hope to enjoy much success without
the backing of the Planters' Association and the rest of the European
community. Although several prominent planters, including many well-
known figures in the Planters* Association, supported the League, the
leaders of the Association remained unmoved. This was a vital factor,
because it meant that when the government tried to fill the vacancies
on the Legislative Council caused by the resignations of the unofficials,
there were men of substance available who were willing to serve. The
administrative system could therefore function quite normally, and the
League was effectively by-passed. This, coupled with the lack of
unity among its leading members, and the fact that its central cause,
the military expenditure question, was in the process of settlement, con-
demnde the League to ineffectiveness and ultimately, to oblivion.
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A book was published in London in an attempt to win support there.
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This was a larger membership than the Planters' Association had
ever possessed.
Chapter 15
PLANTERS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE
In May 1865 G.D.B. Harrison, one of the leading figures in the
Planters' Association, addressed a committee meeting at which the main
point under discussion was the newly-submitted Manifesto of the Ceylon
League.^" In speaking forcibly against giving official Association
approval to this document, Harrison referred to the fact that the
Association had opposed the government for the past four years with
unsatisfactory results. The greatest years of the Association, he
declared, had been those in which they had cooperated with the local
government. The influence of the planters for good, he said, 'would
2
be far greater if acting with than if against the ruler.'
Why Harrison took this view is not immediately obvious. Firm
evidence of this opposition to the government during these years is
hard to find. However, it is not difficult to detect the unsympathe-
fce-V
tic atmosphere which existedjthem. The leading planters knew Mac-
Carthy and what they might expect of him when he became Governor. A
man of learning, charm and tact he might be, but he was also something
of an intellectual snob and he tended to look ton upon those engaged
3
in the planting industry. Never brusque or rude to deputations, the
apparently favourable receptions which he accorded to them often made
"^Published in the Observer, 29 May 1865.
2
Report of committee meeting, 24 May 1865 in the PA Proceedings, 1865.
^MacCarthy's lack of sympathy for the planting interest was evidenced
by his letter to Monckton-Milnes on 29 May 1862 in which he reportedt
'I have been on the verge of a battle with my "Planters" here, as in
India, the most unreasonable and unmanageable part of the population,
expecting everything and everybody to yield to them, and manifesting
the most intense disregard of all interests but their own.' Letter
284.
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the ultimate rejection of their demands the harder to bear. One con¬
temporary writer has written of the 'considerable gap between the sym¬
pathies of the planter, and the ideas of the local administrators'
which existed during his years in Ceylon? and this statement refers
4
particularly to this period. The views of the administration, this
writer felt, were often quite out of keeping with planting ways and
•The planting community looked upon the Government as an unsympathetic
and ignorant, dogmatic master, incapable alike of understanding the
oC
planting interests^or/the people, with whom the planters were in con-
5
stant touch.'
MacCarthy did not see, and never had seen, the role of the govern¬
ment as being one of support for the plantation economy. Soon after
his arrival in the colony, he wrote home that cultivation was reviving
after the crash of 1848 'wherever it should legitimately revive, that
is where it is legitimately carried on, upon unborrowed capital and
with econoiry and personal industry.'** With calls to the government
for financial aid he had little sympathy. 'Private enterprise,' he
wrote, 'however laudable a thing in itself, should operate with its own
capital, and not with that of the public, and I need hardly remark that
any appropriation of the general Revenue to such private enterprize,
7
would be sinply a misappropriation of public funds.' His attitude
4 t,
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was well known to the planters and was hardly calculated to arouse any
g
hopes in that quarter.
From 1863 onwards, the Governor and the Planters' Association were
involved in a serious disagreement as to whether or not reductions had
been made in the amounts of money devoted to public works. On opening
the Legislative Council in September 1863, MacCarthy made reference to
the fact that the surplus of revenue over expenditure in the previous
year had been due 'mainly to the increased productiveness of the Reve-
9
nue, not to reduction of Expenditure.' This statement met with a
hostile reception from the Planters' Association, who felt that the
surplus had arisen mainly through the denial of facilities to them.
A letter to the Duke of Newcastle was accordingly composed.'''0 This
requested that his instruction to MacCarthy to husband resources and
postpone major items of expenditure until the completion of the rail¬
way, should be rescinded. The roads in Central Province, the planters
claimed, had been allowed to deteriorate very badly in recent years and
would now require major expenditure on repairs in the near future. As
the Memorial remarked, 'in a tropical climate to allow works of public
utility to fall into disrepair, is a source of ruinous outlay after¬
wards. *^
O
So suspicious were some of the planters of MacCarthy's motives that
when, in 1861, he did offer to make the government steamer, the 'Pearl'
available to bring immigrants over from India, A.F. Harper announced
that this was only a 'blind by our present ruler to cause delay in the
providing of steamers with a view ultimately^ . ©C getting rid of the
promise altogether.' PA Proceedings, 1861^ April istl.
^Opening Address by the Governor, C057/33^ P2. PVo^ost
*°This was forwarded in C054/3?o/172 20 September 1863.
i;LIbid.
Che controversy over the amounts devoted to public works in Mac-
Carthy*s administration is well known, and figures can be produced in
support of both sides of the argument. What seems to be clear is
that, irrespective of the amounts voted during this time, considerably
less was actually spent than under Ward. Unbiased accounts of the
condition of the roads are hard to find. Harvey Tower, a British
traveller who visited the island in 1861, found the roads on which he
12
travelled 'excellent*, and he was 'quite surprised at the goodness of
13
what they call in Ceylon a bad road.' Later, in December of that
year, he made the journey from Kandy to Colombo and again described the
14
'excellent road, through coffee plantations.' Whilst he was cer¬
tainly an impartial witness, his evidence is not conclusive since he
was writing at a very early stage in MacCarthy's Governorship, and
probably did not travel far from the main routes of communication.
L.F. Liesching, in his book on Ceylon, agreed that 'the excellence of
the roods throughout the Island is always a subject o£" remark with
15
strangers,' but he again was writing of the very early 1860s. Nor
was he impartial, being a servant of the colonial administration.
At the same time, it is clear that MacCarthy was not an enthusias¬
tic supporter of lavish expenditure on roads. During his period as
Colonial Secretary, he wrote to Richard Morgan in a far from favourable
tone about contemporary expenditure on roads: "The alarming thing to
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me is the quantity of money thrown away on roads, on which there is
not, and never will be, any remunerative traffic and the general
\;c
tendency in all departments, not sufficiently checked, to look on
mere expenditure as a bonum per se without reference to its results 1.5^
The justification for the complaints which were made cannot be inves¬
tigated now, but when Major-General O'Brien assumed the post of Acting
Governor, he threw his weight behind criticisms of the condition of
public works in the country, and the roads in particular. He, again,
was a far from impartial judge, however, having suffered from the ar.ti-
military bias of KacCarthy's administration. Perhaps, therefore, too
much weight should not be attached to his views. Nor can it be denied
that the planters were very hard to please since they considered that
they had first call on the attentions of the government. No evidence
exists to indicate that the planting industry was seriously hampered in
the early 1860s by poor communications. It is hard, in thecircum-
stances, to resist the conclusion that many of the complaints made by
the planters stemmed from nothing more than a desire to appropriate the
surpluses for their own purposes. Many believed that the increased
demands from the Colonial Office were caused solely by the existence of
these surpluses. It therefore seemed entirely reasonable to assume
that, if this money could be shown to be needed in the colony, or
better, that the colony was in fact languishing without it, these de¬
mands might be resisted. Hew the money was spent in the colony was
almost irrelevent so long as it was actually put to use in Ceylon and
did not accrue to the Imperial Treasury. Thus a man such as Alexander
^Quoted in W. Digbv, Life of Sir Richard Morgan, vol. 1, p. 242.
Brown, who had once been an opponent of the contributions made toward
the reduction of the railway debt, came to accept that using the sur¬
plus funds in this way was far preferable to seeing the money appro-
17
priated by the Imperial authorities.
Whatever the rights and wrongs of arguments concerning the effi¬
ciency or otherwise of the Public Works Department, the significance
of the dispute lies rather in the atmosphere which was created between
the Governor and the Planters' Association. Clearly their relation¬
ship was poor during this period. It was made worse by the dispute
which arose from charges levelled at unofficial Justices of the Peace
by the Deputy Queen's Advocate, Thomas Berwick. The charges became
the basis of a circular, sent round by the Queen's Advocate, Richard
Morgan, in April 1863. This directed that the rural police should no
longer be at the disposal of Justices of the Peace for the execution
18
of warrants of arrest. This decision had been taken in response to
information collated by Berwick, which led him to the conclusion that
the gaols of the Central Province were 'crammed' with men, women and
children who had been arrested on the charge of deserting from estates.
He sought to explain this apparently alarming fact by arguing that this
one class of defaulter occupied the attention of the unofficial Justices
to the exclusion of all other criminals, that is, that they abused their
official positions to further the interests of their own particular class.
17
At a meeting on 10 September 1864, Brown put forward a resolution
suggesting that the government be asked to vote away a surplus of
£214,000 of which he proposed £150,000 should go toward the liqui¬
dation of the railway debt. Observer, 12 September 1864.
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The circular was issued on 27 March 1863 and published in the
Examiner on 29 April 1863.
Once the circular had been published, the Planters* Association
immediately demanded details of the evidence upon which the charges
were based. At first there was no response from the government and
on 6 July the Association was merely told by the Colonial Secretary
that the Queen's Advocate had received the information from his offi-
19
cials. The indignation of the Planters' Association knew no bounds.
It reiterated demands for an investigation into the truth of the accu¬
sation and harshly criticised the government's actions in issuing the
circular on apparently slender grounds. 'Strange, however, as was a
course pursued in issuing a circular,' a letter to the Colonial Secre¬
tary ran, 'it is perhaps stranger still that no-one amongst those res¬
ponsible for this measure should have thought it necessary first to
20
verify Mr. Berwick's unqualified assertion by reference to facts.'
The Planters' Association based its defence of the unofficial
Justices on a strictly literal interpretation of Berwick's statements.
It questioned the definition of a gaol and strongly disputed his ref¬
erence to the 'hundreds' crammed into them. In fact, the real signi¬
ficance of Berwick's charges lay not in his estimate of the numbers
arrested on desertion charges but in his assertion that no real action
was taken by the unofficial Justices against any other form of crime.
This was a point which Berwick made in a letter to Morgan in August
1863. He related how the fairly extensive powers accorded the un-
19
The Planters' Association made its request on 6 June and again on
3 July. On 6 July the Colonial Secretary replied forwarding the
letter from the Queen's Advocate. See Observer, 30 July 1863.
20
Letter of 27 July from the Planters' Association to the Colonial
Secretary, published in the Observer, 30 July 1863.
official Justices had been used only against those charged with an
offence 'eminently one of particular class interest, not concerning
21the public peace, and fully within the jurisdiction of minor Courts.'
He thus charged the Planters' Association with defending the practice
'of perverting warrants of arrest from their legitimate use as means
for the judicial punishment of crime, into instruments for obtaining
Estate labour. • ^
The implications of the dispute were clear. The withdrawal of
the use of the police for the execution of warrants was realised by
many planters to be the overt act of hostility toward the planting
community which it undoubtedly was. It was an indication that the
government felt that the planting Justices could no longer be trusted
to act fairly; this was not only a slight to the planters but an in¬
convenience as well. In September 1863,a resolution at a Planters'
Association meeting requested that an ordinance be framed so that plan-
23ters could be protected against 'crimping*. It was envisaged by the
planters that such an ordinance would also include provision for the
police to be at the disposal of Justices for the execution of warrants
against absconders. It was also hoped that Justices would be permit¬
ted to return runaways to their former employers if both parties agreed
This was already a widespread practice, albeit one of doubtful legality
21





Resolution 9 of the meeting of 5 September 1863 reported in the
Observer, 10 September 1863. Crimping was, effectively, stealing
coolies en route for an estate from which they had received a pay¬
ment in advance, by luring them to a different estate.
^1
Although an ordinance was actually framed by the government on this
question, it failed to satisfy the Planters' Association since it con¬
tained no provision for the execution of processes against runaways.
The Association notified the government of its dissatisfaction in Feb-
24
ruary 1864, and at the same time the Planters' Association commis¬
sioned W. Cayley to draft an ordinance, for submission to the govern¬
ment, which would encompass all the improvements which that body wished
to see, as well as consolidating all the existing legislation. This
was an admission that what the planters wanted was unlikely to be
forthcoming from the government.
Despite agitation, the government remained quite adamant that the
police force should not be used for the execution of the warrants.
Berwick defended this line of action to Morgan by pointing out how
seriously this work had hampered the regular duties of the police
25
force in the past. Nor was there any question of peons being paid
by the government to execute warrants unless a scheme could be organ¬
ised whereby the districts could be assessed to provide the necessary
finance. The planters' problems could certainly be solved in this
way but they would have to bear the cost themselves. This was not
at all what the Planters' Association wanted. It was clear that the
Association felt that, as the government had accepted responsibility
for ensuring that warrants were executed in the past, there was no
reason why it should not continue to do so.
24
Resolution 4, Annual General Meeting of the Planters' Association,
17 February 1864, reported in the Observer, 18 February 1864.
25
Letter from Berwick to Morgan, published in the Observer, 30 May
1864.
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It is perhaps unfortunate that the main participants in the dis¬
pute in opposition to the Planters' Association were Morgan and Berwick,
both prominent members of the Burgher community. They were supported
26
by the Burgher owned and edited Examiner. The European owned Ceylon
Times and Observer predictably showed themselves much more sympathetic
to the planting case. In this way, the affair could only increase the
divisions which already existed between the Burgher and planting classes.
Unfortunately, there was yet another aspect of the labour laws
question upon which the government proved, in planting eyes, most un¬
cooperative. This concerned the employment status of the coolie, that
is,whether he was employed as a dai ly or as a monthly worker. Con¬
siderable dissatisfaction existed with the ordinance of 1841, the Master
and Servants Law, which covered the question. The Planters' Associa-
27
tion requested an investigation into its workings. The main conces¬
sion which the planters sought was to have the coolie regarded as a
monthly and not a daily worker in the future. This, revealingly, was
not to extend to the field of pay, where the coolie would be paid, as
in the past, on a daily basis. What was hoped for from the proposed
change was that the coolie would become legally obliged to give a
month's notice of his intention to leave an estate, whereas the law as
established by ordinance 5 of 1841, required only a week's notice. The
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The Examiner stated categorically that 'no reasonable man who
knows anything of the Planting Districts, can doubt the substantial
truth of Mr. Berwick's statements.' It went on to ask, 'Whence this
tender regard for the Planter? Is it because he is a superior
being dearer to us than the liberty and comfort of a
few thousand coolies.' 1 August 1863.
27
Resolution 8, General Meeting, 25 May 1863. PA Proceedings,
1863.
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existing law was much resented by the planters who considered it unjust
that they were required to give a month's notice to their coolies. The
discontent was greatly increased when the Queen's Advocate announced
28
that he considered a coolie who did not work out the 'advance' which
he had received from an employer, was not guilty of theft. To make
matters worse, the Colonial Secretary himself announced that he did not
29
consider 'advances' to be legally binding on the coolies. These two
opinions caused grave concern to the planters,striking, as they did, at
their most vulnerable point, their hold over their labour force.
The negotiations between the Association and the government over
the proposed new labour laws dragged on interminably, souring relations
between them for years. This alone would explain why the planters
felt themselves to be under attack from the government in the early
1860s. It is clear also, from a study of the question of the unoffi¬
cial Justices and the controversy over the surpluses, that there was a
basic lack of symapthy between the two bodies at the time. This pro¬
vides the setting for an examination of the attitude adopted by the
Planters' Association to the military expenditure question, and helps,
perhaps, to explain whythe Association's actions on that subject were
so limited.
It has been suggested that the Planters' Association felt itself
alienated from the government in the early 1860s and had some reason
28
'Advances were paid to the coolies before they commenced work, and
were nothing more than payment in advance.
29
Both these pronouncements were referred to in Brown's speech at
the Planters' Association meeting of 5 September 1863, reported in
the Observer, 10 September 1863.
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to feel that the interests of the planters were regarded with some¬
thing less than concern by the local administration. This, and the
conservative attitude of the new leaders of the Association, may
account for the apparent lack of response to the military expenditure
question. Although the Association expressed its views quite loudly
on topics of immediate interest to the planting community, its voice
on subjects of wider interest was strangely muted. Partly, this
stemmed from the belief that the Association should not publicly in¬
volve itself in matters which were not of obvious concern to its mem¬
bers, that is, the predominance of the views of Bird, Leake and Harri¬
son over those of the men of wider outlook, such as Alexander Brown.
It was also partly the result of lack of success in the representations
made on those subjects which were of direct concern to the planters.
The subject of military expenditure t~as not ignored completely
however. The statement by Fortescue in the Commons in March 1863
that Ceylon should be called upon to pay an increased proportion of
her military costs, caused great alarm among the planters, and an Asso-
30
ciation meeting was held at which the matter was discussed. A reso¬
lution was passed requesting that no heavier burden should be imposed
on the Colony on account of military expenditure until the existing
military expenditure had been enquired into, and a decision reached as
to what proportion of the force now maintained in Ceylon was necessary
^The General Meeting was held on 25 May 1863 and details are avail¬
able in the PA Proceedings for 1863. It is interesting to note
that at this meeting Wall put forward a resolution that 'The very
serious alternative of annexation to India was now held over their
heads, and he doubted whether it would not be expedient that we
should quietly pay what was asked.' In the light of Wall's later
conduct, this was a surprising idea.
for the purposes of internal security. A Memorial was drawn up sub¬
sequently which provides a good account of the views of the Association
on the question.3*
The Memorial began by stating that any increased demands made to
Ceylon would be both unjust and impolitic. It then attempted to
answer the arguments advanced by those in England who wished to see
the colony pay an increased share of the burden. The Imperial view¬
point was that the forces stationed in the island were there for the
purpose of maintaining internal law and order, but the Memorial empha¬
sised that the colony was distinguished both by the orderly behaviour
and the loyalty of its inhabitants and that such a force was not needed
for the preservation of local peace. The force stationed in Ceylon
was nearly as large as that maintained in the whole of Canada, and the
obvious conclusion seemed to be that the troops were not there for in¬
ternal security. The Memorialists were convinced that both Galle and
Trincomalee were Imperial stations. Until fairly recently, they felt,
this fact had been accepted in London also. It therefore seemed only
just that if Ceylon were to be asked to pay an increased part, or even
the whole of her military expenditure, an attempt should be made to as¬
certain what proportion of the total expenditure related to colonial
and what to Inperial defence.
It was often claimed in London that the colonial Treasury did not
pay its fair share of the costs; the Memorial continued by examining
this argument. The Report of the 1861 Commons Select Committee on
Military Expenditure was quoted, especially the reference to the fact
31C054/377/123 21 July 1863.
that Ceylon paid about £25,000 per annum more than any other colony
toward her military expenditure, despite being by no means the largest
or wealthiest of colonies. 'not only does Ceylon contribute absolu-
prv&
tely more than her,wealthy fellows' the Memorial continued, 'but the
proportion which her contribution bears to the Imperial
greater than the same proportion in any other (polony, save Victoria
32
alone.' In these circumstances^it seemed clear to the Memorialists
that a request for further payment from Ceylon would be grossly inequi¬
table if made purely on the grounds that the colony could afford to
pay it, for 'it can hardly be argued that an over flowing Revenue, how¬
ever great might be its wealth, would afford a just ground for increas-
33
ing the already disproportionate burden.'
There was no question of leaving the argument here, however.
Having proved, to their own satisfaction, that no further increase
could justly be demanded, even if Ceylon's Exchequer were over-flowing,
the Memorialists then sought to disprove the existence of any such sur¬
plus. This was really the crux of their argument, and, they judged,
was more likely to appeal to the Colonial Office than any simple argu¬
ment of equity. The colony was engaged, it was pointed out, in the
construction of a railway for which a massive debt had been incurred.
The main argument, however, was that the money lying in the colonial
Treasury was the result 'not of the elasticity of the Revenue or the
prosperity of the country, but of a strict economy in expenditure on
the part of the Government, owing to which private enterprise has already





suffered considerable loss.' In other words, the money was needed
in the colony and any further appropriation by the Imperial authori¬
ties would cripple the colony.
This was the case advanced by the Planters' Association. It is
noticeable that no attention was given to the constitutional aspect,
and the lack of Legislative Council control over the military expendi¬
ture was not mentioned in the Memorial. Instead, the argument con¬
centrated on the fact that the colony could not afford to pay more
tcward military costs because of the existence of severe wants within
the island. It is scarcely surprising that the succeeding months saw
a proliferation of complaints about the state of roads and other pub¬
lic works.
Unfortunately, as the subject was under examination in the Colo¬
nial Office, no answer was sent to this Memorial. Instead, it was
hoped that the main despatch to be sent on the question would answer
all the various objections. The absence of any response from London
exacerbated feelings and the Planters' Association leadership decided
to call for a public meeting to be held on the subject. This is indic¬
ative of both the concern felt by individual planters on the subject
and the reluctance of the leadership to become too closely involved in
the issue. A public meeting therefore provided the best solution.
The Association actually took no further direct action on the matter
whatsoever, although several of its members, as individuals, continued
to stress the need to expend the surplus funds. Leake, himself, made
35
an appeal to the government at the meeting in November 1863, asking
34C054/377/123 21 July 1863.
35
Report of meeting at Kandy in Observer, 26 November 1863.
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that the balances be voted away by aiding immigration, roads and the
railway. He would, in fact, have been prepared to see the money de¬
voted to almost any project rather than see it go to the Imperial au¬
thorities. Further than these requests to invest more heavily in
enterprises which would assist the plantation economy, the Association
was not prepared to go. Despite its criticisms of the government, it
was unwilling to consider any action which might seem to bring it into
outright opposition to the administration, when its real desire was to
work with the Governor as his counsellor behind the scenes.
At no time was the innate conservatism of the Planters' Associa¬
tion leadership better illustrated than after the resignation of the
unofficials from the Legislative Council and the formation of the Ceylon
League. Bird wrote to the Observer in August 1865, totally denying
36
the justice of the case put forward by the League. In Bird's view,
the Council had no rights or privileges other than those which were con¬
ceded to it, and it had no claim to be regarded as a representative body.
His opinion was that Grey in his famous despatches, had merely sketched
out a desirable plan, but had not made any binding promise. Anyway,
Grey's aims would be achieved by the Colonial Office proposals which
were outlined in Cardwell's despatch, so no complaints about the consti¬
tutional situation seemed justified. The dilemma of men such as Bird
is clearly seen in this letter; he was no less opposed to an increased
military contribution than was anyone else, and he agreed that demands
for the increased amount were obnoxious. However, he regarded the
situation as a purely temporary one, since it was known that an enquiry
"^Observer, 14 August 1865.
ass
was to follcw. His real grievance was not based on constitutional
grounds, but on the belief that the demand for an increased contribu¬
tion had been made solely because of the existence of surpluses. He
disliked and feared the fact that much of the outright opposition to
the increased military payment appeared to be inexorably linked with
demands for increased powers to the Legislative Council, and perhaps
even for the concession of an unofficial majority. This seemed to
him to be a fearful prospect. 'Better have no Legislative Council,'
he wrote, 'than one with such a majority - composed of such men as we
are likely to get - difficult enough as it is to get men of influence
and respect.'37
Many of Bird's arguments were repeated by W. Martin Leake, in res¬
ponse to a request for his signature on a petition supporting the
Ceylon League. The fear of even a small step on the road to repres-
38
entative government was to the fore in his reply. The general
public of Ceylon, he felt, was clearly unfit for anything approaching
a representative system, and although it might appear that the European
population had much to gain from constitutional change, he believed
that 'even to these the gain of greater power would be more than com-
39
pensated by the weakening of the Governor's position.' Hie situa¬
tion which he wished to avoid was one where the spending power of an
active Governor was restricted, for he felt that a generous Governor
was the greatest good that could befall the island and the best check
37
Observer, 14 August 1865.
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Leake's letter was published in the Observer, 18 September 1865.
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Ibid.
cn the arbitrary power of the Secretary of State. This argument was
greatly reinforced by the arrival in the colony of Sir Hercules Robin-
40
son, who had won fame in Hong Kong for his stand against the Home
Government over the question of military expenditure and who gave
every sign of being an extremely satisfactory Governor.
How far the views of the leadership of the Planters* Association
were actually representative of its members, is, of course, a matter
for speculation. The number of those who attended committee and even
general meetings has been shown to have been small. Nevertheless, it
seems clear that a substantial amount of opposition did exist within
the Association to the leadership of Messrs Bird, Leake and Harrison.
The Association had been divided over Wall's resignation from the Leg¬
islative Council in 1855^ when some members had condemned the Council as
a farce. Division had also occurred over moves to make property the
basis of menfoership of the body. It seems highly likely that those
who opposed proposals to limit membership were the people who wished to
see the Association take a more active political role. The split
within the Association was apparent when it was asked to approve the
Manifesto of the Caylon League. The view of the leaders was that the
planters should not be concerned with such matters but several well-
known planters disagreed, and instead supported Brown's contention that
40
Born in 1824, Robinson made his first career in the army but he
retired from this in 1846 and accepted a colonial appointment in the
West Indies. He was appointed governor of Hong Kong in 1859 and of
Ceylon in 1865, going on to become governor of New South Wales in
1872, of New Zealand in 1878 and High Commissioner of South Africa
in 1880. He was created Baron Posmead in 1896 and died in 1897.
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the Association should not stand aloof. W.A. Pose, W.A. Swan,
P.D. Millie, W.F. Lindesay, J. Steele, and J.F. Mcleod were all com¬
mittee members who became involved in the work of the League, organ¬
ising district committees in their area as they had once done for the
Planters* Association. Many other well-known names threw their weight
behind the League - Hay, Van Langenburg and Ferdinands all saw the
League as a body which could achieve all that the Planters* Associa¬
tion had ever tried to do and more besides. Hay argued very forcibly
at a meeting in Kandy that the Association had always been a political
body and therefore had no reason to recoil at the idea of supporting
the League. 'Has it not,' he asked with reference to the Association,
'on every occasion and wherever opportunity offered, expressed its views
upon the conduct of the Government in general and its members in par¬
ticular? ... Have we not spoken frequently in rather umneasurable lang-
42
uage of the acts of a roost inefficient Governor.' This was only
partly the truth, however, for though the Association had criticised
the government during MacCarthy's administration, it had never seriously
o
contemplated any form of government other than the one in operation.
The leadership of the Planters' Association found itself in a most
difficult position over the military expenditure question. The
leaders were convinced that their strength lay in the unofficial influ¬
ence which they could bring to bear on the Governor. They were thus
41
Brown moved a resolution supporting the League at a Planters'
Association meeting in July 1865. He argued that the League 'pro¬
fesses to do the same work as the Association has been doing for
many years, but it will do it more efficiently because it will be
more powerful and more wealthy.' Observer, 24 July 1865.
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Peport in PA Proceedings, 1865 of meeting on 19 July.
unwilling to bring about any reduction in the power of the Governor.
Nor did they see how this could be done without increasing the power
of the Burgher community or some other sections of the indigenous
population, which would have the effect of lessening the influence of
the planting interest. At the same time, they were more critical of
MacCarthy than anyone else. They sensed that his administration was
hostile to planters as a class and they resented the fact that they
did not wield the influence with him for which they hoped. Further¬
more, his policies had led to the accumulation of surpluses which they
felt might have been better spent in the interests of the planting
community. Instead, the surplus funds had occasioned the demands of
the Home Government. The departure of MacCarthy and his subsequent
death, meant that his administration could be attacked with impunity.
However, the arrival of Robinson, the new Governor in the colony,
raised hopes that a new era was imminent and guaranteed that the weight
of the Association leadership would be thrown against the claims of
the Ceylon League when the need arose.
2.5°)
Conclusion
An attempt has been made to examine two of the most controversial
subjects which arose in Ceylon during the years 1855-65, from the
viewpoint of four of the agencies involved. The choice of these
agencies is a somewhat subjective one. It could be argued that the
Chanfoer of Commerce had played an important role in bringing steam
communications to Ceylon and thus deserves consideration. Whilst its
part in the railway question is undeniable, it is clear that on the
military expenditure issue the Chamber was largely silent. Much
attention has also been devoted to the Planters' Association and
it is not claimed that this Association was in any way representative
of planting views as a whole - indeed quite the reverse has been sug¬
gested - the attention paid to the views of the Association is a re¬
flection of the disproportionate importance which it commanded at the
time. Whilst it is not claimed that an examination of events through
studies of the actions of the Governor, the Colonial Office, the Leg¬
islative Council and the Planters' Association provides a complete
picture, it is contended that such studies contribute at least a very
substantial part of the story.
As was intimated earlier, the character of the Governor could play
a vital role in determining how the system functioned. Ward was an
independently-minded Governor. He had a successful parliamentary
career behind him and possessed a name well known outside colonial ser¬
vice circles. lie therefore had the stature to risk incurring the dis¬
pleasure of the Colonial Office. This he did, for example, in defend¬
ing Doyne and criticising Strachey in 1859. Charles MacCarthy was a
very different kind of Governor. A man whose entire livelihood depen-
X60
ded on the good office of the Secretary of State, he was the complete
servant of the Colonial Office. At no time was this more apparent
than in his warm reception of Newcastle's plan for an increased mili¬
tary contribution. Again, whilst Ward was an impetuous and impulsive
man, lavish in both praise and criticism, MacCarthy was more prudent
and moderate in his opinions. There seems little dcubt that Ward
wished to make a name for himself as the instigator of the railway
plan and that he rushed enthusiastically into the Company scheme with
all too little thought for the consequences or heed for the opposition.
Hence it was left to MacCarthy, who had opposed the Company scheme from
the first, to effect a solution and see the railway plan come to frui¬
tion. Moreover, it seems clear that despite the popularity of many of
Ward's actions, his somewhat arbitrary methods viover military allow¬
ances for example, caused irritations with which his successor had to
deal.
The merits of the two Governorships cannot, of course, be judged
merely on the evidence presented by a study of only two aspects of
their respective administrations. It is worth noting, however, that
contemporaries in the Colonial Office were as lavish in their praise
of MacCarthy as colonists were generally loud in their criticisms.
Clearly, financial policy lay at the root of the problem and MacCarthy
was faced with having to settle both the railway and military expendi¬
ture questions during his tenure of office. There is much to indi¬
cate that a reappraisal of MacCarthy's administration is necessary and
a wealth of material exists on MacCarthy's life and his long period of
office in Ceylon, suggesting that much could be learnt of the colonial
administration from a study of his career.
Neither of these Governors was a particularly outstanding inter¬
mediary between the colony and the Colonial Office. In Ward's case,
his own views and ambitions were too strong to allow him to present
the opinions made known to him in Ceylon in a totally unbiased light.
MacCarthy, on the contrary, lacked the independence of mind to do this.
These traits were rendered the more important by the attitude of the
Colonial Office to the main problems experienced by each Governor.
Officials in Downing Street could not, and did not, assume a dominant
position in the actual formulation of policy on the railway. This
was simply because it was not an issue in which they had any real
interest. It did not much matter to the Colonial Office what arrange¬
ments were made since the expense was to fall on the colonial rather
than the Imperial Treasury. At the same time; officials were willing
to undertake whatever was required of them by way of negotiations in
London and the Secretary of State certainly wished to see the best pos¬
sible terms secured for the colony. Since the Colonial Office had no
direct interest in the question, officials were anxious that the wishes
of the articulate members of the colonial population should be heard
and heeded as it was the residents of the island who wanted and were to
pay for the railway. Here, the system faltered a little because the
only means by which information could be transmitted from the colony to
the Colonial Office was through the medium of the Governor. On the
railway issue, the Governor himself had very strong views and he threw
his weight forcefully behind the project, in the hope that it could be
completed during his tenure of office. Hence the views of those who
opposed the scheme were not always given the emphasis which they deserved
in despatches to London and Ward tried to explain away some opinions
contrary to his own as being those of people with no real interest in
the future of the colony. Even MacCarthy's views were described as
an attempt to win popularity or to illustrate the Colonial Secretary's
importance to Ward. The Governor, undoubtedly, did not sufficiently
stress the importance of the resolutions of the Legislative and Execu¬
tive Councils when these were forwarded to England in August 1855.
Osit?.■ the military question, on the contrary, the Colonial Office
adopted a masterful attitude. This was because officials were obli¬
ged by pressures upon them from the Treasury and War Office, to impose
policy rather than merely to act as a background check, as had been the
case over the railway. The problems which the Colonial Office en¬
countered in attempting to impose this policy indicate very clearly the
difficulties of ruling from Downing Street. Not only was this unpop¬
ular in theory in the colony, but coincidences, such as the enforced
departure of the Governor at a critical moment, could make a great
difference to the presentation of policy.
Perhaps the most striking single feature to emerge in the Colonial
Office during this period is the important role played by William
Strachey, the precis writer. Although his post in the Office did not
give him the authority to formulate general lines of policy, he was in¬
creasingly looked to for advice, as his knowledge of the colony increased.
His application to the complex problems first of the railway, and later
military expenditure, meant that he was virtually the decision-reaiker on
these subjects in the Colonial Office. Whether he enjoyed a similar
position with regard to other topics in which he specialised, such as
the Newfoundland Fisheries, is a subject for future investigation.
The Secretaries of State, of course, exercised the ultimate power
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over policy making, even if Strachey's general views were usually the
major influencing factor. A key point here was the lack of consis¬
tency ensuing from the many changes in the tenure of this office
around 1055. This was a vital time in the history of the railway and
rapid changes in the holder of the Secretaryship helped to make Colo¬
nial Office policy appear weak and vacillating. Newcastle, for exam¬
ple, had a much more strict view of the terms which should be obtained
from the Ceylon Railway Company than Labouchere, one of his succes¬
sors. Similarly, Molesworth viewed the possibility of an export duty
on coffee alone much more favourably than did Labouchere.
The Legislative Council was the body which brought official mem¬
bers of the government and members of the public together to debate
matters of importance and to pass legislative measures. On neither
the railway nor the military question, however, was there a significant
divergence of opinion between the views of the officials and those of
the unofficial members of the Council. On a free vote, as has been
shown, MacCarthy opposed the Company scheme>which was supported by the
Governor, as forcibly as did most of the unofficials. Later, over the
increased military contribution, the undoubted leader of the group in
opposition to this on the Legislative Council was the Colonial Secre¬
tary, W.C. Gibson.
The Legislative Council signally failed to exercise, any real check
on the actions of the Governor. Its opportunities for debate were too
limited and the members too internally divided for this to be possible.
When conditions for the construction of the railway were laid down by
the Council in 1055, they were largely ignored because the Governor
failed to emphasise thnir importance to the Colonial Office. It is
true that the Council was able to arrive at a decision as to whether
or not the railway contract should be annulled, but that was a simple
matter of saying yea or nay. The confusion which had occurred in
1859^when the future of the railway was placed before the Council and
a Report and Resolutions were passed which were mutually contradic¬
tory, indicatedthe difficulties of allowing the Legislative Council a
truly constructive role.
The degree of influence which the unofficials were able to exer¬
cise was minimal. Their great successes came in the early 1860s when
they lent their support to the moves initiated by Gibson over military
expenditure. They were able to express dissatisfaction with MacCar-
thy's Governorship, it is true, by the insertion of a new clause in the
reply to O'Brien's Address in 1864, but this was possible only because
of the absence from the Council on that day of certain of the official
mentoers. It was, furthermore, the action of a group of individuals
which had clearly made no realistic appraisal of their own position.
To alienate the official members in this way severely lessened the pos¬
sibility of realising any constructive achievement over the military
question. Finally, the very act of resignation symbolis_ed a total
lack of understanding of the constitutional system, for instead of
bringing the administration to its knees, the Council merely continued
throughout the session without the services of the unofficials and new
members were later appointed.
The Planters' Association, though formed in on3y 1854, soon achie¬
ved a certain prominence by virtue of being one of the two major perma¬
nent organisations representing commercial opinion in the island. As
such, it was consulted, particularly over the railway, to a far greater
degree than its size merited. It could never claim to represent the
majority of planters in the Central Province but, because it was a per¬
manent and organised body, it was easier for the government to consult
with its leaders than to attenpt to draw upon the views of individual
planters.
The political importance of the Association, however, was limited
because of the narrowness of its outlook. The members were generally
concerned only with the planting industry and with those issues which
had a direct bearing on their own prosperity. From the time of its
foundation, the Association was divided between those who felt its
energies should be concentrated exclusively on planting matters and
those who were prepared to see it undertake a slightly wider role.
Increasingly, the organisation became dominated by a small group,
based in Kandy, who belonged to the first of these categories. There¬
fore, whilst the body had been fairly active in putting forward its
views on the construction of the railway, even though these views were
subject to fluctuations as planting conditions changed, over the mili¬
tary issue the Association had little to offer.
The appointment of MacCarthy as Governor pushed the Association
from its favoured position, but its leaders, nevertheless, could not
bring themselves to join the ranks of those critical of the constitu¬
tional system. These men were far too conservative to wish to help
to bring about an increase in the unofficial representation on the
Legislative Council, which might open the gates to increased numbers
of Burghers, Tamils and Sinhalese. This was what they most feared.
Instead, they harked back to what they saw as the golden age of Ward's
Governorship during which, they felt, they had been accorded their
rightful place in the Councils of the Governor.
The two major issues which have been examined have indicated that
the administrative system did not always function as smoothly or as
efficiently as might have been the case. In the light of what has
been shown of the difficulties of reconciling the views of the agen¬
cies involved, and the very complexity of the problems encountered,
the shortcomings of the system are surely less worthy of remark than




The decision by both the Company's Resident Engineer and the
Agent in Ceylon to make private approaches to contractors was taken
soon after the arrival of Beeston, the Agent, in the colony in Febru¬
ary 1859. Beeston was soon aware of the lack of progress on the line,
and, like Doyne, he came to blame the situation on the Company manage¬
ment in London. The two men decided the existing system of adminis¬
tration could never be made to work efficiently and the only hope for
the future of the railway (and their own jobs) lay in turning the work
over to a contractor. It is not clear at what stage Doyne realised
the cost of the line would be so far in excess of Moorsom's estimate.
Certainly, he gave no indication to the Governor until late April 1859
that his estimate would exceed £2,000,000. It seems probable, however,
that Doyne's suspicions of hew high his final estimate would be were
another contributory factor to his wish to come to an arrangement with
a contractor, and his estimate was known to include an allowance for a
profit of fifteen to twenty per cent for a contractor. He may have
feared that such a high estimate, coupled with the administrative dif¬
ficulties already encountered would make it impossible for the Company
to continue the project and so hoped that such a decision on the part
of the Company would be forestalled by the revelation that a reputable
contractor had already agreed to undertake the work.
Doyne, Beeston and Fitzgibbon all made approaches to different
contractors, but it was the letter from Fitzgibbon to Ogilvie, a part¬
ner of Thomas Brassey, which caused the ensuing trouble for all three.
The original letter written by Fitzgibbon was destroyed by Ogilvie but
not before it had been seen by several persons. One of the men who
saw it later wrote of it to Gregory, 'The impression produced on my
mind by this letter was that an unjustifiable job was being got up,
that the prices of the Estimates were kept up unduly for a corrupt
motive and that Mr. Fitzgibbon was fully aware of the jobbery and
also bad faith to you and the Co. in secretly corresponding with a Con¬
tractor or he would not have made so certain of his dismissal should
the fact of his having written the letter come to light'.* Another
viewer described the general tenor of the letter as appearing 'to be
a desire to prove to Mr. Ogilvie that the Company's servants in Ceylon
wished to make arrangements with him for the Contract, more favourable
than he would get through the Co.'s Rep. in England, and secresy [sic]
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in Mr. Ogilvie's enquiries was urged as necessary'.
Fitzgibbon later made a statement to the Board of the Company in
which he claimed that he had been informed by Doyne and Beeston that
the Governor was aware of the approaches to the contractors and fully
approved. He had done nothing more, he argued, than obey the orders
of his superiors to contact Ogilvie, whom he already knew. He admit¬
ted, however, to having written that if the contents of the letter
became public he would be dismissed and this indicates his awareness
of the fact that the Board in London had not authorised the approaches.
He also conceded that he had advised Brassey and Company to send their
agent to Ceylon by a circuitous route, so that no-one would suspect
that tenders had been invited.
^"Letter from T.O. Donaldson of the Dorset Railway Engineer's Office,
Blandford, to Gregory, 14 January 1860. Reproduced in C054/3S6 11
February.
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Letter from F.R. Window to Gregory, dated 26 January 1860, repro¬
duced in C054/356 11 January 1860.
The letter from Fitzgibbon did not remain confidential for long.
It was shown first to Albinus Martin, Ogilvie's father-in-law, and
then by him to his friend, Charles Gregory, the Company's Consulting
■O
Engineer, whom Martim assumed would be fully conversant with its con¬
tents. Gregory, having been shown the letter in confidence was un¬
able to inform the Board of its contents but instead advised them to
ask for tenders themselves, in order to forestall Doyne's move. Ulti¬
mately, Gregory did inform the Board of his discovery, but the Board,
in dispensing with Doyne's services, chose not to make public the
reason behind their action. It was not until January 1860 that Doyne,
hearing rumours that he was considered to have engaged in illicit com¬
munications with contractors, approached the Company. There followed
a series of accusations and counter-accusations which faded into obscu¬
rity when a legal ruling was made forbidding Beeston to publish the
contents of secret letters between himself and Anstruther, the Chair¬
man of the Company, which he had claimed would throw further light on
the situation.
The defence offered by Doyne and Beeston was simply that in making
advances to contractors and encouraging Fitzgibbon to do so, they were
doing no more than was authorised by their official instructions. It
seems clear that this was not the case. There is little doubt the
contracts envisaged by the Instructions were no more than minor local
contracts for small earthworks. In any case^the same instructions
clearly specified that the Board should be kept informed of all actions
taken touching on the interests of the Company. This Doyne undoubted¬
ly did nbt do. On 16 January 1860, the Board wrote to him asking why
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his Reports contained no reference to his attempts to contact firms,
but no satisfactory reply was ever received."*
Doyne claimed that he had acted within his powers and for the
good of the Company and colony. He argued that he had wished to
avoid a public advertisement for tenders which would inevitably attract
the attention of disreputable contractors. Furthermore, he hoped that
by his method, a firm could be found who would be willing to send out
an agent to tender at their own expense^ whereas any public advertise¬
ment for tenders would have to be accompanied by a statement of will¬
ingness on the part of the Company to pay expenses. This is a far
*
from convincing argument. Had this been the case, there would have
been no reason for Doyne not to disclose the contacts with Brassey and
Company when the Company did publicly invite tenders in June 1859.
Instead at this time^he wrote to Gregory, in what can only be interpre¬
ted as an attempt to dissuade him from the idea of contractors, saying
that in his view the time was not yet ripe for the employment of con¬
tractors. It is difficult to believe that any desire for the good of
the Company or colony could have justified this deliberate deceit.
3
C054/356 11 February, letter from Board to Doyne, written on 16
January.
Appendix 2
Agitation in London on the Railway Question
Agitation on the railway question was not confined to Ceylon.
In London were found not only many representatives of mercantile houses
with substantial interests in Ceylon but also a continuous transient
population of planters and merchants home on leave from the colony.
Many members of this latter group were as deeply involved in the out¬
come of the project as those who remained in Ceylon. The former were,
potentially, a most important group, being permanently resident in
London and being, in many cases, well-known figures in the commercial
world. They had more opportunity of exercising influence with the
Colonial Office than had individual planters. However^they were
clearly a far from cohesive body, their interests in Ceylon varying
considerably in size and they were inevitably divided over many issues.
Not only was considerable apathy exhibited by many over the Ceylon
railway but there also existed a lack of leadership and mutual trust,
inevitable amongst firms which might be considered rivals.
Christopher Elliott arrived in London in late 1855 and set out to
arouse interest in the railway question and to provide the leadership
which had previously been lacking. He was, of course, a staunch
opponent of the Conpany scheme. He described the existing situation
in a report for the Observer in February 1856s 'There is however, so
much distrust of each other amongst them (Ceylon people) and so much
indifference, that strange as it may appear - I seem to be the only
neutral point around which they can meet and co-operate; and as they
say themselves, when I am gone ... this great question upon which the
prosperity or failure of the Colony depends - will ... be abandoned to
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its fate.'^" Elliott was able to remain in London until the end of
March 1856, and during that time he used all his fire and enthusiasm
to try to involve all those with interests in Ceylon in his campaign.
Some indication of the amount of work involved is given in a letter
which he wrote in March 1856 where he described how 'the labour and
excitement have been so great that I seldom get to sleep before 3 or
2
4 o'clock in the morning.'
It proved impossible, however, to organise any anti-Company party
as strong as that which existed in Ceylon. Worries regarding labour,
fares and tolls inevitably made less impact on mercantile men in London
than those more immediately concerned with planting in Ceylon. Simi¬
larly, proximity to the directors of the Company and the fact that they
were nearly all well-known figures in the London commercial and finan¬
cial world, clearly made outright opposition to them more difficult.
As time went by, it also became more apparent that the Colonial Office
and Ceylon Railway Company were deeply involved in negotiations. It
therefore became necessary for Elliott and his supporters to modify
their opposition to the Company and endeavour rather to secure the
best possible terms for the colony, than to oppose the Company scheme
in its entirety. It was in this sense that Elliott's London campaign
differed from the outright opposition of the Observer in Ceylon.
The first London meeting of those with interests in Ceylon was
held in December 1855 and was attended largely by the uncommitted and
by those hostile to the Company. A Minute of opinion signed by such
^"Observer. 28 February 1856.
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Observer, 12 March 1856 (Supplement)^ oC io rebco^j.
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influential names as Baring Brothers, J.M. Robertson, Arbuthnot,
Latham and Company, and R.D. Gerard resulted and was presented to the
Secretary of State.^ The Address began by stating that the signators
considered the best course of action would be for the Ceylon government
to raise the money required for construction by loan, and to employ
contractors to undertake the work. Having said this, the Address
turned to the terms mooted with regard to the Ceylon Railway Company,
pleading against a guarantee of over a £1,000,000 and emphasising the
need to bind the Company to a specific cost and a definite time for
completion of the work.
In the face of this opposition, the Company supporters were not
idle, however; Hastie and Anstruther lunched with Labouchere on 22
January and just over a week later, on 30 January, the morning of the
next general meeting about the railway, the Company published its offi¬
cial prospectus. This hasty move was not favourably viewed at the
Colonial Office, but largely secured the Company's aim of frightening
off other Companies whicb had been showing signs of interest in the
project.
The meeting of 30 January was attended not only by those with
reservations about the Company but also by many of its supporters, in¬
cluding the Company's Deputy Chairman, Philip Anstruther. Chaired by
Viscount Torrington, the meeting appointed Elliott as its Secretary,
thus achieving a combination which would have seemed out of the ques¬
tion only a few years previously. The general tenor of this meeting
was favourable to the Company. By this time, Jolly had come round to
^Observer, 14 January 1856.
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the idea of Company construction and Anstruther stressed that the Com¬
pany was intended to be little more than a means by which the colony
might raise the necessary money. The meeting appointed a delegation
to visit Labouchere with the object of acquiring up to date information
on the attitude of the Colonial Office. It is apparent that of this
five-man delegation, only two, Elliott and Hay Cameron, were firmly
opposed to the scheme. The deputation met the Secretary of State on
18 February 1856, at which time Labouchere announced that he was still
far from decided as to the best course to be pursued.
A third public meeting was held in late February. According to
Elliott's account, the Ceylon proprietors at this gathering were com¬
pletely outnumbered by Railway Company officials and those connected
with the Oriental Bank which Elliott claimed was closely associated
4
with the Company. Many Company shareholders, including Cooper, the
Company Secretary, claimed the right to vote and this request was
granted by Elphinstone, who was in the Chair. When J.M. Robertson
and Elliott put forward a resolution favouring a loan and the enploy-
mant of a contractor, it was heavily defeated.
This, in effect, marked the end of Elliott's attempt to rally
opposition in London against the Ceylon Railway Company. His motiva¬
tion is open to some question. Whilst on the one hand, the consis¬
tency of his anti-Company stance is indisputable, it is unclear whether
this was due to genuine belief, or whether he saw the railway as yet
another cause over which he could rally dissidents against the Colo¬
nial government. This latter possibility seems unlikely, however.
4
Report in Observer, 31 March 1856.
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both because of the nature of his activities and because they were
concurrent with his application to become Principal Civil Medical
Officer for the colony. In fact, his ultimate appointment to this
post suggests that his days of direct anti-government activity had
ceased.
There remains to be considered, nevertheless, his relationship
with Jackson, the railway contractor who submitted a tender for the
construction of the line, which was strongly supported by Elliott.
The two men had originally made contact through an engineer employed
by Jackson with whom Elliott travelled to England in 1855. This
third party induced Jackson to submit a tender, and it was suggested
by some in Colombo that Elliott stood to benefit considerably by his
appointment as Jackson's manager if this tender were accepted. The
tender related to the seventy miles of Drane's line and a precise sum,
£809,000, was quoted, which, it was projected, would be paid in seven-
year bonds at five per cent interest. Ward, however, criticised
this tender as being based on insufficient information since Jackson
had gained details only by telegraph. It is clear that, despite
Elliott's support, this proposal was never seriously considered.
Whether the strength of Elliott's opposition to the Ceylon Railway
Company was increased by the fact that he may have stood to gain if
Jackson's tender were accepted, is not clear. It is certain, however,
that this does not account for his original opposition to the Company
s cheme.
Although Elliott's attempt to influence the Colonial Office
against the Company scheme failed, the campaign which he mounted in
London and the meetings which were held, may well have played a useful
part in securing for the colony more advantageous terras than might
otherwise have been the case. Had no opponents of the Coupany raised
their voices in London, the contract might have been even less favour¬
able to the colony. Unfortunately, in the face of the Governor's
support for the scheme, this opposition could achieve little.
I'll
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